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Abstract
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Con-
structive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition
of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins [BTT92]. Destructive control refers to attempts
by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate’s victory [HHR07a]. An election system in
which an agent can sometimes affect the result and it can be determined in polynomial time on which inputs
the agent can succeed is said to be vulnerable to the given type of control. An election system in which an
agent can sometimes affect the result, yet in which it is NP-hard to recognize the inputs on which the agent
can succeed, is said to be resistant to the given type of control.
Aside from election systems with an NP-hard winner problem, the only systems previously known to
be resistant to all the standard control types were highly artificial election systems created by hybridiza-
tion [HHR07b]. This paper studies a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copelandα ,
where the parameter α is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise
comparisons of candidates. In every previously studied constructive or destructive control scenario, we deter-
mine which of resistance or vulnerability holds for Copelandα for each rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In particular,
we prove that Copeland0.5, the system commonly referred to as “Copeland voting,” provides full resistance
to constructive control, and we prove the same for Copelandα , for all rational α , 0 < α < 1. Among systems
with a polynomial-time winner problem, Copeland voting is the first natural election system proven to have
full resistance to constructive control. In addition, we prove that both Copeland0 and Copeland1 (interest-
ingly, Copeland1 is an election system developed by the thirteenth-century mystic Ramon Llull) are resistant
to all standard types of constructive control other than one variant of addition of candidates. Moreover, we
show that for each rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα voting is fully resistant to bribery attacks, and we
establish fixed-parameter tractability of bounded-case control for Copelandα .
We also study Copelandα elections under more flexible models such as microbribery and extended con-
trol, we integrate the potential irrationality of voter preferences into many of our results, and we prove our
results in both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. Our vulnerability results for
microbribery are proven via a novel technique involving min-cost network flow.
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1
1 Introduction
1.1 Some Historical Remarks: Llull’s and Copeland’s Election Systems
Elections have played an important role in human societies for thousands of years. For example, elections
were of central importance in the democracy of ancient Athens. There citizens typically could only agree
(vote yes) or disagree (vote no) with the speaker, and simple majority-rule was in effect. The mathematical
study of elections, give or take a few discussions by the ancient Greeks and Romans, was until recently
thought to have been initiated only a few hundred years ago, namely in the breakthrough work of Borda and
Condorcet—later in part reinvented by Dodgson (see, e.g., [MU95] for reprints of these classic papers). One
of the most interesting results of this early work is Condorcet’s observation [Con85] that if one conducts
elections with more than two alternatives then even if all voters have rational (i.e., transitive) preferences, the
society in aggregate can be irrational (indeed, can have cycles of strict preference). Nonetheless, Condorcet
believed that if there exists a candidate c such that c defeats each other candidate in head-to-head contests
then c should win the election (see, e.g., [MU95, p. 114]). Such a candidate is called a Condorcet winner.
Clearly, there can be at most one Condorcet winner in any election, and there might be none.
This understanding of history has been reconsidered during the past few decades, as it has been discov-
ered that the study of elections was considered deeply as early as the thirteenth century (see Ha¨gele and
Pukelsheim [HP01] and the citations therein regarding Ramon Llull and the fifteenth-century figure Cusanus,
especially the citations that in [HP01] are numbered 3, 5, and 24–27). Ramon Llull (b. 1232, d. 1315), a
Catalan mystic, missionary, and philosopher developed an election system that (a) has an efficient winner-
determination procedure and (b) elects a Condorcet winner whenever one exists and otherwise elects candi-
dates that are, in a certain sense, closest to being Condorcet winners.
Llull’s motivation for developing an election system was to obtain a method of choosing abbesses, abbots,
bishops, and perhaps even the pope. His election ideas never gained public acceptance in medieval Europe
and were long forgotten.
It is interesting to note that Llull allowed voters to have so-called irrational preferences. Given three
candidates, c, d, and e, it was perfectly acceptable for a voter to prefer c to d, d to e, and e to c. On the other
hand, in modern studies of voting and election systems each voter’s preferences are most typically modeled
as a linear order over all candidates. (In this paper, as is common when discussing elections, “linear order”
implies strictness, i.e., no tie in the ordering; that is, by “linear order” we mean a strict, complete order, i.e.,
an irreflexive, antisymmetric, complete, transitive relation.) Yet allowing irrationality is very tempting and
natural. Consider Bob, who likes to eat out but is often in a hurry. Bob prefers diners to fast food because
he is willing to wait a little longer to get better food. Also, given a choice between a fancy restaurant and a
diner he prefers the fancy restaurant, again because he is willing to wait somewhat longer to get better quality.
However, given the choice between a fast-food place and a fancy restaurant Bob might reason that he is not
willing to wait so much longer to be served at the fancy restaurant and so will choose fast food instead. Thus
regarding catering options, Bob’s preferences are irrational in our sense, i.e., intransitive. When voters make
their choices based on multiple criteria—a very common and natural occurrence both among humans and
software agents—such irrationalities can occur.
Llull’s election system is remarkably similar to what is now known as “Copeland elections” [Cop51], a
more than half-century old voting procedure that is based on pairwise comparisons of candidates: The winner
(by a majority of votes—in this paper “majority” always, as is standard, means strict majority) of each such
head-to-head contest is awarded one point and the loser is awarded zero points; in ties, both parties are (in
the most common interpretation of Copeland’s meaning) awarded half a point; whoever collects the most
points over all these contests (including tie-related points) is the election’s winner. In fact, the point value
awarded for ties in such head-to-head majority-rule contests is treated in two ways in the literature when
speaking of Copeland elections: half a point (most common) and zero points (less common). To provide
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a framework that can capture both those notions, as well as capturing Llull’s system and the whole family
of systems created by choices of how we value ties, we propose and introduce a parameterized version of
Copeland elections, denoted by Copelandα , where the parameter α is a rational number, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and
in the case of a tie both candidates receive α points. So the system widely referred to in the literature
as “Copeland elections” is Copeland0.5, where tied candidates receive half a point each (see, e.g., Merlin
and Saari [SM96,MS97]; the definition used by Conitzer et al. [CSL07] can be scaled to be equivalent to
Copeland0.5). Copeland0, where tied candidates come away empty-handed, has sometimes also been referred
to as “Copeland elections” (see, e.g., Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Kaminka [PRK07] and an early version
of this paper [FHHR07]). The above-mentioned election system proposed by Ramon Llull in the thirteenth
century is in this notation Copeland1, where tied candidates are awarded one point each, just like winners of
head-to-head contests.1 The group stage of the FIFA World Cup finals is in essence a collection of Copeland 13
tournaments.
At first glance, one might be tempted to think that the definitional perturbation due to the parameter α
in Copelandα elections is negligible. However, it in fact can make the dynamics of Llull’s system quite
different from those of, for instance, Copeland0.5 or Copeland0. Specific examples witnessing this claim,
both regarding complexity results and regarding their proofs, are given at the end of Section 1.3.
Finally, we mention that a probabilistic variant of Copeland voting (known as the Jech method) was
defined already in 1929 by Zermelo [Zer29] and later on was reintroduced by several other researches (see,
e.g., the paper of Levin and Nalebuff [LN95] for further references and a description of the Jech method).
We note in passing that the Jech method is applicable even when it is fed incomplete information. In the
present paper, however, we do not consider incomplete-information or probabilistic scenarios, although we
commend such settings as interesting for future work.
1.2 Computational Social Choice
In general it is impossible to design a perfect election system. In the 1950s Arrow [Arr63] famously showed
that there is no social choice system that satisfies a certain small set of arguably reasonable requirements,
and later Gibbard [Gib73], Satterthwaite [Sat75], and Duggan and Schwartz [DS00] showed that any natural
election system can sometimes be manipulated by strategic voting, i.e., by a voter revealing different pref-
erences than his or her true ones in order to affect an election’s result in his or her favor. Also, no natural
election system with a polynomial-time winner-determination procedure has yet been shown to be resistant
to all types of control via procedural changes. Control refers to attempts by an external agent (called “the
chair”) to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, make a given candidate win
the election (in the case of constructive control [BTT92]) or preclude a given candidate’s victory (in the case
of destructive control [HHR07a]).
These obstacles are very discouraging, but the field of computational social choice theory grew in
part from the realization that computational complexity provides a potential shield against manipula-
tion/control/etc. In particular, around 1990, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a,BTT92] and Bartholdi
and Orlin [BO91] brilliantly observed that while we perhaps might not be able to make manipulation (i.e.,
strategic voting) and control of elections impossible, we could at least try to make such manipulation and
control so computationally difficult that neither voters nor election organizers will attempt it. For example, if
1Page 23 of Ha¨gele and Pukelsheim [HP01] indicates in a way we find deeply convincing (namely by a direct quote of Llull’s in-
this-case-very-clear words from his Artifitium Electionis Personarum—which was rediscovered by those authors in the year 2000) that
at least one of Llull’s election systems was Copeland1 , and so in this paper we refer to the both-candidates-score-a-point-on-a-tie variant
as Llull voting.
In some settings Llull required the candidate and voter sets to be identical and had an elaborate two-stage tie-breaking rule ending in
randomization. We disregard these issues here and cast his system into the modern idiom for election systems. (However, we note in
passing that there do exist some modern papers in which the voter and candidate sets are taken to be identical, see for example the work
of and references in [AT07].)
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there is a way for a committee’s chair to set up an election within the committee in such a way that his or her
favorite option is guaranteed to win, but the chair’s computational task would take a million years, then for
all practical purposes we may feel that the chair is prevented from finding such a set-up.
Since the seminal work of Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick, a large body of research has been ded-
icated to the study of computational properties of election systems. Some topics that have received much
attention are the complexity of manipulating elections [CS03,CS06,CSL07,EL05,HH07,PR07,PRZ07] and
of controlling elections via procedural changes [HHR07a,HHR07b,PRZ07,ENR08b]. Recently, Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra introduced the study of the complexity of bribery in elections ([FHH06a],
see also [Fal08]). Bribery shares some features of manipulation and some features of control. In particular,
the briber picks the voters he or she wants to affect (as in voter control problems) and asks them to vote as he
or she wishes (as in manipulation). (For additional citations and pointers, see the recent survey [FHHR].)
In this paper we study Copelandα elections with respect to the computational complexity of bribery and
procedural control; see [FHS08] for a study of manipulation within Copelandα .
The study of election systems and their computational properties, such as the complexity of their ma-
nipulation, control, and bribery problems, is an important topic in multiagent systems. Agents/voters may
have different, often conflicting, individual preferences over the given alternatives (or candidates) and voting
rules (or, synonymously, election systems) provide a useful method for agents to come to a “reasonable”
decision on which alternative to choose. Thus elections can be employed in multiagent settings and also in
other contexts to solve many practical problems. As just a few examples we mention the work of Ephrati
and Rosenschein [ER97] where elections are used for planning, the work of Ghosh et al. [GMHS99] who de-
veloped a recommender system for movies that is based on voting, and the work of Dwork et al. [DKNS01]
where elections are used to aggregate results from multiple web-search engines. In a multiagent setting we
may have hundreds of elections happening every minute and we cannot hope to carefully check in each case
whether the party that organized the election attempted some procedural change to skew the results. However,
if it is computationally hard to find such procedural changes then we can hope it is practically infeasible for
the organizers to undertake them.
A standard technique for showing that a particular election-related problem (for example, the problem of
deciding whether the chair can make his or her favorite candidate a winner by influencing at most k voters not
to cast their votes) is computationally intractable is to show that it is NP-hard. This approach is taken in almost
all the papers on computational social choice cited above, and it is the approach that we take in this paper.
One of the justifications for using NP-hardness as a barrier against manipulation and control of elections
is that in multiagent settings any attempts to influence the election’s outcome are made by computationally
bounded software agents that have neither human intuition nor the computational ability to solve NP-hard
problems.
Recently, such papers as [CS06,PR07,HH,MPS08] have studied the frequency (or sometimes, probabil-
ity weight) of correctness of heuristics for voting problems. Although this is a fascinating and important
direction, it does not at this point remove the need to study worst-case hardness. Indeed, we view worst-
case study as a natural prerequisite to a frequency-of-hardness attack: After all, there is no point in seeking
frequency-of-hardness results if the problem at hand is in P to begin with. And if one cannot even prove
worst-case hardness for a problem, then proving “average-case” hardness is even more beyond reach. Also,
current frequency results have debilitating limitations (for example, being locked into specific distributions;
depending on unproven assumptions; and adopting “tractability” notions that declare undecidable problems
tractable and that are not robust under even linear-time reductions). These models are arguably not ready for
prime time and, contrary to some people’s impression, fail to imply average-case polynomial runtime claims.
[EHRS07,HH] provide discussions of some of these issues.
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1.3 Outline of Our Results
The goal of this paper is to study Copelandα elections from the point of view of computational social choice
theory, in the setting where voters are rational and in the setting where voters are allowed to have irrational
preferences. (Note: When we henceforward say “irrational voters,” we mean that the voters may have irra-
tional preferences, not that they each must.) We study the issues of bribery and control and we point the reader
to the work of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Schnoor [FHS08] for work on manipulation. (Very briefly
summarized, the work of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Schnoor [FHS08] on manipulation of Copelandα
elections shows that for all rational α , 0 < α < 1, α 6= 12 , the coalitional manipulation problem in unweighted
Copelandα elections, even for coalitions of just two manipulators, is NP-complete. Some of the constructions
of the present paper have been adopted or adapted in that paper in order to prove results about manipulation.)
Bribery and control problems have some very natural real-life interpretations. For example, during pres-
idential elections a candidate might want to encourage as many of his or her supporters as possible to vote
(“get-out-the-vote” efforts): control via addition of voters; elections can be held at an inconvenient date for a
group of voters (e.g., a holiday) or at a hard-to-reach location (e.g., requiring one to own a car, or such that
getting to the location involves passing dangerous areas): control via deleting voters; one can choose voting
districts in a way favorable to a particular candidate or party (gerrymandering): control via partitioning vot-
ers; one can introduce a new candidate to the election in the hope that he or she will steal votes away from
the opponents of one’s favorite candidate without affecting the favorite candidate’s performance: control via
adding candidates. All the other control scenarios that we study also have natural interpretations.
Similarly, bribery is a natural and important issue in the context of elections. We stress, however, that
bribery problems do not necessarily need to correspond to cheating or any sort of illegal action. One could
view bribery problems as, for example, problems of finding the minimum number of voters who can switch
the result of the election and, thus, as problems of finding coalitions, especially if one assigns prices to
voters to measure the difficulty of convincing a particular voter to join the coalition (see, e.g., the paper of
Faliszewski [Fal08] for an example of a bribery problem where such an interpretation is very natural).
It is quite natural to study control and bribery both in constructive settings (where we want to make our
favorite candidate a winner) and in destructive settings (where we try to prevent a candidate from winning).
In the context of real-life elections, one often hears voters speaking of which candidate they hope will win,
but one also often hears voters expressing the sentiment “Anyone but him.” The constructive and destructive
settings correspond to actions that agents belonging to these groups might be interested in.
One of the main achievements of this paper is to classify which of resistance or vulnerability holds for
Copelandα in every previously studied control scenario for each rational value of α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In doing
so, we provide an example of a control problem where the complexity of Copeland0.5 (which is the system
commonly referred to as “Copeland”) differs from that of both Copeland0 and Copeland1: While the latter two
problems are vulnerable to constructive control by adding (an unlimited number of) candidates, Copeland0.5
is resistant to this control type (see Section 2 for definitions and Theorem 4.10 for this result).
In fact, Copeland (i.e., Copeland0.5) is the first natural election system (with a polynomial-time winner
problem) proven to be resistant to every type of constructive control that has been proposed in the literature
to date. This result closes a 15-year quest for a natural election system fully resistant to constructive control.
We also show that Copelandα is resistant to both constructive and destructive bribery, for both the case
of rational voters and the case of irrational voters. Our hardness proofs work for the case of unweighted
voters without price tags (see [FHH06a]) and thus, naturally, apply as well to the more involved scenarios of
weighted unpriced voters, unweighted priced voters, and weighted priced voters.
To prove our bribery results, we introduce a method of controlling the relative performances of certain
voters in such a way that, if one sets up other restrictions appropriately, the legal possibilities for bribery
actions are sharply constrained. We call our approach “the UV technique,” since it is based on dummy
candidates u and v. The proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 are particular applications of this method. We feel
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that the UV technique will be useful, even beyond the scope of this paper, for the analysis of bribery in other
election systems based on head-to-head contests.
We also study Copelandα elections under more flexible models such as “microbribery” (see Section 3.2)
and “extended control” (see Section 4.3). We show that Copelandα (with irrational voters allowed) is vul-
nerable to destructive microbribery and to destructive candidate control via providing fairly simple greedy
algorithms. In contrast, our polynomial-time algorithms for constructive microbribery are proven via a tech-
nique involving min-cost network flows. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of min-cost
flows to election problems. We believe that the range of applicability of flow networks to election problems
extends well beyond microbribery for Copelandα elections and we point the reader to a recent, independent
paper by Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar [PRZ08]2 and to a paper by Faliszewski [Fal08] for examples of
such applications.
We also mention that during our study of Copeland control we noticed that the proof of an important
result of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92, Theorem 12] (namely, that Condorcet voting is resistant to
constructive control by deleting voters) is invalid. The invalidity is due to the proof centrally using nonstrict
voters, in violation of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s [BTT92] (and our) model, and the invalidity seems
potentially daunting or impossible to fix with the proof approach taken there. We note also that Theorem 14 of
the same paper has a similar flaw. In Section 5 we validly reprove their claimed results using our techniques.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, Copelandα elections may behave quite differently depending on the value of
the tie-rewarding parameter α . We now give concrete examples to make this case. Specifically, proofs of re-
sults for Copelandα occasionally differ considerably for distinct values of α , and in some cases even the com-
putational complexity of various control and manipulation problems (for the manipulation case see [FHS08])
may jump between P membership and NP-completeness depending on α . Regarding control, we have already
noted that Theorem 4.10 shows that some control problem (namely, control by adding an unlimited number of
candidates) for Copelandα is NP-complete for each rational α with 0 < α < 1, yet Theorem 4.11 shows that
same control problem to be in P for α ∈ {0,1}. To give another example involving a different control prob-
lem, namely control by partition of candidates with the ties-eliminate tie-handling rule (see Section 2), we
note that the proofs of Theorem 4.20 (which applies to α = 1 for this control problem within Copelandα) and
of Theorem 4.21 (which applies to all rational α with 0 ≤ α < 1 for the same problem) differ substantially.
Regarding constructive microbribery, the vulnerability constructions for α = 0 (see Lemma 3.13) and α = 1
(see Lemma 3.16) significantly differ from each other, and neither of them works for tie-rewarding values
other than 0 and 1. The above remarks notwithstanding, for most of our results we show that it is possible
to obtain a unified—though due to this uniformity sometimes rather involved—construction that works for
Copelandα for every rational α , 0≤ α ≤ 1.
1.4 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formalize the notion of elections and in particular
of Copelandα elections, we introduce some useful notation, and we formally define the control and bribery
problems we are interested in. In Section 3, we show that for each rational α , 0≤α ≤ 1, Copelandα elections
are fully resistant to bribery, both in the case of rational voters and in the case of irrational voters. On the other
hand, if one changes the bribery model to allow “microbribes” of voters (a fine-grained approach to bribery,
in which the more one changes a voter’s vote, the more one has to pay the voter), we prove vulnerability for
each rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, in the irrational-voters destructive case and for some specific values of α in the
irrational-voters constructive case. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we present our results on procedural control for
Copelandα elections for each rational α with 0≤ α ≤ 1. We will see that very broad resistance holds for the
constructive-control cases. Section 4.3 presents our results on fixed-parameter tractability of bounded-case
2Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar [PRZ08] independently of our work in [FHHR07] used a similar technique in their work regard-
ing the complexity of achieving proportional representation.
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control for Copelandα . Section 5 provides valid proofs for several control problems for Condorcet elections
(studied by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92]) whose original proofs were invalid due to being at odds
with the model of elections used in [BTT92]. We conclude the paper with a brief summary in Section 6 and
by stating some open problems.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Elections: The Systems of Llull and Copeland
An election E = (C,V ) consists of a finite candidate set C = {c1, . . . ,cm} and a finite collection V of voters,
where each voter is represented (individually, except later when we discuss succinct inputs) via his or her
preferences over the candidates. An election system (or an election rule) is a rule that determines the winner(s)
of each given election, i.e., a mapping from pairs (C,V ) to subsets of C.
We consider two ways in which voters can express their preferences. In the rational case (our default
case), each voter’s preferences are represented as a linear order over the set C,3 i.e., each voter vi has a
preference list ci1 > ci2 > · · · > cim , with {i1, i2, . . . , im} = {1,2, . . . ,m}. In the irrational case, each voter’s
preferences are represented as a preference table that for every unordered pair of distinct candidates ci and c j
in C indicates whether the voter prefers ci to c j (i.e., ci > c j) or prefers c j to ci (i.e., c j > ci).
Some well-known election rules for the case of rational voters are plurality, Borda count, and Condorcet.
Plurality elects the candidate(s) that are ranked first by the largest number of voters. Borda count elects the
candidate(s) that receive the most points, where each voter vi gives each candidate c j as many points as the
number of candidates c j is preferred to with respect to vi’s preferences. A candidate ci is a Condorcet winner
if for every other candidate c j it holds that ci is preferred to c j by a majority of voters. Note that each election
instance will have at most one Condorcet winner.
In this paper, we introduce a parameterized version of Copeland’s election system [Cop51], which we
denote by Copelandα , where the parameter α is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are
rewarded in the head-to-head majority-rule contests between any two distinct candidates.
Definition 2.1 Let α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, be a rational number. In a Copelandα election, for each head-to-head
contest between two distinct candidates, if some candidate is preferred by a majority of voters then he or
she obtains one point and the other candidate obtains zero points, and if a tie occurs then both candidates
obtain α points. Let E = (C,V ) be an election. For each c ∈ C, scoreαE (c) is (by definition) the sum of
c’s Copelandα points in E. Every candidate c with maximum scoreαE (c) (i.e., every candidate c satisfying
(∀d ∈C)[scoreαE (c)≥ scoreαE (d)]) wins.
Let CopelandαIrrational denote the same election system but with voters allowed to be irrational.
As mentioned earlier, in the literature the term “Copeland elections” is most often used for the system
Copeland0.5 (e.g., [SM96,MS97] and a rescaled version of [CSL07]), but has occasionally been used for
Copeland0 (e.g., [PRK07] and an early version of this paper [FHHR07]). As mentioned earlier, the system
Copeland1 was proposed by Llull in the thirteenth century (see the literature pointers given in the introduction)
and so is called Llull voting.
We now define some notation to help in the discussion of Copelandα elections. Informally put, if E =
(C,V ) is an election and if ci and c j are any two candidates in C then by vsE(ci,c j) we mean the surplus of
votes that candidate ci has over c j. Formally, we define this notion as follows.
Definition 2.2 Let E = (C,V ) be an election and let ci and c j be two arbitrary candidates from C. Define
3In this paper, we take “linear order” to mean a strict total order. This is a common convention within voting theory, see, e.g., the
book of Austen-Smith and Banks [AB00]. However, we mention that in the field of mathematics the term “linear order” is typically
taken to allow nonstrictness, i.e., to allow ties.
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the relative vote-score of ci with respect to c j by
vsE(ci,c j) =
{
0 if ci = c j
‖{v ∈V | v prefers ci to c j}‖−‖{v∈V | v prefers c j to ci}‖ otherwise.
So, if ci defeats c j in a head-to-head contest in E then vsE(ci,c j) > 0, if they are tied then vsE(ci,c j) = 0,
and if c j defeats ci then vsE(ci,c j) < 0. (Throughout this paper, “defeats” excludes the possibility of a tie,
i.e., “defeats” means “(strictly) defeats.” We will say “ties-or-defeats” when we wish to allow a tie to suffice.)
Clearly, vsE(ci,c j) = −vsE(c j,ci). We often speak, in the plural, of relative vote-scores when we mean a
group of results of head-to-head contests between particular candidates.
Let α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, be a rational number. Definition 2.1 introduced scoreαE (c), the Copelandα score of
candidate c in election E . Note that for each candidate ci ∈C,
scoreαE (ci) = ‖{c j ∈C | ci 6= c j and vsE(ci,c j)> 0}‖
+α‖{c j ∈C | ci 6= c j and vsE(ci,c j) = 0}‖.
In particular, we have score0E(ci) = ‖{c j ∈C | ci 6= c j and vsE(ci,c j)> 0}‖, and score1E(ci) = ‖{c j ∈C | ci 6=
c j and vsE(ci,c j) ≥ 0}‖. Note further that the highest possible Copelandα score in any election E = (C,V )
is ‖C‖− 1.
Recall that a candidate ci ∈ C is a Copelandα winner of E = (C,V ) if for all c j ∈ C it holds that
scoreαE (ci) ≥ score
α
E (c j). (Clearly, some elections can have more than one Copelandα winner.) A candidate
ci is a Condorcet winner of E if score0E(ci) = ‖C‖−1, that is, if ci defeats all other candidates in head-to-head
contests.
In many of our constructions to be presented in the upcoming proofs, we use the following notation for
rational voters.
Notation 2.3 Within every election we fix some arbitrary order over the candidates. Any occurrence of a
subset D of candidates in a preference list means the candidates from D are listed with respect to that fixed
order. Occurrences of ←−D mean the same except that the candidates from D are listed in the reverse order.
For example, if C = {a,b,c,d,e}, with the alphabetical order being used, and D = {a,c,e} then b > D > d
means b > a > c > e > d, and b >←−D > d means b > e > c > a > d.
2.2 Bribery and Control Problems
We now describe the computational problems that we study in this paper. Our problems come in two flavors:
constructive and destructive. In the constructive version the goal is to determine whether, via the bribery
or control action type under study, it is possible to make a given candidate a winner of the election. In the
destructive case the goal is to determine whether it is possible to prevent a given candidate from being a
winner of the election.
Let E be an election system. In our case, E will be either Copelandα or CopelandαIrrational, where α , 0≤
α ≤ 1, is a rational number. The bribery problem for E with rational voters is defined as follows [FHH06a].
Name: E -bribery and E -destructive-bribery.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters specified via their preference lists over C, a distin-
guished candidate p ∈C, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question (constructive): Is it possible to make p a winner of the E election resulting from (C,V ) by modi-
fying the preference lists of at most k voters?
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Question (destructive): Is it possible to ensure that p is not a winner of the E election resulting from (C,V )
by modifying the preference lists of at most k voters?
The version of this problem for elections with irrational voters allowed is defined exactly like the rational
one, with the only difference being that voters are represented via preference tables rather than preference
lists, and the briber may completely change a voter’s preference table at unit cost. At the end of the present
section, Section 2.2, we will describe the variants based on seeking to make p be (or to preclude p from
being) a unique winner. Later in the paper we will study another variant of bribery problems—a variant in
which one is allowed to perform microbribes: bribes for which the cost depends on each preference-table
entry change, and the briber pays separately for each such change.
Bribery problems seek to change the outcome of elections via modifying the reported preferences of
some of the voters. In contrast, control problems seek to change the outcome of an election by modifying
the election’s structure via adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. When formally defining
these control types, we use the following naming conventions for the corresponding control problems. The
name of a control problem starts with the election system used (when clear from context, it may be omitted),
followed by CC for “constructive control” or by DC for “destructive control,” followed by the acronym
of the type of control: AC for “adding (a limited number of) candidates,” ACu for “adding (an unlimited
number of) candidates,” DC for “deleting candidates,” PC for “partition of candidates,” RPC for “run-off
partition of candidates,” AV for “adding voters,” DV for “deleting voters,” and PV for “partition of voters.”
All the partitioning cases (PC, RPC, and PV) are two-stage elections, and we here use both tie-handling
rules of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07a] for first-stage subelections in these two-stage
elections. In particular, for all the partitioning cases, the acronym PC, RPC, and PV, respectively, is followed
by the acronym of the tie-handling rule used in first-stage subelections, namely TP for “ties promote” (i.e., all
winners of first-stage subelections are promoted to the final round of the election) and TE for “ties eliminate”
(i.e., only unique winners of first-stage subelections are promoted to the final round of the election, so if
there is more than one winner in a given first-stage subelection or there is no winner in a given first-stage
subelection then that subelection does not move any of its candidates forward).
We now formally define our control problems. These definitions are due to Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT92] for constructive control and to Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07a] for de-
structive control.
Let E be an election system. Again, E will here be either Copelandα or CopelandαIrrational, where α ,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is a rational number. We describe our control problems as if they were for the case of rational
preferences, but the irrational cases are perfectly analogous, except for replacing preference lists with prefer-
ence tables.
Control via Adding Candidates
We start with two versions of control via adding candidates. In the unlimited version the goal of the election
chair is to introduce candidates from a pool of spoiler candidates so as to make his or her favorite candidate a
winner of the election (in the constructive case) or prevent his or her despised candidate from being a winner
(in the destructive case). As suggested by the name of the problem, in the unlimited version the chair can
introduce any subset of the spoiler candidates (none, some, or all are all legal options) into the election.
Name: E -CCACu and E -DCACu (control via adding an unlimited number of candidates).
Given: Disjoint sets C and D of candidates, a collection V of voters specified via their preference lists over
the candidates in the set C∪D, and a distinguished candidate p ∈C.
Question (E -CCACu): Is there a subset E of D such that p is a winner of the E election with voters V and
candidates C∪E?
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Question (E -DCACu): Is there a subset E of D such that p is not a winner of the E election with voters V
and candidates C∪E?
The definition of E -CCACu was (using different notation) introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT92]. In contrast with the other control problems involving adding or deleting candidates or voters,
in the adding candidates problem Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick did not introduce a nonnegative integer k that
bounds the number of candidates (from the set D) the chair is allowed to add. We feel this asymmetry in
their definitions is not well justified,4 and thus we define a with-change-parameter version of the control-
by-adding-candidates problems, which we denote by ACl (where the “l” stands for the fact that part of the
problem instance is a limit on the number of candidates that can be added, in contrast with the model of
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], which we denote by ACu with the “u” standing for the fact that the
number of added candidates is unlimited, at least in the sense of not being limited via a separately input
integer). The with-parameter version is the long-studied case for AV, DV, and DC, and we in this paper will
use AC as being synonymous with ACl, and will thus use the notation AC for the rest of this paper when
speaking of ACl. We suggest this as a natural regularization of the definitions and we hope this version will
become the “normal” version of the adding-candidates problem for further study. However, we caution the
reader that in earlier papers AC is used to mean ACu.
In the present paper, we will obtain results not just for ACl but also for the ACu case, in order to allow
comparisons between the results of this paper and those of earlier works.
Turning now to what we mean by AC (equivalently, ACl), as per the above definition in E -CCAC (i.e.,
E -CCACl) we ask whether it is possible to make the distinguished candidate p a winner of some E election
obtained by adding at most k candidates from the spoiler candidate set D. (Note that k is part of the input.)
We define the destructive version, E -DCAC (i.e., E -DCACl), analogously.
Name: E -CCAC and E -DCAC (control via adding a limited number of candidates).
Given: Disjoint sets C and D of candidates, a collection V of voters specified via their preference lists over
the candidates in the set C∪D, a distinguished candidate p ∈C, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question (E -CCAC): Is there a subset E of D such that ‖E‖ ≤ k and p is a winner of the E election with
voters V and candidates C∪E?
Question (E -DCAC): Is there a subset E of D such that ‖E‖≤ k and p is not a winner of the E election with
voters V and candidates C∪E?
Control via Deleting Candidates
In constructive control via deleting candidates, the chair seeks to ensure that his or her favorite candidate p
is a winner of the election by suppressing at most k candidates. In the destructive variant of this problem, the
chair’s goal is to block p from winning by suppressing at most k candidates other than p.
Name: E -CCDC and E -DCDC (control via deleting candidates).
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters represented via preference lists over C, a distinguished
candidate p ∈C, and a nonnegative integer k.
4Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] are aware of this asymmetry. They write: “To a certain extent the exact formalization of a
problem is a matter of taste. [. . . ] we could equally well have formalized [the problem of control via adding candidates] to be whether
there are K or fewer candidates to be added [. . . ] It does not much matter for the problems we discuss, since both versions are of the
same complexity.” In contrast, the complexity of the problems studied here crucially hinges on which formalization is used, and we thus
define both versions formally.
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Question (E -CCDC): Is it possible to by deleting at most k candidates ensure that p is a winner of the
resulting E election?
Question (E -DCDC): Is it possible to by deleting at most k candidates other than p ensure that p is not a
winner of the resulting E election?
Control via Partition and Run-Off Partition of Candidates
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] gave two types of control of elections via partition of candidates. In
both cases the candidate set C is partitioned into two groups, C1 and C2 (i.e., C1∪C2 =C and C1∩C2 = /0),
and the election is conducted in two stages. For control via run-off partition of candidates, the election’s first
stage is conducted separately on each group of candidates, C1 and C2, and the group winners that survive the
tie-handling rule compete against each other in the second stage. In control via partition of candidates, the
first-stage election is performed on the candidate set C1 and those of that election’s winners that survive the
tie-handling rule compete against all candidates from C2 in the second stage.
In the ties-promote (TP) model, all first-stage winners within a group are promoted to the final round. In
the ties-eliminate (TE) model, a first-stage winner within a group is promoted to the final round if and only if
he or she is the unique winner within that group.
Name: E -CCRPC and E -DCRPC (control via run-off partition of candidates).
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters represented via preference lists over C, and a distin-
guished candidate p ∈C.
Question (E -CCRPC): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that p is a winner of the two-stage
election where the winners of subelection (C1,V ) that survive the tie-handling rule compete against the
winners of subelection (C2,V ) that survive the tie-handling rule? Each subelection (in both stages) is
conducted using election system E .
Question (E -DCRPC): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that p is not a winner of the two-stage
election where the winners of subelection (C1,V ) that survive the tie-handling rule compete against the
winners of subelection (C2,V ) that survive the tie-handling rule? Each subelection (in both stages) is
conducted using election system E .
The above description defines four computational problems for a given election system E : E -CCRPC-TE,
E -CCRPC-TP, E -DCRPC-TE, and E -DCRPC-TP.
Name: E -CCPC and E -DCPC (control via partition of candidates).
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters represented via preference lists over C, and a distin-
guished candidate p ∈C.
Question (E -CCPC): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that p is a winner of the two-stage elec-
tion where the winners of subelection (C1,V ) that survive the tie-handling rule compete against all
candidates in C2? Each subelection (in both stages) is conducted using election system E .
Question (E -DCPC): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that p is not a winner of the two-stage
election where the winners of subelection (C1,V ) that survive the tie-handling rule compete against all
candidates in C2? Each subelection (in both stages) is conducted using election system E .
This description defines four computational problems for a given election system E : E -CCPC-TE,
E -CCPC-TP, E -DCPC-TE, and E -DCPC-TP.
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Control via Adding Voters
In the scenario of control via adding voters, the chair’s goal is to either ensure that p is a winner (in the
constructive case) or ensure that p is not a winner (in the destructive case) via causing up to k additional
voters to participate in the election. The chair can draw the voters to add to the election from a prespecified
collection of voters (with given preferences).
Name: E -CCAV and E -DCAV (control via adding voters).
Given: A set C of candidates, two disjoint collections of voters, V and W , represented via preference lists
over C, a distinguished candidate p, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question (E -CCAV): Is there a subset Q, ‖Q‖ ≤ k, of voters in W such that the voters in V ∪Q jointly elect
p ∈C as a winner according to system E ?
Question (E -DCAV): Is there a subset Q, ‖Q‖ ≤ k, of voters in W such that the voters in V ∪Q do not elect
p as a winner according to system E ?
Control via Deleting Voters
In the control via deleting voters case the chair seeks to either ensure that p is a winner (in the constructive
case) or prevent p from being a winner (in the destructive case) via blocking up to k voters from participating
in the election. (This loosely models vote suppression or disenfranchisement.)
Name: E -CCDV and E -DCDV (control via deleting voters).
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters represented via preference lists over C, a distinguished
candidate p ∈C, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question (E -CCDV): Is it possible to by deleting at most k voters ensure that p is a winner of the resulting
E election?
Question (E -DCDV): Is it possible to by deleting at most k voters ensure that p is not a winner of the
resulting E election?
Control via Partition of Voters
In the case of control via partition of voters, the following two-stage election is performed. First, the voter
set V is partitioned into two subcommittees, V1 and V2. The winners of election (C,V1) that survive the tie-
handling rule compete against the winners of (C,V2) that survive the tie-handling rule. Again, our tie-handling
rules are TE and TP (ties-eliminate and ties-promote).
Name: E -CCPV and E -DCPV (control via partition of voters).
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters represented via preference lists over C, and a distin-
guished candidate p ∈C.
Question (E -CCPV): Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that p is a winner of the two-stage election
where the winners of election (C,V1) that survive the tie-handling rule compete against the winners of
(C,V2) that survive the tie-handling rule? Each subelection (in both stages) is conducted using election
system E .
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Question (E -DCPV): Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that p is not a winner of the two-stage
election where the winners of election (C,V1) that survive the tie-handling rule compete against the
winners of (C,V2) that survive the tie-handling rule? Each subelection (in both stages) is conducted
using election system E .
Unique Winners and Irrationality
Our bribery and control problems were each defined above only for rational voters and in the nonunique-
winner model, i.e., asking whether a given candidate can be made, or prevented from being, a winner.
Nonetheless, we have proven all our control results both for the case of nonunique winners and (to be able
to fairly compare them with existing control results, which except for the interesting “multi-winner” model
of Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar [PRZ07] are in the unique-winner model) unique winners (a candidate
is a unique winner if he or she is a winner and is the only winner). Similarly, all our bribery results are
proven both in the unique-winner model and (to be able to fairly compare them with existing bribery results
in the literature) in the nonunique-winner model. In addition to the rational-voters case, we also study these
problems for the case of voters who are allowed to be irrational. As mentioned earlier, in the case of irrational
voters, voters are represented via preference tables rather than preference lists.
2.3 Graphs
An undirected graph G is a pair (V (G),E(G)), where V (G) is the set of vertices and E(G) is the set of edges
and each edge is an unordered pair of distinct vertices.5 A directed graph is defined analogously, except that
the edges are represented as ordered pairs. For example, if u and v are distinct vertices in an undirected graph
G then G either has an edge e = {u,v} that connects u and v or it doesn’t. On the other hand, if G is a directed
graph then G either has an edge e′ = (u,v) from u to v, or an edge e′′ = (v,u) from v to u, or both e′ and e′′,
or neither e′ nor e′′.
For a directed graph G, the indegree of a vertex u ∈ V (G) is the number of G’s edges that enter u (i.e.,
the number of edges of the form (v,u) in E(G)). Similarly, the outdegree of u ∈V (G) is the number of edges
that leave u (i.e., the number of edges of the form (u,v) in E(G)).
2.4 NP-Complete Problems and Reductions
Without loss of generality, we assume that all problems that we consider are encoded in a natural, efficient
way over the alphabet Σ = {0,1}. We use the standard notion of NP-completeness, defined via polynomial-
time many-one reductions. We say that a computational problem A polynomial-time many-one reduces to a
problem B if there exists a polynomial-time computable function f such that
(∀x ∈ Σ∗)[x ∈ A ⇐⇒ f (x) ∈ B].
A problem is NP-hard if all members of NP polynomial-time many-one reduce to it. Thus, if an NP-hard
problem A polynomial-time many-one reduces to a problem B, then B is NP-hard as well. A problem is
NP-complete if it is NP-hard and is a member of NP. When clear from context we will use “reduce” and “re-
duction” as shorthands for “polynomial-time many-one reduce” and “polynomial-time many-one reduction.”
5In this paper, the symbols E and V are generally reserved for elections and voters, except the just introduced “overloading” of them
to mean sets of edges and vertices in a given graph. The intended meaning of E and V will be clear from the context, even when our
proofs involve multiple elections and graphs.
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Our NP-hardness results typically follow via a reduction from either the exact-cover-by-3-sets problem
or from the vertex cover problem (see, e.g., [GJ79]). These are well-known NP-complete problems, but we
define them here for the sake of completeness.
Name: X3C (exact cover by 3-sets).
Given: A set B = {b1, . . . ,b3k}, k ≥ 1, and a family of sets S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} such that for each i, 1≤ i≤ n,
it holds that Si ⊆ B and ‖Si‖= 3.
Question: Is there a set A ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, ‖A‖= k, such that ⋃i∈A Si = B?
The set A about which we ask in the above problem is called an exact cover of B. It is a “cover” because
every member of B belongs to some Si such that i ∈ A, and it is “exact” because each member of B belongs
to exactly one Si such that i ∈ A.
Whenever we consider instances of the X3C problem, we assume that they are well-formed, that is, we
assume that they follow the syntactic requirements stated in the above “Given” field (e.g., the cardinality of
the set B is indeed a multiple of three). We apply this convention of considering only syntactically correct
inputs to all other problems as well. Let A be some computational problem and let x be an instance of A.
When we consider an algorithm for A, and input x is malformed, then we can immediately reject. When we
are building a reduction from A to some problem B, then whenever we hit a malformed input x we can output
a fixed y not in B. (In our reductions B is never Σ∗, so this is always possible.)
Copelandα elections can often be considered in terms of appropriate graphs. This representation is partic-
ularly useful when we face control problems that modify the structure of the candidate set, since in this case
operations on an election directly translate into suitable operations on the corresponding graph. For candidate
control problems, we—instead of using reductions from X3C—construct reductions from the vertex cover
problem. A vertex cover of an undirected graph G is a subset of G’s vertices such that each edge of G is
adjacent to at least one vertex from that subset.
Name: VertexCover.
Given: An undirected graph G and a nonnegative integer k.
Question: Is there a set W such that W ⊆V (G), ‖W‖ ≤ k, and for every edge e ∈ E(G) it holds that e∩W 6=
/0?
2.5 Resistance and Vulnerability
Not all election systems can be affected by each control type; if not, the system is said to be immune to this
type of control. For example, if a candidate c is not a Condorcet winner then it is impossible to make him or
her a Condorcet winner by adding candidates (see [BTT92] and [HHR07a] for more such immunity results).
However, for Copelandα elections it is easy to see that for each type of control defined in Section 2.2 there
is a scenario in which the outcome of the election can indeed be changed via conducting the corresponding
control action. If an election system is not immune to some type of control (as witnessed by such a scenario),
the election system is said to be susceptible to that control type.
Proposition 2.4 For each rational number α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα is susceptible to each type of control
defined in Section 2.2.
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We say that an election system (Copelandα or CopelandαIrrational, in our case) is resistant to a particular
attack (be it a type of control or of bribery) if the appropriate computational problem is NP-hard and sus-
ceptibility holds.6 On the other hand, if the computational problem is in P and susceptibility holds, then we
say the system is vulnerable to this attack. Because of how our bribery and control problems are defined, the
vulnerability definition merely requires that there exist a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether
a successful bribe or control action exists on a given input. However, in every single one of our vulnerability
proofs we will provide something far stronger. We will provide a polynomial-time algorithm that actually
finds a successful bribe or control action on each input for which a successful bribe or control action exists,
and on each input where no successful bribe or control action exists will announce that fact.
The notions of resistance and vulnerability (and of immunity and susceptibility) for control problems in
election systems were introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], and we here follow the defini-
tion alteration of [HHR07b] of resistance from “NP-complete” to “NP-hard,” as that change is compelling
(because under the old definition, NP-completeness, things could actually become nonresistant by being too
hard, which is not natural). However, for all resistance claims in this paper NP-membership is clear, and so
NP-completeness in fact does hold.
3 Bribery
In this section we present our results on the complexity of bribery for the Copelandα election systems, where
α is a rational number with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Our main result, which will be presented in Section 3.1, is that each
such system is resistant to bribery, regardless of voters’ rationality and of our mode of operation (constructive
versus destructive). In Section 3.2, we will provide vulnerability results for Llull and Copeland0 with respect
to “microbribery.”
3.1 Resistance to Bribery
Theorem 3.1 For each rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα and CopelandαIrrational are resistant to both con-
structive and destructive bribery, in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model.
We prove Theorem 3.1 via Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 below. Our proofs employ an approach
that we call the UV technique. For the constructive cases, this technique proceeds by constructing bribery
instances where the only briberies that could possibly ensure that our favorite candidate p is a winner involve
only voters who rank a group of special candidates (often the group will contain exactly two candidates, u
and v) above p. The remaining voters, the bystanders so to speak, can be used to create appropriate padding
and structure within the election. The destructive cases follow via a cute observation regarding the dynamics
of our constructive cases.
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 3.1. We start with the case of rational voters
in Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 below and then argue that the analogous results for the case of irrational voters
follow via, essentially, the same proof.
Theorem 3.2 For each rational number α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα is resistant to constructive bribery in the
unique-winner model and to destructive bribery in the nonunique-winner model.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary rational number α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Our proof provides reductions from the X3C
problem to, respectively, the unique-winner variant of constructive bribery and to the nonunique-winner
6It is true that for some unnatural election systems immunity to bribery holds, e.g., the election system “Every candidate is a winner”
is immune to all types of bribery. However, our Copelandα -type systems are all susceptible to all the bribery types we look at in this
paper, so we won’t further explicitly discuss or state susceptibility for the bribery cases.
15
variant of destructive bribery. Our reductions will differ regarding only the specification of the goal (i.e.,
regarding which candidate we attempt to make a unique winner or which candidate we prevent from being a
winner) and thus we describe them jointly as, essentially, a single reduction.
Our reduction will produce an instance of an appropriate bribery problem with an odd number of voters,
and so we will never have ties in head-to-head contests. Thus our proof works regardless of which rational
number α with 0≤ α ≤ 1 is chosen.
Let (B,S ) be an instance of X3C, where B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3k}, S is a collection {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of three-
element subsets of B with
⋃n
j=1 S j = B, and k≥ 1. If our input does not meet these conditions then we output
a fixed instance of our bribery problem having a negative answer.
Construct a Copelandα election E = (C,V ) as follows. The candidate set C is {u,v, p}∪B, where none
of u, v, and p is in B. The voter set V contains 2n+ 4k+ 1 voters of the following types.
1. For each Si, we introduce one voter of type (i) and one voter of type (ii):
(i) u > v > Si > p > B− Si,
(ii) ←−−−B− Si > p > u > v >←−Si .
2. We introduce k voters for each of the types (iii)-1, (iii)-2, (iv)-1, and (iv)-2:
(iii)-1 u > v > p > B,
(iii)-2 v > u > p > B,
(iv)-1 u >←−B > p > v,
(iv)-2 v >←−B > p > u.
3. We introduce a single type (v) voter:
(v) B > p > u > v.
We have the following relative vote-scores:
1. vsE(u,v) = 2n+ 1 ≥ 2k+ 1, where the inequality follows from our assumption
⋃n
j=1 S j = B (which
implies n≥ ‖B‖/3 = k),
2. vsE(u, p) = vsE(v, p) = 2k− 1,
3. for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k}, vsE(u,bi) = vsE(v,bi)≥ 2k+ 1,
4. for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k}, vsE(bi, p) = 1, and
5. for each i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k} with i 6= j, |vsE(bi,b j)|= 1.
For example, to see that vsE(u,bi) ≥ 2k+ 1 for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k}, note that each bi is in at least one S j
because of
⋃n
j=1 S j = B, so the voters of types (i) and (ii) give u an advantage of at least two votes over bi.
Furthermore, the voters of types (iii)-1, (iii)-2, (iv)-1, and (iv)-2 give u an advantage of 2k additional votes
over each bi, and the single type (v) voter gives each bi a one-vote advantage over u. Summing up, we obtain
vsE(u,bi)≥ 2+ 2k− 1= 2k+ 1. The other relative vote-scores are similarly easy to verify.
These relative vote-scores yield the following Copelandα scores or upper bounds on such scores:
1. scoreαE (u) = 3k+ 2,
2. scoreαE (v) = 3k+ 1,
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3. for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k}, scoreαE (bi)≤ 3k, and
4. scoreαE (p) = 0.
To prove our theorem, we need the following claim.
Claim 3.3 The following three statements are equivalent:
1. (B,S ) ∈ X3C.
2. Candidate u can be prevented from winning via bribing at most k voters of E.
3. Candidate p can be made a unique winner via bribing at most k voters of E.
Proof of Claim 3.3. (1) implies (2): It is easy to see that if (B,S ) ∈X3C then there is a bribe involving k
or fewer voters that prevents u from being a winner: It is enough to bribe those type (i) voters that correspond
to a cover of size k to report p as their top choice (while not changing anything else in their preference lists):
p > u > v > Si > B− Si. Call the resulting election E ′. In E ′ the following relative vote-scores change:
vsE ′(p,u) = vsE ′(p,v) = n+ k− (n− k)−2k+1= 1 and vsE ′(p,bi)≥ 1 for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k}, while all
other relative vote-scores remain unchanged. Thus scoreαE ′(p) = 3k+2, score
α
E ′(u) = 3k+1, score
α
E ′(v) = 3k,
and scoreαE ′(bi)< 3k for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k}, so p defeats all other candidates and is the unique winner. In
particular, this bribe (of at most k voters in E) ensures that u is not a winner.
(2) implies (3): Suppose that there is a bribe involving k or fewer voters that prevents u from being a
winner. Note that u defeats everyone except p by more than 2k votes in E . This means that via bribery of
at most k voters u’s score can decrease by at most one. Thus, to prevent u from being a winner via such
a bribery, we need to ensure that u receives a Copelandα score of 3k+ 1 and some candidate other than u
gets a Copelandα score of 3k+ 2, that is, that candidate defeats everyone. Neither v nor any of the bi’s can
possibly obtain a Copelandα score of 3k+ 2 via such a bribery, since bribery of at most k voters can affect
only head-to-head contests where the relative vote-scores of the participants are at most 2k. Thus, via such a
bribery, u can be prevented from winning only if p can be made a (in fact, the unique) winner of our election.
(3) implies (1): Let W be a set of at most k voters whose bribery ensures that p is a unique winner of our
election. Thus we know that ‖W‖ = k and that W contains only voters who rank both u and v above p (as
otherwise p would not defeat both u and v), which is the case only for voters of types (i), (iii)-1, and (iii)-2.
Furthermore, a bribery that makes p the unique winner has to ensure that p defeats all members of B; note that
the type (iii)-1 and (iii)-2 voters in E already rank p above all of B. Thus, via a simple counting argument, W
must contain exactly k type (i) voters that correspond to a size-k cover of B. ❑ Claim 3.3
Since our reduction is computable in polynomial time, Claim 3.3 completes the proof of
Theorem 3.2. ❑
Theorem 3.4 For each rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα is resistant to constructive bribery in the
nonunique-winner model and to destructive bribery in the unique-winner model.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary rational number α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we handle the
appropriate constructive and destructive cases jointly using essentially the same reduction for each of them,
differing only in the specification of the goal of the briber. Thus we describe our reductions from X3C to the
appropriate constructive and destructive bribery problems as a single reduction, separately specifying only
the goals for each of the cases.
Our reduction works as follows. We are given an X3C instance (B,S ), where B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3k} is
a set, S is a collection {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of three-element subsets of B with
⋃n
j=1 S j = B, and k is a positive
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integer. We form an election E = (C,V ), where C = {p,s, t,u,v}∪B and where V is as specified below. In the
nonunique-winner constructive case we want to ensure that p is a winner and in the unique-winner destructive
case we want to prevent s from being the unique winner. In each case we want to achieve our goal via bribing
at most k voters from V . V contains 2n+ 24k+ 1 voters of the following types:
1. For each Si, we introduce one voter of type (i) and one voter of type (ii):
(i) s > t > u > v > Si > p > B− Si,
(ii) ←−−−B− Si > p > v > u > t > s >←−Si .
2. We introduce k voters for each of the types (iii)-1, (iii)-2, (iv)-1, and (iv)-2:
(iii)-1 s > t > u > v > p > B,
(iii)-2 s > t > v > u > p > B,
(iv)-1 u >←−B > p > s > v > t,
(iv)-2 v >←−B > p > s > u > t.
3. We introduce 20k normalizing voters:
2k voters of type (v)-1 u > v > t > p > s > B,
2k voters of type (v)-2 u > v > s > t > p > B,
3k voters of type (v)-3 s > t > u > v > p > B,
3k voters of type (v)-4 s > v > t > u > p > B,
3k voters of type (v)-5 t >←−B > p > u > s > v,
k voters of type (v)-6 ←−B > p > s > u > v > t,
3k voters of type (v)-7 s >←−B > p > u > v > t,
3k voters of type (v)-8 ←−B > p > s > v > t > u.
4. Finally, we introduce a single type (vi) voter:
(vi) B > p > u > v > s > t.
In the nonunique-winner constructive case we want to ensure that p is a winner and in the unique-winner
destructive case we want to prevent s from being the unique winner. In each case we want to achieve our
goal via bribing at most k voters. Thus within our bribery we can affect the results of head-to-head contests
between only those candidates whose relative vote-scores are, in absolute value, at most 2k. In E , we have
the following relative vote-scores:
1. vsE(s, t) > 2k, vsE(s,u) > 2k, vsE(s,v) > 2k, vsE(t, p) > 2k, vsE(t,u) > 2k, vsE(v, t) > 2k, and
vsE(u,v)> 2k,
2. vsE(s, p) = vsE(u, p) = vsE(v, p) = 2k− 1,
3. for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k}, vsE(bi, p) = 1, vsE(s,bi) > 2k, vsE(t,bi) > 2k, vsE(u,bi) > 2k, and
vsE(v,bi)> 2k, and
4. for each i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k} with i 6= j, we have |vsE(bi,b j)|= 1.
To analyze E , let E ′ denote an arbitrary election resulting from E via bribing at most k voters. The relative
vote-scores among any two candidates in E yield the following Copelandα scores:
1. scoreαE (s) = 3k+4, and since we have vsE(s,c)> 2k for each candidate c∈C with p 6= c 6= s, it follows
that 3k+ 3≤ scoreαE ′(s).
18
2. For each x ∈ {t,u,v}, scoreαE (x) = 3k+2, and since we have vsE(s,x)> 2k, vsE(t,u)> 2k, vsE(u,v)>
2k, and vsE(v, t)> 2k, it follows that scoreαE ′(x)≤ 3k+ 2.
3. scoreαE (p) = 0, and since we have vsE(t, p)> 2k, it follows that scoreαE ′(p)≤ 3k+ 3.
4. For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k}, scoreαE (bi) ≤ 3k, and since we have vsE(x,bi) > 2k for each candidate
x ∈ {s, t,u,v}, it follows that scoreαE ′(bi)≤ 3k.
Thus s is the unique winner of E , and the only candidate who is able to prevent s from being the unique
winner via at most k voters being bribed is p.
We claim that (B,S ) ∈ X3C if and only if there is a bribe involving at most k voters that prevents s from
being the unique winner. (Equivalently, (B,S ) ∈ X3C if and only if there is a bribe of at most k voters that
ensures that p is a winner.)
From left to right, if S has an exact cover for B, then, via bribing the k type (i) voters that correspond
to this cover, s can be prevented from being the unique winner. In more detail, if the k bribed voters rank
p on top while leaving their preferences otherwise unchanged (i.e., their votes are now p > s > t > u >
v > Si > B− Si), then the only relative vote-scores that have changed in this new election, call it E ′, are:
vsE ′(p,s) = vsE ′(p,u) = vsE ′(p,v) = 1, vsE ′(t, p) = 4k− 1, and vsE ′(p,bi) = 1 for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,3k}. It
follows that p and s tie for winner in E ′ with scoreαE ′(p) = score
α
E ′(s) = 3k+ 3.
From right to left, suppose there is a bribe of at most k voters that prevents s from being the unique winner.
By construction, for each election E ′ that results from E via bribing at most k voters, this is possible only if
scoreαE ′(p) = score
α
E ′(s) = 3k+ 3. Let W be a set of at most k voters whose bribery ensures that s is not the
unique winner in the resulting election. Since vsE(t, p)> 2k, it is not possible for p to win the head-to-head
contest with t via such a bribery. Thus, for p to obtain a score of 3k+3, p must win the head-to-head contests
with each candidate in {s,u,v}∪B. However, since vsE(s, p) = vsE(u, p) = vsE(v, p) = 2k− 1, we have
‖W‖ = k and every voter in W must rank each of s, u, and v ahead of p. Thus W can contain only voters
of types (i), (iii)-1, (iii)-2, (v)-2, (v)-3, and (v)-4. However, since p also needs to defeat each member of B
and since all voters of types (iii)-1, (iii)-2, (v)-2, (v)-3, and (v)-4 rank p ahead of each member of B, W must
contain exactly k type (i) voters that correspond to an exact cover for B.
Since our reduction is computable in polynomial time, this completes the proof of Theorem 3.4. ❑
The proofs of the above theorems have an interesting feature. When we discuss bribery, we never
rely on the fact that the voters are rational. Thus we can allow the voters to be irrational and form
CopelandαIrrational-bribery and CopelandαIrrational-destructive-bribery instances simply by deriving the voters’
preference tables from the voters’ preference lists given in the above proofs. It is easy to see that the proofs
remain valid after this change; in the proofs we assume that each bribed voter, after the bribery, prefers p to
all other candidates, but we do not make any further assumptions (and, in particular, we do not use linearity
of the preferences). Thus we have the following corollary to the proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4.
Corollary 3.5 For each rational number α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, CopelandαIrrational is resistant to both constructive
bribery and destructive bribery, in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model.
Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 together constitute a proof of Theorem 3.1 and establish that for
each rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα and CopelandαIrrational possess broad—essentially perfect—resistance
to bribery regardless of whether we are interested in constructive or destructive results. However, the next
section shows that this perfect picture is, in fact, only near-perfect when we consider microbribes, which
don’t allow changing the complete preferences of voters at once but rather change the results of head-to-head
contests between candidates in the voters’ preferences. We will show that there is an efficient way of finding
optimal microbriberies for the case of irrational voters in Copelandα elections.
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3.2 Vulnerability to Microbribery for Irrational Voters
In this section we explore the problems related to microbribery of irrational voters. In standard bribery
problems, which were considered in Section 3.1, we ask whether it is possible to ensure that a designated
candidate p is a winner (or, in the destructive case, to ensure that p is not a winner) via modifying the
preference tables of at most k voters. That is, we can at unit cost completely redefine the preference table of
each voter bribed. So in this model, we pay for a service (namely, the modification of the reported preference
table) and we pay for it in bulk (when we buy a voter, we have secured his or her total obedience). However,
sometimes it may be far more reasonable to adopt a more local approach in which we have to pay separately
for each preference-table entry flip—to pay more the more we alter a vote.
Throughout the remainder of this section we will use the term microbribe to refer to flipping an entry
in a preference table, and we will use the term microbribery to refer to bribing possibly irrational voters via
microbribes. Recall that by “irrational voters” we simply mean that they are allowed to have, but not that they
must have, irrational preferences.
For each rational α , 0≤ α ≤ 1, we define the following two problems.
Name: CopelandαIrrational-microbribery and CopelandαIrrational-destructive-microbribery.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters specified via their preference tables over C, a distin-
guished candidate p ∈C, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question (constructive): Is it possible, by flipping at most k entries in the preference tables of voters in V ,
to ensure that p is a winner of the resulting election?
Question (destructive): Is it possible, by flipping at most k entries in the preference tables of voters in V , to
guarantee that p is not a winner of the resulting election?
We can flip multiple entries in the preference table of the same voter, but we have to pay separately
for each flip. The microbribery problems for CopelandαIrrational are very similar in flavor to the so-called
bribery′ problems for approval voting that were studied by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaan-
dra [FHH06a], where unit cost for flipping approvals or disapprovals of voters are paid. However, the proofs
for CopelandαIrrational seem to be much more involved than their counterparts for approval voting. The reason
is that CopelandαIrrational elections allow for very subtle and complicated interactions between the candidates’
scores.
Before we proceed with our results, let us define some notation that will be useful throughout this section.
Let E be an election with candidate set C = {c1,c2, . . . ,cm} and voter collection V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn}. We
define two functions, wincostE and tiecostE , that describe the costs of ensuring a victory or a tie of a given
candidate in a particular head-to-head contest.
Definition 3.6 Let E = (C,V ) be an election and let ci and c j be two distinct candidates in C.
1. By wincostE(ci,c j) we mean the minimum number of microbribes that ensure that ci defeats c j in their
head-to-head contest. If ci already wins this contest then wincostE(ci,c j) = 0.
2. By tiecostE(ci,c j) we mean the minimum number of microbribes that ensure that ci ties with c j in their
head-to-head contest, or ∞ if E has an odd number of voters and thus ties are impossible.
Our first result regarding microbribery is that destructive microbribery is easy for CopelandαIrrational. Since
this is the paper’s first vulnerability proof, we take this opportunity to remind the reader (recall Section 2.5)
that although the definition of vulnerability requires only that there be a polynomial-time algorithm to de-
termine whether a successful action (in the present case, a destructive microbribery) exists, we will in each
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vulnerability proof provide something far stronger, namely a polynomial-time algorithm that both determines
whether a successful action exists and that, when so, finds a successful action (e.g., for our flow algorithms
later on, the successful action will be implicit in the flow computed).
Theorem 3.7 For each rational α , 0≤ α ≤ 1, CopelandαIrrational is vulnerable to destructive microbribery in
both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary rational number α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We give an algorithm for CopelandαIrrational, for
destructive microbribery in the nonunique-winner model. (We omit the analogous algorithm for the unique-
winner case.)
Let E = (C,V ) be the input election where C = {p,c1,c2, . . . ,cm} and V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn}, and let k be
the number of microbribes that we are allowed to make. We define the predicate M(E, p,ci,k) to be true if
and only if there is a microbribery of cost at most k that ensures that ci’s score is higher than that of p. Our
algorithm computes M(E, p,ci,k) for each ci ∈C and accepts if and only if it is true for at least one of them.
We now describe how to compute M(E, p,ci,k).7
We set E1, E2, and E3 to be elections identical to E except that
1. in E1, p defeats ci in their head-to-head contest,
2. in E2, p loses to ci in their head-to-head contest, and
3. in E3, p ties ci in their head-to-head contest (we disregard E3 if the number of voters is odd and thus
ties are impossible).
Let k1, k2, and k3 be the minimum costs of microbriberies that transform E to E1, E to E2, and E to E3,
respectively. Such microbriberies involve only the head-to-head contest between p and ci. We define the
predicate M′(E ′, p,ci,k′), where E ′ ∈ {E1,E2,E3} and where k′ is an integer, to be true if and only if there
is a microbribery of cost at most k′ that does not involve the head-to-head contest between p and ci but that
ensures that ci’s CopelandαIrrational score is higher than p’s. It is easy to see that
M(E, p,ci,k) ⇐⇒
(
M′(E1, p,ci,k− k1)∨M′(E2, p,ci,k− k2)∨M′(E3, p,ci,k− k3)
)
.
Thus it is enough to focus on the problem of computing M′(E ′, p,ci,k′).
Let (E ′,k′) be one of (E1,k− k1), (E2,k− k2), and (E3,k− k3). Define promoteE ′(ci,w′,w′′, t), where
ci ∈ C is a candidate and w′, w′′, and t are nonnegative integers, to be the minimum cost of a microbribery
that, when applied to E ′, increases ci’s CopelandαIrrational score by w′+(1−α)w′′+αt via ensuring that
1. ci wins an additional w′ head-to-head contests against candidates in C−{p} that used to defeat ci
originally,
2. ci wins an additional w′′ head-to-head contests against candidates in C−{p} with whom ci used to tie
originally, and
3. ci ties an additional t head-to-head contests with candidates in C−{p} that used to defeat ci originally.
If such a microbribery does not exist then we set promoteE ′(ci,w′,w′′, t) to be ∞. It is an easy exercise to see
that promoteE ′ is computable in polynomial time by a simple greedy algorithm.
We define demoteE ′(ci, ℓ′, ℓ′′, t) to be the minimum cost of a microbribery that, when applied to election
E ′, decreases p’s score by ℓ′+αℓ′′+(1−α)t via ensuring that
1. p loses an additional ℓ′ head-to-head contests to candidates in C−{ci} whom p used to defeat origi-
nally,
7We stress that we have optimized our algorithm for simplicity rather than for performance.
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2. p loses an additional ℓ′′ head-to-head contests to candidates in C−{ci} with whom p used to tie
originally, and
3. p ties an additional t head-to-head contests with candidates in C−{ci} whom p used to defeat origi-
nally.
If such a microbribery does not exist then we set demoteE ′(ci, ℓ′, ℓ′′, t) to be ∞. Note that demoteE ′ can be
computed in polynomial time using an algorithm similar to that for promoteE ′ .
Naturally, the microbriberies used implicitly within promoteE ′(ci,w′,w′′, t ′), within demoteE ′(ci, ℓ′, ℓ′′, t ′′),
and within transforming E to E ′ are “disjoint,” i.e., they never involve the same pair of candidates. Thus
M′(E ′, p,ci,k′) is true if and only if there exist integers w′,w′′, ℓ′, ℓ′′, t ′, t ′′ ∈ {0,1, . . . ,m} such that
scoreαE ′(ci)+ (w
′+ ℓ′+(1−α)(t ′′+w′′)+α(t ′+ ℓ′′))− scoreαE ′(p)> 0
and
promoteE ′(ci,w
′,w′′, t ′)+ demoteE ′(ci, ℓ′, ℓ′′, t ′′)≤ k.
There are only polynomially many combinations of such w′,w′′, ℓ′, ℓ′′, t ′, and t ′′, and we can try them all. Thus
we have given a polynomial-time algorithm for M′(E ′, p,ci,k′). Via the observations given at the beginning
of our proof this implies that M(E, p,ci,k) is computable in polynomial time and the proof is complete. ❑
The above destructive-case algorithm and approach is fairly straightforward; in the destructive case we
do not need to worry about any side effects of promoting c and demoting p. The constructive case is more
complicated, but we still are able to obtain polynomial-time algorithms via a fairly involved use of flow
networks to model how particular points shift between candidates. In the remainder of this section we restrict
ourselves to the values α ∈ {0,1} or settings where the number of voters is odd and so ties never happen. We
remind the reader that Copeland1 and Copeland1Irrational, respectively, refer to Llull voting.
A flow network is a network of nodes with directed edges through which we want to transport some
amount of flow from the source to the sink (these are two designated nodes). Each edge e can carry up to c(e)
units of flow, and transporting each unit of flow through e costs a(e). In the min-cost-flow problem we have
a target flow value F , and the goal is to find a way of transporting F units of flow from the source to the sink,
while minimizing the cost. (If there is no way of achieving target flow F , the cost in effect is infinite.)
We now define the notions related to flow networks more formally. Let N = {0,1,2, . . .} and Z =
{. . . ,−2,−1,0,1,2, . . .}.
Definition 3.8 1. A flow network is a quintuple (K,s, t,c,a), where K is a set of nodes that includes the
source s and the sink t, c : K2 → N is the capacity function, and a : K2 → N is the cost function. We
assume that c(u,u) = a(u,u) = 0 for each node u ∈ K, and that at most one of c(u,v) and c(v,u) is
nonzero for each pair of distinct nodes u,v ∈ K. We also assume that if c(u,v) = 0 then a(u,v) = 0 as
well.
2. Given a flow network (K,s, t,c,a), a flow is a function f : K2 →Z that satisfies the following conditions:
(a) For each u,v ∈ K, we have f (u,v)≤ c(u,v), i.e., capacities limit the flow.
(b) For each u,v ∈ K, we have f (u,v) =− f (v,u).8
(c) For each u ∈ K−{s, t}, we have ∑v∈K f (u,v) = 0, i.e., the flow is conserved in all nodes except
the source and the sink.
8Note that each flow is fully defined via its nonnegative values. Whenever we speak of a flow (e.g., when defining some particular
flows) we will just speak of its nonnegative part.
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3. The value of flow f is:
flowvalue( f ) = ∑
v∈K
f (s,v).
The particular flow network we have in mind will always be clear from the context and so we will not
indicate it explicitly (we will not write it explicitly as a subscript to the function flowvalue).
4. The cost of flow f is defined as:
flowcost( f ) = ∑
u,v∈K
a(u,v) f (u,v).
That is, we pay the price a(u,v) for each unit of flow that passes from node u to node v.
Given a flow network (K,s, t,c,a) we will often use the term edges to refer to pairs of distinct nodes
(u,v) ∈ K2 for which c(u,v)> 0.
Below we define the min-cost-flow problem, which is well known from the literature. The definition we
employ here is not the most general one but will suffice for our needs. (Readers seeking a broader discussion
of the problem may wish to see, for example, the monograph by Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin [AMO93].)
Definition 3.9 We define the min-cost-flow problem as follows: Given a flow network (K,s, t,c,a) and a
target flow value F, find a flow f that has value F (if one exists) and has minimum cost among all such flows,
or otherwise indicate that no such flow f exists.
The min-cost-flow problem has a polynomial-time algorithm.9 There is a large body of work devoted
to flow problems and we will not even attempt to provide a complete list of references here. Instead, we
again point the reader to the excellent monograph by Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin [AMO93], which provides
descriptions of polynomial-time algorithms, theoretical analysis, and numerous references to previous work
on flow-related problems. We also mention that the issue of flows is so prevalent in the study of algorithms
that the textbook of Cormen et al. [CLRS01, p. 787] contains an exposition of the min-cost-flow problem.
Coming back to the study of constructive microbribery for Llull and Copeland0, with irrational voters
allowed, we now present the following result.
Theorem 3.10 For α ∈ {0,1}, CopelandαIrrational is vulnerable to constructive microbribery, in both the
nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model.
We prove Theorem 3.10 via Lemmas 3.11 through 3.17 below, which cover three cases: (a) an odd
number of voters, where all CopelandαIrrational elections with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 are identical due to the lack of ties,
(b) Copeland1Irrational with an even number of voters, and (c) Copeland0Irrational with an even number of voters.
These lemmas only discuss the nonunique-winner model but in each case it is easy to see how to change the
algorithms and proofs to make them work for the unique-winner model.
Lemma 3.11 For each rational α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that solves the con-
structive microbribery problem for CopelandαIrrational elections with an odd number of voters (in the nonunique-
winner model).
9The min-cost-flow problem is often defined in terms of capacity and cost functions that are not necessarily limited to nonnegative
integer values and so the corresponding flows are not restricted to integer values either. However, crucially for us, it is known that if the
capacity and cost functions have integral values (as we have assumed) then there exist optimal solutions to the min-cost-flow problem
that use only integer-valued flows and that can be found in polynomial time.
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Edge Parameters
e = (s,ci),
where ci ∈C
c(e) = scoreαE (ci)
a(e) = 0
e = (ci,c j),
where ci,c j ∈C and vsE(ci,c j)> 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = wincostE(c j,ci)
e = (c0, t)
c(e) = T
a(e) = 0
e = (ci, t),
where i > 0 and ci ∈C
c(e) = T
a(e) = B
every other edge e c(e) = 0
a(e) = 0
Figure 1: Edge capacities and costs for min-cost-flow instance I(T ), built from election E .
Proof. Our input is a nonnegative integer k (the budget) and an election E = (C,V ), where the candidate
set C is {c0,c1, . . . ,cm}, the number of voters is odd, and p = c0 is the candidate whose victory we want to
ensure via at most k microbribes. Note that we interchangeably use p and c0 to refer to the same candidate,
since it is sometimes convenient to be able to speak of p and all other candidates uniformly. As the number
of voters is odd, ties never occur. Thus any candidate ci has the same CopelandαIrrational score for each rational
value of α , 0≤ α ≤ 1. Fix an arbitrary such α .
We give a polynomial-time algorithm for the constructive microbribery problem. A high-level overview
is that we try to find a threshold value T such that there is a microbribery of cost at most k that transforms E
into E ′ such that (a) p has scoreαE ′ exactly T , and (b) every other candidate has scoreαE ′ at most T .
Let B be a number that is greater than the cost of any possible microbribery within E (e.g., B = ‖V‖ ·
‖C‖2 + 1). For each possible threshold T , we consider a min-cost-flow instance I(T ) with node set K =
C∪{s, t}, where s is the source and t is the sink, the edge capacities and costs are specified in Figure 1, and
the target flow value is
F = ∑
ci∈C
scoreαE (ci) =
‖C‖(‖C‖− 1)
2
.
Example 3.12 For illustration, consider the following example. Suppose the given election E has four can-
didates and three voters, and the preference tables of the voters (who each happen to be rational in this
example) can be obtained from their preference orders that are shown in Figure 2, which also gives the cor-
responding values of vsE(ci,c j) for each pair of candidates. Thus we have scoreαE (c0) = 2, scoreαE (c1) = 0,
scoreαE (c2) = 3, and scoreαE (c3) = 1. Suppose further that we are allowed to perform one microbribe, so
k = 1. Clearly, one microbribe that changes the preference of the third voter from c2 > c0 to c0 > c2 will flip
the outcome of their head-to-head contest from c2 winning to c0 winning, which is enough to reach our goal
of making c0 win the election, and this is of course the cheapest possible successful microbribery. Finally,
note that in this example we have B = 49.
For each threshold T with 0 ≤ T ≤ 3, the flow network I(T ) corresponding to this instance (E,c0,k) of
the constructive microbribery problem is shown in Figure 3, and we have a target flow value of F = 6. Every
edge e in this flow network is labeled by the pair (c(e),a(e)) of numbers that give the capacity and the cost
of edge e, respectively.
To continue the proof of Lemma 3.11, note that with an odd number of voters, constructive microbribery
in CopelandαIrrational simply requires us to choose for which pairs of distinct candidates we want to flip the
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Voter 1 : c0 > c1 > c2 > c3
Voter 2 : c3 > c2 > c1 > c0
Voter 3 : c2 > c0 > c3 > c1
vsE(ci,c j) c0 c1 c2 c3
c0 0 1 −1 1
c1 −1 0 −1 −1
c2 1 1 0 1
c3 −1 1 −1 0
Figure 2: Sample election E for Example 3.12 in the proof of Lemma 3.11.
c1
c2
c3
ts
c0
(2,0)
(0,0)
(1,0)
(3,0)
(1,1)
(1,1)
(1,1)
(T,0)
(T,49)
(T,49)
(T,49)
(1,1)
(1,1)
(1,1)
Figure 3: Flow network I(T ) corresponding to the instance (E,c0,k) of Example 3.12.
outcome of their head-to-head contest in order to ensure p’s victory. Thus it is sufficient to represent a
microbribery M as a collection of pairs (ci,c j) of distinct candidates for whom we need to flip the result of
their head-to-head contest from ci winning to c j winning. Clearly, given such a collection M, the cheapest
way to implement it costs
∑
(ci,c j)∈M
wincostE(c j,ci).
A crucial observation for our algorithm is that we can directly translate flows to microbriberies using the
following interpretation. Let f be a flow (as per Definition 3.8 with all edge flows being integers) of value
F within instance I(T ). The units of flow that travel through the network correspond to CopelandαIrrational
points. For each ci ∈ C, we interpret the amount of flow that goes directly from s to ci as the number of
CopelandαIrrational points that ci has before any microbribery is attempted,10 and the amount of flow that goes
directly from ci to t as the number of CopelandαIrrational points that ci has after the microbribery (defined by
the flow). The units of flow that travel between distinct ci’s (i.e., through edges of the form (ci,c j), i 6= j)
correspond to the microbribes exerted: A unit of flow traveling from node ci to c j corresponds to changing
the result of the head-to-head contest between ci and c j from ci winning to c j winning. In this case, the
CopelandαIrrational point moves from ci to c j and the cost of the flow increases by a(ci,c j) = wincost(c j,ci),
exactly the minimum cost of a microbribery that flips this contest’s result. Let M f be the microbribery defined,
10Note that for each ci ∈C any flow of value F within I(T ) needs to send exactly scoreαE (ci) units from s to ci .
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procedure CopelandαIrrational-odd-microbribery(E = (C,V ),k, p)
begin
if p is a winner of E then accept;
F = ∑ci∈C scoreαE (ci) = ‖C‖(‖C‖−1)2 ;
for T = 0 to ‖C‖− 1 do
begin
build an instance I(T ) of min-cost-flow;
if I(T ) has no flow of value F then
restart the for loop with the next value of T ;
f = a minimum-cost flow for I(T );
if f (c0, t)< T then restart the loop;
κ = flowcost( f )−B · (F−T );
if κ ≤ k then accept;
end;
reject;
end
Figure 4: The constructive microbribery algorithm for CopelandαIrrational elections with an odd number of
voters.
as just described, by flow f . It is easy to see that
flowcost( f ) = B · (F− f (c0, t))+ ∑
(ci,c j)∈M f
wincostE(c j,ci).
Thus we can easily extract the cost of microbribery M f from the cost of flow f .
Our algorithm crucially depends on this correspondence between flows and microbriberies. (Also, in
the proofs of Lemmas 3.14 and 3.17 that cover the case of an even number of voters we simply show how
to modify the instances I(T ) to handle ties, and we show correspondences between the new networks and
microbriberies; the rest of these proofs is the same as here.)
Note that for small values of T no flow of value F exists for I(T ). The reason for this is that the edges
coming into the sink t might not have enough capacity so as to hold a flow of value F . In such a situation
it is impossible to guarantee that every candidate gets at most T points; there are too many CopelandαIrrational
points to distribute.
Figure 4 gives our algorithm for constructive microbribery in CopelandαIrrational. This algorithm runs in
polynomial time since, as we have already mentioned, the min-cost-flow problem is solvable in polynomial
time.
Let us now prove that this algorithm is correct. We have presented above how a flow f of value F within
the flow network I(T ) (with 0≤ T ≤ F) defines a microbribery. Based on this, it is clear that if our algorithm
accepts then there is a microbribery of cost at most k that ensures p’s victory.
On the other hand, suppose now that there exists a microbribery of cost at most k that ensures p’s victory
in the election. We will show that our algorithm accepts in this case.
Let M be a minimum-cost bribery (of cost at most k) that ensures p’s victory. As pointed out above, M
can be represented as a collection of pairs (ci,c j) of distinct candidates for whom we flip the result of the
head-to-head contest from ci winning to c j winning. The cost of M is
∑
(ci,c j)∈M
wincostE(c j,ci).
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Since applying microbribery M ensures that p is a winner, we have that each candidate among c1,c2, . . . ,cm
has at most as many CopelandαIrrational points as p does. Let E ′ be the election that results from E after
applying microbribery M to E (i.e., after flipping the results of the contests specified by M in an optimal
way, as given by wincostE ). Let T ′ be scoreαE ′(p), p’s CopelandαIrrational score after implementing M. Clearly,
0≤ T ′ ≤ ‖C‖− 1.
Consider instance I(T ′) and let fM be the flow that corresponds to the microbribery M. In this flow each
edge of the form (s,ci) carries flow of its maximum capacity, scoreαE (ci), each edge of the form (ci,c j) carries
one unit of flow exactly if e is listed in M and carries zero units of flow otherwise, and each edge of the form
(ci, t) carries scoreαE ′(ci) units of flow. It is easy to see that this is a legal flow. The cost of fM is
flowcost( fM) = B · (F−T ′)+ ∑
(ci,c j)∈M
wincostE(c j,ci).
After applying M, p gets T ′ CopelandαIrrational points that travel to the sink t via edge (c0, t) with cost a(c0, t) =
0, and all the remaining F − T ′ points travel via edges (ci, t), i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}, with cost a(ci, t) = B. The
remaining part of flowcost( fM) is the cost of the units of flow traveling through the edges (ci,c j) that directly
correspond to the cost of microbribery M.
Now consider some minimum-cost flow fmin for I(T ′). Since fM exists, a minimum-cost flow must exist
as well. Clearly, we have
flowcost( fmin)≤ flowcost( fM).
Let T ′′ be the number of units of flow that fmin assigns to travel over the edge (c0, t), i.e., T ′′ = fmin(c0, t).
The only edges with nonzero cost for sending flow through them are those in the set {(ci,c j) | ci,c j ∈
C ∧ vsE(ci,c j) > 0} ∪ {(ci, t) | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} and thus the cost of fmin can be expressed as (recall that
vsE(ci,c j)> 0 implies i 6= j)
flowcost( fmin) = B · (F−T ′′)+ ∑
ci,c j∈C∧vsE (ci,c j)>0
fmin(ci,c j) ·wincostE(c j,ci).
B > ∑i, j,i6= j wincostE(ci,c j), for each ci,c j ∈ C such that vsE(ci,c j) > 0 we have fmin(ci,c j) ∈ {0,1}, and
flowcost( fmin)≤ flowcost( fM), so it must hold that T ′′ = T ′ and
∑
ci,c j∈C∧vsE (ci,c j)>0
fmin(ci,c j) ·wincostE(c j,ci)≤ ∑
(ci,c j)∈M
wincostE(c j,ci).
Thus flow fmin corresponds to a microbribery that guarantees p’s victory and has cost at most as high as that
of M. Since M was chosen to have minimum cost among all such microbriberies, flow fmin corresponds to
a microbribery of minimum cost and our algorithm correctly accepts within the for loop of Figure 4, at the
very latest when in the for loop T is set to T ′. ❑
We now turn to the algorithms showing that Llull and Copeland0, with irrational voters allowed, are
vulnerable to constructive microbribery when the number of voters is even. In this case we need to take into
account that it sometimes is more desirable to have some candidates tie each other in a head-to-head contest
than to have one of them win the contest.
Lemma 3.13 Let E = (C,V ) be an election with candidate set C = {c0,c1, . . . ,cm} and with an even number
of voters, specified via preference tables over C. If the election is conducted using Copeland0Irrational then no
minimum-cost microbribery that ensures victory for c0 involves either (a) flipping a result of a head-to-head
contest between any two distinct candidates ci,c j ∈C−{c0} from ci winning to c j winning, or (b) changing
a result of a head-to-head contest between any two distinct candidates in C−{c0} from a tie to one of them
winning.
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Proof. Our proof follows by way of contradiction. Let E = (C,V ) be an election as specified in the lemma.
For the sake of a contradiction suppose there is a minimum-cost microbribery M that makes c0 win and that
there are two distinct candidates, ci and c j, in C−{c0} such that microbribery M involves switching the result
of the head-to-head contest between these candidates from ci winning to c j winning or from a tie to one of
them winning. Consider the microbribery M′ that is identical to M, except that it makes ci tie with c j in a
head-to-head contest, either via an appropriate number of microbribes if ci and c j do not tie originally, or via
leaving the corresponding preference-table entries untouched if they do tie initially. Clearly, this microbribery
M′ has a lower cost than M and it still ensures c0’s victory. This is a contradiction. ❑
With Lemma 3.13 at hand, we can show that constructive microbribery is easy for Copeland0Irrational for
the case of an even number of voters.
Lemma 3.14 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that solves the constructive microbribery problem for
Copeland0Irrational elections with an even number of voters (in the nonunique-winner model).
Proof. Our input is election E = (C,V ), where C = {c0,c1, . . . ,cm}, p = c0, and V is a collection of an
even number of voters, each specified via a preference table over C. Our algorithm is essentially the same
as that used in the proof of Lemma 3.11, except that instead of using instances I(T ) we now use instances
J(T ) defined below. In this proof we show how to construct these instances and how they correspond to
microbriberies within E . The proof of Lemma 3.11 shows how to use such a correspondence to solve the
microbribery problem at hand.
Let T be a nonnegative integer, 0 ≤ T ≤ ‖C‖− 1. Instance J(T ) is somewhat different from the instance
I(T ) used in the proof of Lemma 3.11. In particular, due to Lemma 3.13 (and the fact that our goal is to make
c0 a winner), we model only microbriberies that have the following effects on our election:
1. For any two distinct candidates ci, c j in C−{c0}, the result of the head-to-head contest between ci and
c j may possibly turn into a tie.
2. For each candidate ci in C−{c0}, the result of a head-to-head contest between c0 and ci may possibly
turn into either a tie (from ci defeating c0) or into c0 defeating ci (from either a tie or from ci defeating
c0).
Our instance J(T ) contains special nodes, namely the elements of the sets C′ and C′′ below, to handle
these possible interactions. We define
C′ = {ci j | i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}∧vsE(ci,c j)> 0} and
C′′ = {ci0 | i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}∧vsE(ci,c0)≥ 0}.
For each possible threshold T , define J(T ) to be the flow network with node set K =C∪C′∪C′′∪{s, t}, where
s is the source, t is the sink, and the edge capacities and costs are as stated in Figure 5. (As before, we set B
to be a number that is greater than the cost of any possible microbribery within E , e.g., B = ‖V‖ · ‖C‖2 + 1.)
The target flow value is
F = ∑
v∈K
c(s,v).
Instance J(T ) is fairly complicated but it in fact does closely follow the instance of microbribery that we
have at hand. As in the proof of Lemma 3.11, the units of flow that travel through the network are interpreted
as Copeland0Irrational points, and flows are interpreted as specifying microbriberies.
Example 3.15 For illustration, we add a fourth voter to the election given in Example 3.12; call the resulting
election E. Again, all voters happen to be rational, and their preference tables can easily be derived from
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Edge Parameters
e = (s,ci),
where ci ∈C
c(e) = score0E(ci)
a(e) = 0
e = (ci,ci j),
where ci,c j ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c j)> 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = tiecostE(c j,ci)
e = (ci, t),
where ci ∈C−{c0}
c(e) = T
a(e) = B
e = (ci j, t),
where ci,c j ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c j)> 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = B
e = (ci,ci0),
where ci ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c0)> 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = tiecostE(c0,ci)
e = (ci0,c0),
where ci ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c0)≥ 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = wincostE(c0,ci)− tiecostE(c0,ci)
e = (s,ci0),
where ci ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c0) = 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = 0
e = (ci0, t),
where ci ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c0)≥ 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = B
e = (c0, t)
c(e) = T
a(e) = 0
every other edge e c(e) = 0
a(e) = 0
Figure 5: Edge capacities and costs for min-cost-flow instance J(T ), built from election E .
Voter 1 : c0 > c1 > c2 > c3
Voter 2 : c3 > c2 > c1 > c0
Voter 3 : c2 > c0 > c3 > c1
Voter 4 : c2 > c3 > c0 > c1
vsE(ci,c j) c0 c1 c2 c3
c0 0 2 −2 0
c1 −2 0 −2 −2
c2 2 2 0 2
c3 0 2 −2 0
Figure 6: A sample election E for Example 3.15 in the proof of Lemma 3.14.
the preference orders shown in Figure 6, which also provides the corresponding values of vsE(ci,c j) for
each pair of candidates. We now have score0E(c0) = score0E(c3) = 1, score0E(c1) = 0, and score0E(c2) = 3.
Suppose we are allowed to do two microbribes and so have k = 2. Two microbribes that change, say, the
fourth voter’s preference table to him or her now ranking c0 above of both c2 and c3 yields an election E ′
with score0E ′(c0) = score
0
E ′(c2) = 2, score
0
E ′(c3) = 1, and score
0
E ′(c1) = 0, thus reaching our goal of making
c0 a winner of the election. It is easy to see that this is a cheapest among all possible successful microbribes.
Finally, note that in this example we have B = 65.
For any threshold T with 0 ≤ T ≤ 3, the flow network J(T ) corresponding to this instance (E,c0,k) of
the constructive microbribery problem is shown in Figure 7, and we have a target flow value of F = 6. Every
edge e in this flow network is labeled by the pair (c(e),a(e)) of numbers that give the capacity and the cost
of edge e, respectively.
To continue the proof of Lemma 3.14, let us now describe a bit more precisely how we interpret our
flow network J(T ). In particular, we will argue that each flow f of value F that travels through the network
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c0
c30
c3
c1 c2
c20
c21
c23
c31
(1,0)
(1,0)
(1,0)
(0,0)
(3,0)
(1,1)
(1,1)
(1,1)
(1,1)
(1,1)
(1,1)
(T,65)
(T,65)
(T,65)
(T,0)
(1,65)
(1,65)
(1,65)
(1,65)
(1,65)
Figure 7: Flow network J(T ) corresponding to the instance (E,c0,k) of Example 3.15.
J(T ) corresponds to a microbribery within E that gives each candidate ci ∈C exactly f (ci, t) Copeland0Irrational
points:
1. For each ci ∈C, the units of flow that enter ci from s correspond to the number of ci’s Copeland0Irrational
points in E , prior to any microbribery.
2. For each ci ∈ C, the units of flow that go directly from ci to t correspond to the number of ci’s
Copeland0Irrational points after a microbribery as specified by the flow.
3. For each pair of distinct candidates ci,c j ∈C−{c0} such that ci defeats c j in their head-to-head contest
in E , we have an edge e = (ci,ci j) with capacity one and cost tiecostE(c j,ci). A unit of flow that
travels through e corresponds to a microbribe that makes ci tie with c j: ci loses the point, we pay
tiecostE(c j,ci), and then the unit of flow goes directly to t. (From Lemma 3.13 we know that we do
not need to handle any other possible interactions between ci and c j in their head-to-head contest.)
4. For each candidate ci ∈C−{c0} such that ci defeats c0 in a head-to-head contest, we need to allow for
the possibility that a microbribery causes c0 to either tie with ci or to defeat ci. Fix an arbitrary such ci.
A unit of flow that travels directly from ci to ci0 and then directly to t corresponds to a microbribery
after which c0 ties with ci: ci loses the point but c0 does not receive it and the cost of the flow increases
by tiecostE(c0,ci).
On the other hand, if that unit of flow travels from ci to ci0 and then directly to c0, then this corresponds
to a microbribery after which c0 defeats ci. The point travels from ci to c0 and the cost of the flow
increases by wincostE(c0,ci).
If there is no flow entering node ci0 then this means that our microbribery does not change the result of
a head-to-head contest between c0 and ci.
5. For each candidate ci ∈C−{c0} such that ci ties with c0 in a head-to-head contest before any micro-
bribery is attempted, we need to allow for c0 defeating ci after the microbribery. Fix any such ci. A
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unit of flow that travels directly from s to ci0 and then directly to c0 corresponds to a microbribery
after which c0 defeats ci in a head-to-head contest: c0 gets an additional point and the cost of the flow
increases by wincostE(c0,ci)− tiecostE(c0,ci) = wincostE(c0,ci).
On the other hand, a unit of flow that travels from s directly to ci0 and then directly to t corresponds to
a microbribery that does not change the result of a head-to-head contest between c0 and ci.
Based on these comments, we can see the natural correspondence between flows in J(T ) and micro-
briberies. In particular, each flow f of value F that travels through the network J(T ) corresponds to a
microbribery within E that gives each candidate ci ∈C exactly f (ci, t) Copeland0Irrational points.
Now let M f be a microbribery defined by flow f of value F within J(T ), 0 ≤ T ≤ ‖C‖− 1, assuming
that one exists. Let cost(M f ) be the minimum cost of implementing microbribery M f . A close inspection of
instance J(T ) shows that the cost of such a flow f is
flowcost( f ) = B · (F− f (c0, t))+ cost(M f ).
Because of the above equation, the fact that all units of flow that are not accounted for as c0’s points (i.e.,
the units of flow that do not travel through the edge (c0, t)) impose cost B on the flow, and via arguments
analogous to those in Lemma 3.11, the following holds: If for a given J(T ), 0≤ T ≤ ‖C‖− 1, there exists a
flow of value F then a minimum-cost flow fmin of value F corresponds to a minimum-cost microbribery that
ensures that c0 receives T points and each other candidate receives at most T points. (Intuitively, the reason
for this is that B is so large that in a minimum-cost flow one would always send as few units of flow through
edges of cost B, but each node ci can receive (or, equivalently, send through some path to the sink) at most
T points.) Thus, to solve the constructive microbribery problem for Copeland0Irrational elections with an even
number of voters it is enough to run the algorithm from Figure 4, using the instances J(T ) instead of I(T )
and using the new value of F . ❑
We now show that Llull, with irrational voters allowed, is vulnerable to constructive microbribery when
there are an even number of voters. The following lemma reduces the set of microbriberies we need to model
in this case.
Lemma 3.16 Let E = (C,V ) be an election with candidate set C = {c0,c1, . . . ,cm} and with an even number
of voters, specified via preference tables over C. If the election is conducted using Copeland1Irrational then
no minimum-cost microbribery that ensures victory for c0 involves obtaining a tie in a head-to-head contest
between any two distinct candidates in C−{c0}.
Proof. Our proof is again by way of contradiction. Let E = (C,V ) be an election as specified in the lemma.
Suppose there is a minimum-cost microbribery that ensures c0’s victory and that involves obtaining a tie
in a head-to-head contest between two distinct candidates in C−{c0}, say ci and c j. That is, before this
microbribery we have that either ci defeats c j or c j defeats ci in their head-to-head contest but afterward they
are tied. Clearly, a microbribery that is identical to this one except that does not change the result of the head-
to-head contest between ci and c j (i.e., one that does not microbribe any voters to flip their preference-table
entries regarding ci versus c j) has a smaller cost and still ensures c0’s victory. This is a contradiction. ❑
Lemma 3.17 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that solves the constructive microbribery problem for
Copeland1Irrational elections with an even number of voters (in the nonunique-winner model).
Proof. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for constructive microbribery in Copeland1Irrational elec-
tions with an even number of voters. Our input is a budget k ∈ N and an election E = (C,V ), where
31
C = {c0,c1, . . . ,cm}, p = c0, and V contains an even number of voters specified via their preference tables
over C. Our goal is to ensure p’s victory via at most k microbribes.
We use essentially the algorithm from the proof of Lemma 3.11, except that instead of using instances
I(T ) we now employ instances L(T ) that are designed to handle tie issues as appropriate for Copeland1Irrational.
Lemma 3.16 tells us that our min-cost-flow instances L(T ) do not need to model microbriberies that incur
ties between pairs of distinct candidates in C−{c0}. We also don’t need to model microbriberies that change
the outcome of the head-to-head contest between c0 and any candidate in C−{c0} from c0 winning to c0
not winning or from a tie to c0 losing. However, we do need to model possible microbribery-induced ties
between c0 and each ci in C−{c0}.
Define B to be a number that is greater than the cost of any possible microbribery within E (e.g., B =
‖V‖ · ‖C‖2+ 1 will do). Further, define the following three sets of nodes:
C′ = {c′i | ci ∈C},
C′′ = {ci j | i < j∧ ci,c j ∈C∧vsE(ci,c j) = 0}, and
C′′′ = {c0i | ci ∈C∧vsE(ci,c0)> 0}.
Our flow network L(T ) has the node set K =C∪C′∪C′′∪C′′′∪{s, t}, where s is the source, t is the sink, and
the capacities and costs of edges are defined in Figure 8. Each instance L(T ) asks for a minimum-cost flow
of value
F = ∑
ci∈C
c(s,ci).
Example 3.18 Consider the sample election E from Example 3.15 again, which is given in Figure 6. Since we
are using Copeland1Irrational now, we have the following scores: score1E(c0) = score1E(c3) = 2, score1E(c1) = 0,
and score1E(c2) = 3. Let k = 1. We can reach our goal of making c0 win via one microbribe that switches
the preference table of, say, the third voter to now prefer c0 over c2. This microbribe gives c0 one more
Copeland1Irrational point (i.e., score1E ′(c0) = 3 in the modified election E ′), but it doesn’t change the score of
any of the other candidates within Copeland1Irrational. Again, we have B = 65.
For any threshold T with 0 ≤ T ≤ 3, the flow network L(T ) corresponding to this instance (E,c0,k) of
the constructive microbribery problem is shown in Figure 9. We now have a target flow value of F = 7, and
every edge e in this flow network is labeled by the pair (c(e),a(e)) of numbers that give the capacity and the
cost of edge e, respectively.
To continue the proof of Lemma 3.17, note that a flow f of value F within L(T ), 0 ≤ T ≤ ‖C‖− 1,
corresponds to a microbribery M f within election E that leaves each candidate ci with exactly f (ci,c′i)
Copeland1Irrational points. As in the proofs of Lemmas 3.11 and 3.14, points traveling through the network
L(T ) are here interpreted as Copeland1Irrational points and flows are interpreted as specifying microbriberies.
More specifically, we interpret the units of flow traveling through L(T ) as follows:
1. For each ci ∈C, the units of flow that enter ci from s are interpreted as the Copeland1Irrational points that
ci has before any microbribery is attempted.
2. For each ci ∈C, the units of flow that travel directly from ci to c′i are interpreted as the Copeland1Irrational
points that ci has after the microbribery defined by f has been performed.
3. If a candidate ci ∈C−{c0} originally defeats c0 but our flow models a microbribery in which c0 and ci
end up tied in their head-to-head contest, then we have a single Copeland1Irrational point that travels from
ci to c′i, then to c0 through c0i, at cost tiecostE(c0,ci), and then to c′0. This way the same unit of flow is
accounted both for the score of c0 and for the score of ci. Note that such a unit of flow then travels to t
through edge (c0, t) at zero cost.
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Edge Parameters
e = (s,ci),
where ci ∈C
c(e) = score1E(ci)
a(e) = 0
e = (ci,c j),
where ci,c j ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c j)> 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = wincostE(c j,ci)
e = (ci,ci j),
where i < j, ci,c j ∈C and vsE(ci,c j) = 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = wincostE(c j,ci)
e = (c j,ci j),
where i < j, ci,c j ∈C and vsE(ci,c j) = 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = wincostE(ci,c j)
e = (ci j, t),
where i < j, ci,c j ∈C and vsE(ci,c j) = 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = B
e = (ci,c0i),
where ci ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c0)> 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = wincost(c0,ci)
e = (c′i,c0i),
where ci ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c0)> 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = tiecost(c0,ci)
e = (c0i,c0),
where ci ∈C−{c0} and vsE(ci,c0)> 0
c(e) = 1
a(e) = 0
e = (ci,c
′
i),
where ci ∈C
c(e) = T
a(e) = 0
e = (c′i, t),
where ci ∈C−{c0}
c(e) = T
a(e) = B
e = (c′0, t)
c(e) = T
a(e) = 0
every other edge e c(e) = 0
a(e) = 0
Figure 8: Edge capacities and costs for min-cost-flow instance L(T ), built from election E .
4. For any two distinct candidates ci and c j such that ci,c j ∈ C−{c0} where ci defeats c j in a head-to-
head contest in E , a unit of flow traveling from ci to c j corresponds to a microbribery that flips the
result of their head-to-head contest. Thus c j receives the Copeland1Irrational point and the cost of the flow
increases by wincostE(c j,ci).
5. For any ci ∈C−{c0} where ci defeats c0 in a head-to-head contest in E , a unit of flow traveling from
ci to c0 via c0i corresponds to a microbribery that flips the result of their head-to-head contest. Thus
ci receives the Copeland1Irrational point and the cost of the flow increases by wincostE(c0,ci). Note that
since the edge (c0i,c0) has capacity one we ensure that at most one unit of flow travels from ci to c0
(either on a path ci,c0i,c0 (modeling a microbribery that flips the result of the head-to-head contest
between ci and c0 to c0 winning) or on a path ci,c′i,c0i,c0 (modeling a microbribery that enforces a tie
between c0 and ci)).
6. For each ci,c j ∈C, we have to take into account the possibility that ci and c j are tied in their head-to-
head contest within E , but via microbribery we want to change the result of this contest. Let ci,c j ∈C
be two such candidates and let i < j. Here, a unit of flow traveling from ci to ci j (or, analogously, from
c j to ci j) is interpreted as a microbribery that ensures c j’s (ci’s) victory in the head-to-head contest.
Since ci and c j were already tied, c j (ci) already has his or her point for the victory and ci (c j) gets rid
of his or her point through the node ci j. The cost of the flow increases by wincostE(c j,ci) (respectively,
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s t
c0
c1
c03
c2
c3
c′0
c′1
c′2
c′3
(0,0)
(2,0)
(1,2) (1,1)
(1,1)
(T,0)
(T,0)
(T,0)
(T,0)
(1,2)
(T,0)
(T,65)
(T,65)
(T,65)
(2,0)
(3,0)
(1,2)
(1,65)
(1,2)
(1,0)
(1,1)
c02
Figure 9: Flow network L(T ) corresponding to the instance (E,c0,k) of Example 3.18.
by wincostE(ci,c j)). Also, we point out that via the introduction of node ci j we ensure that only one
of ci and c j, let us call him or her ck, can lose a point by sending it from ck to ci j and then to t; the
capacity of edge (ci j, t) is only one.
Through the above description, we can see the natural correspondence between flows in L(T ) and micro-
briberies. In particular, each flow f of value F corresponds to a microbribery M f within E that gives each
candidate ci exactly f (ci,c′i) points.
Let us now analyze the cost of f . It is easy to see that each unit of flow that is not accounted for as a
Copeland1Irrational point of c0 reaches the sink t via an edge of cost B. Also, the only other edges through which
units of flow travel at nonzero cost are those that define the microbribery M f . Thus the cost of our flow f can
be expressed as
flowcost( f ) = B · (F− f (c0,c′0))+ cost(M f ).
Fix T such that 0 ≤ T ≤ ‖C‖− 1. Given the above properties of L(T ) and by the arguments presented
in the proof of Lemma 3.11, if a flow of value F exists within the flow network of instance L(T ), then each
minimum-cost flow in L(T ) corresponds to a microbribery that ensures that c0 has exactly T Copeland1Irrational
points and every other candidate has at most T Copeland1Irrational points. Thus if there exists a value T ′ such
that
1. there is a flow of value F in L(T ′) and
2. the cost of a minimum-cost flow f of value F in L(T ′) is K,
then there is a microbribery of cost K−B · (F−T ′) that ensures c0’s victory.
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On the other hand, via Lemma 3.16 and our correspondence between flows for L(T ) and microbriberies
in E , there is a value T ′′ such that a minimum-cost flow in L(T ′′) corresponds to a minimum-cost micro-
bribery that ensures p’s victory. Thus the algorithm from Figure 4, used with the instances L(T ) instead
of I(T ) and with our new value of F , solves in polynomial time the constructive microbribery problem for
Copeland1Irrational with an even number of voters. ❑
Together, Theorem 3.7 and Lemmas 3.11, 3.14, and 3.17 show that, in particular, both Copeland1Irrational
and Copeland0Irrational are vulnerable to microbribery, both in the constructive and the destructive settings. It
is interesting to note that all our microbribery proofs above would work just as well if we considered a slight
twist on the definition of the microbribery problem, namely, if instead of saying that each flip in a voter’s
preference table has unit cost we would allow each voter to have a possibly different price for flipping each
separate entry in his or her preference table. This change would affect only the computing of the values of
the functions wincost and tiecost. (Technically, we would also have to modify Lemmas 3.13 and 3.16, which
in our unit-cost setting say that an optimal microbribery never involves certain specified pairs of candidates,
whereas in the priced setting we would need to rephrase them to state that there exist optimal microbriberies
that do not involve those specified pairs of candidates.)
An interesting direction for further study of the complexity of bribery within Copelandα systems is to
consider a version of the microbribery problem for the case of rational voters. There, one would pay unit cost
for a switch of two adjacent candidates on a given voter’s preference list.
For CopelandαIrrational, we would also like to know the complexity of constructive microbribery when α is
a rational number strictly between 0 and 1. Our network-flow-based approach does not seem to generalize
easily to values of α strictly between 0 and 1 (when the number of voters is even) because in a flow network
it is hard to “split” a unit of flow in a tie. A promising approach would be to have several units of flow model
one CopelandαIrrational point (e.g., for the case of α = 12 we could try to use two units of flow to model a single
Copeland0.5 point), but then it seems very difficult (if not impossible) to find edge costs that appropriately
model the microbribery. (It is possible to do so in a very restricted setting, namely where α = 12 and there are
exactly two voters that can be bribed.) Also, the results regarding hardness of manipulation of Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, and Schnoor [FHS08] suggest that microbribery for α strictly between 0 and 1 might be
NP-hard. However, again, it is nontrivial to translate their reduction to the world of microbribery.
On a related note, Kern and Paulusma [KP01] have shown that the following problem, which they call
SC(0,α,1), is NP-complete. Let α be a rational number such that 0 < α < 1 and α 6= 12 . We are given an
undirected graph G = (V (G),E(G)), where each vertex u ∈V (G) is assigned a rational value cu of the form
i+ jα , for nonnegative integers i and j. The question, which we have rephrased to state in terms of (a variant
of) our notion of Copelandα , is whether it is possible to (possibly partially) orient the edges of G such that
for each vertex u ∈ V (G) it holds that u’s Copelandα score is at most cu. Here, by “Copelandα score of a
vertex u” we mean, as is natural, the number of vertices u “defeats” (i.e., the number of vertices v such that
there is a directed edge from u to v) plus α times the number of vertices that u “ties” with (i.e., the number of
vertices such that there is an undirected edge between u and v).
Problem SC(0,α,1) is very closely related to our microbribery problem. However, we do not see an
immediate reduction from SC(0,α,1) to microbribery. A natural approach would be to embed graph G into
an election (in the sense that will be explored in Section 4) in such a way that our preferred candidate p can
become a winner, via a microbribery, if and only if it is possible to orient the edges of G in a way respecting
the constraints defined by the values cu (for each u in V (G)). We would, of course, have to set the budget
of our microbribery high enough to allow modifying each of the edges in G and none of the edges outside
of G. However, this is difficult. The proof of Kern and Paulusma uses values cu that can be implemented
only via using tied head-to-head contests. The agent performing microbribery could, potentially, affect those
head-to-head contests, thus spoiling our reduction.
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4 Control
In this section we focus on the complexity of control in Copelandα elections. In control problems we are
trying to ensure that our preferred candidate p is a winner (or, in the destructive case, that our despised
candidate is not a winner) of a given election via affecting this election’s structure (namely, via adding,
deleting, or partitioning either candidates or voters). In contrast with bribery problems, in control problems
we are never allowed to change any of the votes and, consequently, the issues that we encounter and the proof
techniques we use are quite different from those presented in the previous section. For the same reason as
previously for each standard type of control a resistance result in the rational-voters case implies an analogous
resistance result in the irrational-voters case, and a vulnerability result in the irrational-voters case implies an
analogous vulnerability result in the rational-voters case.
The literature regarding the complexity of control problems is not large. To the best of our knowledge, the
only election systems for which a comprehensive analysis has been conducted previously are plurality, Con-
dorcet, and (variants of) approval voting (see [BTT92,HHR07a,HHR07b,BU08,ENR08b]; see also [PRZ07]
for some results on (variants of) approval voting, single nontransferable vote, and cumulative voting with
respect to constructive control via adding voters). Among plurality, Condorcet, and (the standard variant of)
approval voting, plurality appears to be the least vulnerable to control and so it is natural to compare our
new results with those for plurality. However, we mention in passing that Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra,
and Rothe [HHR07b] show how to construct hybrid election systems that are resistant to all standard types
of control (including both AC and ACu; AC is not discussed or proven in [HHR07b]—the “AC” there is our
“ACu”—but we mention that the techniques clearly can handle it without any problem). (It should also be
noted that these hybrid systems were not designed as “natural” systems to be applied in real-world elections
but rather their purpose was to prove a certain impossibility theorem impossible.)
Our main result in this section is Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1 Let α be a rational number with 0≤ α ≤ 1. Copelandα elections are resistant and vulnerable
to control types as indicated in Table 1 in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model,
for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
In particular, we will prove in this section that the notion widely referred to in the literature simply as
“Copeland elections,” which we here for clarity call Copeland0.5, possesses all ten of our basic types (see
Table 1) of constructive resistance (and in addition, even has constructive ACu resistance). And we will
establish that the other notion that in the literature is occasionally referred to as “Copeland elections,” namely
Copeland0, as well as Llull elections, which are here denoted by Copeland1, both possess all ten of our basic
types of constructive resistance. However, we will show that Copeland0 and Copeland1 are vulnerable to an
eleventh type of constructive control, the incongruous but historically resonant notion of constructive control
by adding an unlimited number of candidates (i.e., CCACu).
Note that Copeland0.5 has a higher number of constructive resistances, by three, than even plurality, which
was before this paper the reigning champ among natural election systems with a polynomial-time winner-
determination procedure. (Although the results regarding plurality in Table 1 are stated for the unique-winner
version of control, for all the table’s Copelandα cases, 0≤ α ≤ 1, our results hold both in the cases of unique
winners and of nonunique winners, so that regardless of which of the two winner models one finds more
natural, one will know what holds in that model.) Admittedly, plurality does perform better with respect to
destructive candidate control problems, but still our study of Copelandα makes significant steps forward in
the quest for a fully control-resistant natural election system with an easy winner problem.
Among the systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, Copeland0.5—and indeed all Copelandα ,
0 < α < 1—have the most resistances currently known for any natural election system whose voters vote by
giving preference lists. We mention that after our work, Erde´lyi, Nowak, and Rothe [ENR08b] have shown
that a variant of approval voting proposed by Brams and Sanver [BS06]—a certain rather subtle election
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Copelandα Plurality
α = 0 0 < α < 1 α = 1
Control type CC DC CC DC CC DC CC DC
ACu V V R V V V R R
AC R V R V R V R R
DC R V R V R V R R
RPC-TP R V R V R V R R
RPC-TE R V R V R V R R
PC-TP R V R V R V R R
PC-TE R V R V R V R R
PV-TE R R R R R R V V
PV-TP R R R R R R R R
AV R R R R R R V V
DV R R R R R R V V
Table 1: Comparison of control results for Copelandα elections, where α with 0≤α ≤ 1 is a rational number,
and for plurality-rule elections. R means resistance to a particular control type and V means vulnerability. The
results regarding plurality are due to Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] and Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra,
and Rothe [HHR07a]. (Note that CCAC and DCAC resistance results for plurality, not handled explicitly
in [BTT92,HHR07a], follow immediately from the respective CCACu and DCACu results.)
system with a richer voter preference type (each voter specifies both a permutation and a set) that combines
approval with preference-based voting—has nineteen (out of a possible twenty-two) control resistances.
This section is organized as follows. The next two sections are devoted to proving Theorem 4.1, and
Section 4.3 considers the case of control in elections with a bounded number of candidates or voters. In
particular, Section 4.1 focuses on the upper part of Table 1 and studies control problems that affect the
candidate structure. Section 4.2 is devoted to voter control and covers the lower part of Table 1. Finally, in
Section 4.3 we study the fixed-parameter complexity of control problems. In particular, we take the role of
someone who tries to solve in-general-resistant control problems and we devise some efficient algorithms for
the case where the number of candidates or the number of voters is bounded.
All our resistance results regarding candidate control follow via reductions from vertex cover and all our
vulnerability results follow via greedy algorithms. Our resistance results for the case of control by modifying
voter structure follow from reductions from the X3C problem.
4.1 Candidate Control
We start our discussion of candidate control for Copelandα with our results on destructive control. It is some-
what disappointing that for each rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα is vulnerable to each type of destructive
candidate control. On the positive side, our vulnerability proofs follow via natural greedy algorithms and will
allow us to smoothly get into the spirit of candidate-control problems.
4.1.1 Destructive Candidate Control
The results for destructive control by adding and deleting candidates use the following observation.
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Observation 4.2 Let (C,V ) be an election, and let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. For every
candidate c ∈C it holds that
scoreα(C,V )(c) = ∑
d∈C−{c}
scoreα({c,d},V)(c).
Theorem 4.3 For each rational number α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα is vulnerable to destructive control
via adding candidates (both limited and unlimited, i.e., DCAC and DCACu), in both the nonunique-winner
model and the unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. Our input is a set C of candidates, a set D of spoiler candidates, a collection V of voters with
preferences (either preference lists or preference tables) over C∪D, a candidate p ∈ C, and a nonnegative
integer k (for the unlimited version of the problem we let k = ‖D‖). We ask whether there is a subset D′ of
D such that ‖D′‖ ≤ k and p is not a winner (is not a unique winner) of Copelandα election E ′ = (C∪D′,V ).
Note that if k = 0, this amounts to determining whether p is not a winner (is not a unique winner) of election
E , which can easily be done in polynomial time.
For the remainder of this proof we will assume that k > 0. Let c be any candidate in (C∪D)−{p}. We
define a(c) to be the maximum value of the expression
scoreα(C∪D′,V )(c)− score
α
(C∪D′,V )(p)
under the conditions that D′ ⊆ D, c ∈C∪D′, and ‖D′‖ ≤ k. From Observation 4.2 it follows that a(c) is the
maximum value of
scoreα(C∪{c},V )(c)− score
α
(C∪{c},V )(p)+ ∑
d∈D′−{c}
(
scoreα({c,d},V )(c)− score
α
({p,d},V)(p)
)
under the conditions that D′ ⊆ D, c ∈C∪D′, and ‖D′‖ ≤ k.
Clearly, p can be prevented from being a winner (a unique winner) if and only if there exists a candidate
c ∈ (C∪D)−{p} such that a(c)> 0 (such that a(c)≥ 0).
Given a candidate c ∈ (C∪D)−{p}, it is easy to construct in polynomial time a set D′ ⊆ D, ‖D′‖ ≤ k,
that yields the value a(c). We start with D′ = /0. If c ∈ D, we add c to D′. Then we add those candidates
d ∈ D−D′ to D′ such that scoreα({c,d},V )(c)− score
α
({p,d},V)(p) is positive, starting with those for whom this
value is highest, until ‖D′‖= k or no more such candidates exist. ❑
Theorem 4.4 For each rational number α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα is vulnerable to destructive control
via deleting candidates (DCDC), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model, for both
the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. Our approach is similar to that of the previous theorem. We are given an election E = (C,V ), a
candidate p ∈C, and a nonnegative integer k. Our goal is to check whether p can be prevented from being a
winner (a unique winner) via deleting at most k candidates in C−{p}.
Let c be any candidate in C−{p}. Define d(c) to be the maximum value of the expression
scoreα(C−D,V )(c)− score
α
(C−D,V )(p)
under the conditions that D⊆C, {p,c}∩D = /0, and ‖D‖ ≤ k.
From Observation 4.2 it follows that d(c) is the maximum value of
scoreα(C,V )(c)− score
α
(C,V )(p)+ ∑
d∈D
(
scoreα({c,d},V )(p)− score
α
({p,d},V)(c)
)
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under the conditions that D⊆C, {p,c}∩D = /0, and ‖D‖ ≤ k.
Clearly, p can be prevented from being a winner (a unique winner) if and only if there exists a candidate
c ∈C−{p} such that d(c)> 0 (such that d(c)≥ 0).
Given a candidate c ∈ C−{p}, it is easy to construct in polynomial time a set D, ‖D‖ ≤ k, that yields
the value d(c). Simply let D consist of as many as possible but at most k candidates d 6∈ {c, p} such that
scoreα
({p,d},V)(p)− score
α
({c,d},V )(c) is positive, starting with those for whom this value is highest. ❑
Destructive control via partitioning of candidates (with or without run-off) is also easy.
Theorem 4.5 For each rational number α with 0≤α ≤ 1, Copelandα is vulnerable to destructive control via
partitioning of candidates and via partitioning of candidates with run-off (in both the TP and TE model, i.e.,
DCPC-TP, DCPC-TE, DCRPC-TP, and DCRPC-TE), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-
winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. It is easy to see that in the TP model, p can be prevented from being a winner via partitioning of
candidates (with or without run-off) if and only if there is a set C′ ⊆C such that p∈C′ and p is not a winner of
(C′,V ). It follows that p can be prevented from being a winner if and only if p can be prevented from being a
winner by deleting at most ‖C‖−1 candidates, which can be determined in polynomial time by Theorem 4.4.
For the TE model, it is easy to see that if there is a set C′ ⊆ C such that p ∈ C′ and p is not a unique
winner of (C′,V ) then p can be prevented from being a unique winner via partitioning of candidates (with or
without run-off). One simply partitions the candidates into C′ and C−C′ and thus p fails to advance to the
final stage. On the other hand, if p can be prevented from being a winner (a unique winner) via partitioning
of candidates (with or without run-off) in the TE model, then there exists a set C′ ⊆C such that p ∈C′ and
p is not a unique winner of (C′,V ). This is so because then either p does not advance to the final stage (and
this means that p is not a unique winner of his or her first-stage election) or p is not a winner (not a unique
winner) of the final stage (note that not being a winner implies not being a unique winner).
Thus, p can be prevented from being a winner (a unique winner) via partitioning of candidates (with or
without run-off) in the TE model if and only if there is a set C′ ⊆C such that p ∈ C′ and p is not a unique
winner of (C′,V ). Clearly, such a set exists if and only if p can be prevented from being a unique winner via
deleting at most ‖C‖− 1 candidates, which by Theorem 4.4 can be tested in polynomial time.
It remains to show that Copelandα is vulnerable to destructive control via partitioning of candidates (with
or without run-off), in both the rational and the irrational voter model, in the unique-winner model with
the TP tie-handling rule. In the argument below we focus on the DCRPC-TP case but it is easy to see that
essentially the same reasoning works for DCPC-TP.
First we determine whether p can be precluded from being a winner in our current control scenario. This
can be done in polynomial time as explained above. If p can be precluded from being a winner, p can certainly
be precluded from being a unique winner, and we are done. For the remainder of the proof, suppose that p
cannot be precluded from being a winner in our current control scenario, i.e., for every set D ⊆C such that
p ∈ D, p is a winner of (D,V ). Let
D1 = {c ∈C−{p} | p defeats c in a head-to-head contest}
and let D2 = D− (D1 ∪{p}). Note that for all c ∈ D2, p ties c in a head-to-head contest, since otherwise
p would not be a winner of ({c, p},V ). If D2 = /0, then p is a Condorcet winner and no partition (with or
without run-off) can prevent p from being a unique winner [HHR07a]. For the remainder of the proof, we
assume that D2 6= /0. We will show that p can be precluded from being a unique winner in our current control
scenario.
If α < 1, we let the first subelection be (D1∪{p},V). Note that p is the unique winner of this subelection.
The final stage of the election involves p and one or more candidates from D2. Note that every pair of
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candidates in D2∪{p} is tied in a head-to-head election (since if c would defeat d in a head-to-head election,
c would be the unique winner of ({c,d, p},V), which contradicts the assumption that p is a winner of every
subelection it participates in). It follows that all candidates that participate in the final stage of the election
are winners, and so p is not a unique winner.
Finally, consider the case that α = 1. Then scoreα(C,V )(p) = ‖C‖− 1. If there is a candidate d ∈C−{p}
such that scoreα(C,V )(d) = ‖C‖− 1, then d will always (i.e., in every subelection containing d) be a winner,
and thus p will not be a unique winner of the final stage of the election, regardless of which partition of C was
chosen. Now suppose that scoreα(C,V )(d) < ‖C‖− 1 for all d ∈ C−{p}. Then score
α
(C,V )(d) ≤ ‖C‖− 2 for
all d ∈C−{p}. Let c be a candidate in D2 and let the first subelection be (C−{c},V). Let C′ be the set of
winners of (C−{c},V). Since scoreα
(C−{c},V )(p) = ‖C‖− 2, it holds that p ∈C
′ and for every d ∈C′−{p},
scoreα(C−{c},V )(d) = ‖C‖− 2. Since score
α
(C,V )(d) ≤ ‖C‖− 2, it follows that c defeats d in a head-to-head
election. The final stage of the election involves candidates C′∪{c}. Note that scoreα(C′∪{c},V )(c) = ‖C
′‖, and
thus c is a winner of the election, and we have precluded p from being a unique winner. ❑
The above vulnerability results for the case of destructive candidate control should be contrasted with the
essentially perfect resistance to constructive candidate control (with the exception of constructive control via
adding an unlimited number of candidates for Copelandα with α ∈ {0,1}) that will be shown in Section 4.1.3.
But first, in Section 4.1.2, we will provide some technical prerequisites.
4.1.2 Constructing Instances of Elections
Many of our proofs in the next section require constructing fairly involved instances of Copelandα elections.
In this section we provide several lemmas and observations that simplify building such instances.
We first note that each election E = (C,V ) induces a directed graph G(E) whose vertices are E’s can-
didates and whose edges correspond to the results of the head-to-head contests in E . That is, for each two
distinct vertices of G(E) (i.e., for each two distinct candidates), a and b, there is an edge from a to b if and
only if a defeats b in their head-to-head contest (i.e., if and only if vsE(a,b) > 0). Clearly, G(E) does not
depend on the value of α . The following fundamental result is due to McGarvey. This result allows us to
basically identify elections with their election graphs in the proofs of resistance for candidate control.
Lemma 4.6 ([McG53]) There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given as input an antisymmetric directed
graph G outputs an election E such that G = G(E).
Proof. For the sake of completeness, we give the algorithm. Let G be an antisymmetric directed graph. The
algorithm computes the election E = (C,V ), where C =V (G) and for each edge (a,b) in G there are exactly
two voters, one with preference list a > b >C−{a,b} and one with preference list
←−−−−−−
C−{a,b}> a > b. Since
G is antisymmetric, it is easy to see that G = G(E). ❑
The above basic construction of McGarvey was improved upon by Stearns [Ste59]. While McGarvey’s
construction requires twice as many voters as there are edges in G, the construction of Stearns needs at most
‖V (G)‖+2 voters. Stearns also provides a lower bound on the number of voters that are needed to represent
an arbitrary graph via an election. (It is easy to see that any such graph can be modeled via two irrational
voters but the lower bound for the case of rational votes is somewhat harder.)
We will often construct complicated elections via combining simpler ones. Whenever we speak of
combining two elections, say E1 = (C1,V1) and E2 = (C2,V2), we mean building, via the algorithm from
Lemma 4.6, an election E = (C,V ) whose election graph is a disjoint union of the election graphs of E1 and
E2 with, possibly, some edges added between the vertices of G(E1) and G(E2) (in each case we will explicitly
state which edges, if any, are added). In particular, we will often want to add some padding candidates to
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an election, without affecting the original election much. In order to do so, we will typically combine our
main election with one of the following “padding” elections. Note that this construction, which we origi-
nally developed for use in the study of control for Copelandα voting, has also proven useful in the study of
manipulation for Copelandα [FHS08].
Lemma 4.7 Let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. For each positive integer n, there is a
polynomial-time (in n) computable election Padn = (C,V ) such that ‖C‖ = 2n+ 1 and for each candidate
ci ∈C it holds that scoreαPadn(c) = n.
Proof. Fix a positive integer n. By Lemma 4.6 it is enough to construct (in polynomial time in n) a
directed, antisymmetric graph G with 2n+ 1 vertices, each with its indegree and outdegree equal to n. We
set G’s vertex set to be {0,1, . . . ,2n} and we put an edge from vertex i to vertex j (i 6= j) if and only if
( j− i) mod (2n+1)≤ n. As a result there is exactly one directed edge between every two distinct vertices and
for each vertex i we have edges going out from i to exactly the vertices (i+1) mod (2n+1),(i+2) mod (2n+
1), . . . ,(i+ n) mod (2n+ 1). Thus, both the indegree and the outdegree of each vertex is equal to n and the
proof is complete. ❑
Lemma 4.6 is very useful when building an election in which we need direct control over the results
of all head-to-head contests. However, in many cases explicitly specifying the results of all head-to-head
contests would be very tedious. Instead it would be easier to specify the results of only the important head-
to-head contests and require all candidates to have certain suitable scores. In the next lemma we show how to
construct elections specified in such a way via combining a “small” election containing the important head-
to-head contest with a “large” padding election. We mention that a generalized version of this lemma has
since been used to study manipulation for Copelandα [FHS08].
Lemma 4.8 Let E = (C,V ) be an election where C = {c1, . . . ,cn′}, let α be a rational number such that
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and let n≥ n′ be an integer. For each candidate ci we denote the number of head-to-head ties of
ci in E by ti. Let k1, . . . ,kn′ be a sequence of n′ nonnegative integers such that for each ki we have 0≤ ki ≤ n.
There is an algorithm that in polynomial time in n outputs an election E ′ = (C′,V ′) such that:
1. C′ =C∪D, where D = {d1, . . . ,d2n2},
2. E ′ restricted to C is E,
3. the only ties in head-to-head contests in E ′ are between candidates in C,
4. for each i, 1≤ i≤ n′, scoreαE ′(ci) = 2n2− ki+ tiα , and
5. for each i, 1≤ i≤ 2n2, scoreαE ′(di)≤ n2 + 1.
Proof. We build E ′ via combining E with a padding election F (see Lemma 4.7 and the paragraph just
before it). F =(D,W ), where D= {d1, . . . ,d2n2}, is essentially the election Padn2 with one arbitrary candidate
removed. We partition the candidates in D into n groups, D1, . . . ,Dn, each with exactly 2n candidates and
we set the results of head-to-head contests between each ci ∈ C and the candidates in D according to the
following scheme. For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,n′} such that i 6= j, ci defeats all members of D j and ci defeats exactly
as many candidates in Di (and loses to all the remaining ones) as needed to ensure that
scoreαE ′(ci) = 2n
2− ki + tiα.
It is easy to see that this is possible: ci’s score in (C′−Di,V ′) is 2n2− 2n+ k′+ tiα for some k′ such that
0≤ k′ ≤ n′− ti. There are 2n candidates in Di and so ci can reach any score of the form 2n2− k+ tiα , where
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k is an integer between 0 and n, via defeating in head-to-head contests an appropriate number of candidates
in Di and losing to all the remaining ones.
Finally, since F is Padn2 with one candidate removed, each di gets at most n2 points from defeating other
members of D and at most one point from possibly defeating some member of C. Thus, for each di ∈ D, it
holds that scoreαE ′(di)≤ n
2 + 1. This completes the proof. ❑
Instead of invoking Lemma 4.8 directly, we will often simply describe an election in terms of the results
of important head-to-head contests and the scores of the important candidates and then mention that such an
election can be built, possibly with adding extra padding candidates that do not affect the general structure of
the election, using Lemma 4.8. In each such case it will be clear that Lemma 4.8 can indeed be used to build
the election we describe.
4.1.3 Constructive Candidate Control
Let us now turn to the case of constructive candidate control. Here we show that resistance holds for
Copelandα in all cases (i.e., for all rational values of α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and for all constructive candidate
control scenarios), except for CCACu for α ∈ {0,1} where vulnerability holds (see Theorem 4.11).
All our resistance proofs in this section follow via reductions from the vertex cover problem. Recall that
in the vertex cover problem our input is (G,k) where G is an undirected graph and k a nonnegative integer
and we accept if and only if G has a vertex cover of size at most k. Without the loss of generality, we assume
that V (G) = {1, . . . ,n} and E(G) = {e1, . . . ,em}. Note that if either m = 0, n = 0, or k ≥ min(n,m) then the
instance has a trivial solution and so in our proofs we will always assume that both n and m are nonzero and
that k is less than min(n,m). In each case, if the input to our reduction does not meet these requirements (or
is otherwise malformed) the reduction outputs a fixed “yes” instance or a fixed “no” instance depending on
the (easily obtained) solution to (G,k) or the malformation of the input. Also note that for every input (G,k)
that meets our requirements, G has a vertex cover of size less than or equal to k if and only if G has a vertex
cover of size k.
Theorem 4.9 Let α be a rational number such that 0≤ α ≤ 1. Copelandα is resistant to constructive control
via adding candidates (CCAC), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model, for both
the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. We give a reduction from the vertex cover problem. Let (G,k) be an instance of the vertex cover
problem, where G is an undirected graph, k is a nonnegative integer, V (G) = {1, . . . ,n}, E(G) = {e1, . . . ,em},
n 6= 0, m 6= 0, and k < min(n,m). We construct an instance of CCAC for Copelandα such that a designated
candidate p can become a winner after adding at most k candidates if and only if G has a vertex cover of size
at most k.
Our reduction works as follows. Via Lemma 4.8, we build an election E ′ = (C′,V ′) such that:
1. {p,e1, . . . ,em} ⊆C′,
2. scoreαE ′(p) = 2ℓ
2− 1 in the nonunique-winner case (scoreαE ′(p) = 2ℓ2 in the unique-winner case),
3. for each ei ∈C′, scoreαE ′(ei) = 2ℓ
2
, and
4. the scores of all candidates in C′−{p,e1, . . . ,em} are at most 2ℓ2− n− 2.
We form election E = (C,V ) by combining E ′ with candidates D = {1, . . . ,n} (corresponding to the ver-
tices of G). The results of the head-to-head contests within D are set arbitrarily, and the head-to-head contests
between the members of C and the members of D are set as follows: All candidates in C−{e1, . . . ,em} de-
feat all members of D, and for each i ∈ D and each e j ∈ {e1, . . . ,em}, candidate i defeats e j if e j is an edge
42
incident to i and loses otherwise. Our reduction outputs an instance (C,D,V, p,k) of CCAC and the question
is whether it is possible to choose a subset D′ ⊆ D, ‖D′‖ ≤ k, such that p is a winner (the unique winner) of
Copelandα election (C∪D′,V ). It is clear that this reduction is computable in polynomial time. We will now
show that it is correct.
If G does have a vertex cover of size k then add the candidates in D that correspond to the cover. Adding
these candidates increases the score of p by k, while the scores of the ei’s can increase only by k−1 each, since
each edge is incident with at least one member of the vertex cover. Clearly, candidates in C−{p,e1, . . . ,em}
can never become winners by adding at most k candidates from D, and thus p becomes a winner (the unique
winner).
For the converse, assume that p can become a winner (the unique winner) via adding at most k candidates
from the set D. In order for p to become a winner (the unique winner), it must be the case that via adding
candidates each ei gets at least one point less than p. However, this is possible only if we add candidates that
correspond to a cover. ❑
Interestingly, when the parameter α is strictly between 0 and 1 (i.e., 0<α < 1) then Copelandα is resistant
to constructive control via adding candidates even if we allow adding an unlimited number of candidates (the
CCACu case). The reason for this is that for each rational α strictly between 0 and 1 our construction will
ensure, via its structure, that we can add at most k candidates. On the other hand, both Copeland0 and
Copeland1 are vulnerable to constructive control via adding an unlimited number of candidates (CCACu, see
Theorem 4.11).
Theorem 4.10 Let α be a rational number such that 0 < α < 1. Copelandα is resistant to constructive
control via adding an unlimited number of candidates (CCACu), in both the nonunique-winner model and the
unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. We give a reduction from the vertex cover problem. Our reduction follows the same general struc-
ture as that in the proof of Theorem 4.9.
For the unique-winner case, we will need to specify one of the candidates’ scores in terms of a number
ε > 0 such that 1− ε ≥ α . Let t1 and t2 be two positive integers such that α = t1t2 and such that their greatest
common divisor is 1. Clearly, two such numbers exist because α is rational and greater than 0. We set ε to be
1
t2
. By elementary number-theoretic arguments, there are two positive integer constants, k1 and k2, such that
k1α = k2− ε .
Let (G,k) be an instance of the vertex cover problem, where G is an undirected graph and k is a nonnega-
tive integer. Let {e1, . . . ,em} be G’s edges and let {1, . . . ,n} be G’s vertices. As before, we assume that both
n and m are nonzero and that k < min(n,m). Using Lemma 4.8, we can build an election E ′ = (C,V ′) with
the following properties:
1. {p,r,e1, . . . ,em} ⊆C (the remaining candidates in C are used for padding),
2. scoreαE ′(p) = 2ℓ
2− 1,
3. scoreαE ′(r) = 2ℓ
2− 1− k+ kα in the nonunique-winner case (scoreαE ′(r) = 2ℓ2− 1− k+ kα− ε in the
unique-winner case11),
4. for each ei ∈C, scoreαE ′(ei) = 2ℓ
2− 1+α in the nonunique-winner case (scoreαE ′(ei) = 2ℓ2− 1 in the
unique-winner case), and
11Note that via the second paragraph of the proof it is easy to build an election where r has a score of this form. To obtain the −ε part
of r’s score we could, for example, have r tie with k1 padding candidates to obtain k2 − ε points. The k2 points could be accounted for
as part of 2ℓ2−1.
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5. the scores of all candidates in C−{p,r,e1, . . . ,em} are at most 2ℓ2− n− 2.
We form election E = (C∪D,V ) via combining E ′ with candidates D = {1, . . . ,n} and appropriate voters
such that the results of the head-to-head contests are:
1. p ties with all candidates in D,
2. for each e j, if e j is incident with some i ∈ D then candidate i defeats candidate e j, and otherwise they
tie, and
3. all other candidates in C defeat each of the candidates in D.
We will now show that G contains a vertex cover of size at most k if and only if there is a set D′ ⊆ D
such that p is a winner (the unique winner) of Copelandα election (C∪D′,V ). It is easy to see that if D′
corresponds to a vertex cover of size at most k then p is a winner (the unique winner) of Copelandα election
(C∪D′,V ). The reason is that adding any member of D′ increases p’s score by α and increases r’s score by
one, and for each e j, adding i ∈ D′ increases e j’s score by α if and only if e j is not incident with i. Thus, via
a simple calculation of the scores of the candidates, it is easy to see that p is a winner (the unique winner) of
this election.
On the other hand, assume that p can become a winner (the unique winner) of Copelandα election (C∪
D′,V ) via adding some subset D′ of candidates from D. First, note that ‖D′‖ ≤ k, since otherwise r would
end up with more points than (at least as many points as) p and so p would not be a winner (would not be a
unique winner). We claim that D′ corresponds to a vertex cover of G. For the sake of contradiction, assume
that there is some edge e j incident to vertices u and v such that neither u nor v is in D′. However, if this were
the case then candidate e j would have more points than (at least as many points as) p and so p would not be
a winner (would not be a unique winner). Thus, D′ must form a vertex cover of size at most k. ❑
Note that in the above proof it is crucial that α is neither 0 nor 1. If α were 0 then the proof would fall
apart because we would not be able to ensure that D′ is a vertex cover, and if α were 1 then we would not be
able to limit the size of D′. In fact, we will now show, as Theorem 4.11, that both Copeland0 and Copeland1
are vulnerable to control via adding an unlimited number of candidates (CCACu).
Theorem 4.11 Let α ∈ {0,1}. Copelandα is vulnerable to constructive control via adding an unlimited
number of candidates (CCACu), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model, for both
the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. Our input is candidate set C, spoiler candidate set D, a collection of voters with preferences (either
preference lists or preference tables) over C∪D, and a candidate p ∈ C. Our goal is to check whether there
is some subset D′ ⊆ D such that p is a winner (the unique winner) of (C∪D′,V ) within Copelandα . We will
show that we can find such a set D′, if it exists, by the following simple algorithm.
Let D1 = {d ∈ D | scoreα({p,d},V)(p) = 1}. Initialize D
′ to be D1, and delete every d ∈ D′ for
which scoreα
(C∪D′,V )(p)< score
α
(C∪D′,V )(d). For the unique-winner problem, delete every d ∈ D
′
for which scoreα(C∪D′,V )(p)≤ score
α
(C∪D′ ,V )(d).
Clearly, this algorithm runs in polynomial time. To show that the algorithm works, first note that for
all D̂ ⊆ D, if p is a winner (the unique winner) of (C ∪ D̂,V ), then p is a winner (the unique winner) of
(C∪ (D̂∩D1),V ). This is so because, by Observation 4.2,
scoreα
(C∪D̂,V )(p) = score
α
(C∪(D̂∩D1),V )
(p)+ ∑
d∈D̂−D1
scoreα({p,d},V)(p)
= scoreα
(C∪(D̂∩D1),V )
(p).
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Now suppose that for some D̂ ⊆ D1, p is a winner (the unique winner) of (C∪ D̂,V ), but that the algo-
rithm computes a set D′ such that p is not a winner (not a unique winner) of (C∪D′,V ). We first consider
the case that D̂⊆D′. Since p is not a winner (not a unique winner) of (C∪D′,V ), it follows by the construc-
tion of D′ that there exists a candidate d ∈C−{p} such that scoreα(C∪D′,V )(p) < score
α
(C∪D′,V )(d) (such that
scoreα
(C∪D′,V )(p)≤ score
α
(C∪D′,V )(d)). However, in the nonunique-winner model we then have
scoreα(C∪D′ ,V )(p) = score
α
(C∪D̂,V )(p)+ ‖D
′‖−‖D̂‖
≥ scoreα
(C∪D̂,V )(d)+ ‖D
′‖−‖D̂‖ ≥ scoreα(C∪D′,V )(d),
which is a contradiction. In the unique-winner model, the first “≥” in the above inequality becomes a “>”
and we reach a contradiction as well.
Finally, consider the case that D̂ 6⊆ D′. Let d be the first candidate in D̂ that is deleted from D′ in the
algorithm. Then there is a set D′′ such that D̂ ⊆ D′′ ⊆ D1 and scoreα(C∪D′′,V )(p) < score
α
(C∪D′′,V )(d) in the
nonunique-winnercase (scoreα(C∪D′′,V )(p)≤ scoreα(C∪D′′,V )(d) in the unique-winner case). Since D̂⊆D′′⊆D1,
we have
1. scoreα
(C∪D̂,V )(p) = score
α
(C∪D′′,V )(p) − (‖D
′′‖ − ‖D̂‖) < scoreα(C∪D′′,V )(d) − (‖D
′′‖ − ‖D̂‖) ≤
scoreα
(C∪D̂,V )(d) in the nonunique-winner case, and
2. scoreα
(C∪D̂,V )(p) = score
α
(C∪D′′,V )(p) − (‖D
′′‖ − ‖D̂‖) ≤ scoreα(C∪D′′,V )(d) − (‖D
′′‖ − ‖D̂‖) ≤
scoreα
(C∪D̂,V )(d) in the unique-winner case.
It follows that p is not a winner (not a unique winner) of (C∪ D̂,V ). This is again a contradiction. ❑
The remainder of this section is dedicated to showing that for any rational α such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
Copelandα is resistant to constructive control via deleting candidates and to constructive control via par-
titioning candidates (with or without run-off and in both the TE and the TP model). We first handle the case
of constructive control via deleting candidates (CCDC) and then, using our proof for the CCDC case as a
building block, we handle the constructive partition-of-candidates cases. The constructions in the proof of
Theorem 4.12 are crucial for the remaining proofs, so we encourage the reader to read that proof particu-
larly carefully, as it is very difficult to understand the remainder of the section without understanding the
constructions and arguments in the proof of Theorem 4.12.
Theorem 4.12 Let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Copelandα is resistant to constructive
control via deleting candidates (CCDC), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model,
for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. The proof follows via a reduction from the vertex cover problem. We first handle the nonunique-
winner case.
Let (G,k) be a given input instance of the vertex cover problem, where G is an undirected graph and k
is a nonnegative integer. Let V (G) = {1, . . . ,n} and let E(G) = {e1, . . . ,em}. Again, we assume that n and
m are nonzero and that k < min(n,m). We build election E ′ = (C′,V ′), where C′ = {p,z,e1, . . . ,em,1, . . . ,n}
and the voter set V ′ yields the following results of head-to-head contests (see Lemma 4.6):
1. p defeats z,
2. z defeats each candidate ei ∈C′,
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3. each candidate ei ∈C defeats exactly those two candidates u,v ∈ {1, . . . ,n} that the edge ei is incident
with,
4. each candidate u ∈ {1, . . . ,n} defeats p and all candidates ei ∈C′ such that vertex u is not incident with
ei, and
5. all the remaining contests result in a tie.
Let ℓ = n+m. We form an election E = (C,V ) via combining election E ′ with election Padℓ = (C′′,V ′′),
where C′′ = {t0, . . . , t2ℓ} and the set V ′′ of voters is set as in Lemma 4.7. We select the following results of
head-to-head contests between the candidates in C′ and the candidates in C′′: p and all candidates ei ∈ C′
defeat everyone in C′′, and each candidate in C′′ defeats all candidates in C′−{p,e1, . . . ,em}. It is easy to
verify that election E yields the following Copelandα scores:
1. scoreαE (p) = mα + 1+ 2ℓ+ 1,
2. scoreαE (z) = m+ nα ,
3. for each ei ∈C, scoreαE (ei) = mα + 2+ 2ℓ+ 1,
4. for each u ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, scoreαE (u)≤ 1+m+ nα , and
5. for each ti ∈C, scoreαE (ti) = ℓ+ n+ 1.
The set of winners of E is W = {e1, . . . ,em}. We claim that p can become a winner of Copelandα election
E via deleting at most k candidates if and only if the graph G has a vertex cover of size at most k. Note that
p is the only nonwinner of E that can become a winner after deleting up to k candidates. All other candidates
lose by more than k points to the members of W .
We now show that if p can become a winner via deleting at most k candidates then there is a set D ⊆
{1, . . . ,n} such that ‖D‖ ≤ k and p is a winner of election (C−D,V ). Let D′ be a smallest (in terms of
cardinality) subset of C such that p is a winner of election (C−D′,V ). Clearly, no candidate in C′′ belongs
to D′ because each member of C′′ loses his or her head-to-head contests with each member of {p}∪W so
deleting any such candidate from C does not bring p any closer to being a winner. Similarly, z wins all
head-to-head contests with the members of W and so D′ does not contain z. Thus, D′ ⊆ {1, . . . ,n,e1, . . . ,em}.
Choosing a subset D′ of C that ensures that p is a winner means, in essence, choosing a D′ such that each
candidate in {e1, . . . ,em} is either in D′ or loses at least one point due to some candidate from {1, . . . ,n} being
in D′. (Keep in mind that deleting any ei affects the scores of the remaining members of {e1, . . . ,em} and p
equally.) Let us assume that there is some ei ∈ D′ such that ei is an edge incident to vertices u and v in G. D′
does not contain u and does not contain v, since ei defeats both u and v in their head-to-head contests; so if D′
included either u or v then p would be a winner of election (C− (D′−{ei}),V ), contradicting the fact that D′
is a smallest set such that deleting D′ from C ensures p’s victory. However, if D′ contains neither u nor v then
p is a winner of election (C− ((D′∪{u})−{ei}). Thus, by removing all members of {e1, . . . ,em} from D′
and replacing each of them with one of the vertices they are incident with, we can build a set D⊆ {1, . . . ,n}
such that ‖D‖ ≤ k and p is a winner of election (C−D,V).
We will now argue that the set D from the previous paragraph corresponds to a vertex cover of G. In elec-
tion E , each of e1, . . . ,em has exactly one point of advantage over p. Deleting any candidate u corresponding
to a vertex of G does not affect p’s score but it does decrease by one the scores of all the candidates e1, . . . ,em
that correspond to the edges incident with u. Since deleting the candidates in D makes p a winner and since
D contains at most k candidates that correspond to vertices of G, it must be the case that D corresponds to
a vertex cover of G. On the other hand, it is easy to see that if G has a vertex cover of size at most k then
deleting the candidates that correspond to this vertex cover guarantees p’s victory. Thus our reduction is
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correct and, as is easily seen, computable in polynomial time. The proof for the nonunique-winner case is
complete.
For the proof in the unique-winner case, we need to add one more candidate, zˆ, that is a “clone” of z (i.e.,
zˆ ties in the head-to-head contest with z and has the same results as z in all other head-to-head contests). In
such a modified election, p has the same Copelandα score as each of the ei’s and, since a candidate ties p if
and only if he or she ties each of the ei’s, p has to gain at least one point over each of them to become the
unique winner. The rest of the argument remains the same. ❑
We will use the above construction in the resistance proofs for the cases of control via partition of can-
didates (with or without run-off, in TP and TE) below. In particular, we will need the fact that in this
construction the only candidates that can be winners after deleting at most k candidates are members of the
set {p}∪W (recall that W = {e1, . . . ,em}).
Often, when proving things about candidate control problems we perform operations on the candidate
set (e.g., deleting candidates, partitioning the candidate set, etc.) while the voter set remains unchanged. To
simplify our notation, in the proofs below we thus will often use the candidate set as if it were the whole
election and leave V implicit from context. For example, if we had two candidate sets C and D, where D⊆C,
and a voter collection V with voter preferences over the candidates from C, we may use C−D to mean the set
of candidates that belong to C but not to D, but may also use C−D to mean the election (C−D,V ) (where,
as usual, the preferences of voters in V as used there are implicitly restricted to the candidates in C−D). In
the second case, we typically write election C−D rather than set C−D. The intended meaning is always
clear from context.
Theorem 4.13 Let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Copelandα is resistant to constructive
control via run-off partition of candidates in both the ties-promote model (CCRPC-TP) and the ties-eliminate
model (CCRPC-TE), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model, for both the rational
and the irrational voter model.
Proof. The proof follows via reductions from the vertex cover problem to appropriate variants of the
CCRPC problem for Copelandα (i.e., to CCRPC-TP and CCRPC-TE in both the nonunique-winner model
and the unique-winner model).
Let (G,k) be an instance of the vertex cover problem, where G is an undirected graph and k is a non-
negative integer. As before, we let V (G) = {1, . . . ,n} and E(G) = {e1, . . . ,em}, where n 6= 0,m 6= 0 and
k < min(n,m). Our goal is to build an election E in which our favorite candidate can become a winner (the
unique winner) via run-off partitioning of candidates (with either the TP or the TE model) if and only if G
has a vertex cover of size at most k, and we do so by combining suitable elections F and H using Construc-
tion 4.14 below. We will later specify F and H separately for each of the two variants of the Copelandα
CCRPC problem (TP and TE), but before doing so we will outline our proof in more detail and prove a useful
property of Construction 4.14 (see Lemma 4.15).
Construction 4.14 Let F and H be two elections, F with candidates f1 = p, f2, . . . , fn and H with candidates
r,h1, . . . ,hq, q≥ 2. We form election E = (C,V ), where C = {r, f1, . . . , fn,h1, . . . ,hq}, by combining F and H
and setting the results of head-to-head contests between candidates of F and H as follows:
1. For each fi ∈C, fi defeats r.
2. For each hi, f j ∈C, hi defeats f j .
In the next lemma we will show that the only partitions (C1,C2) of C such that p is a winner (the unique
winner) of the resulting Copelandα run-off election are of the form C1 = F −D, C2 = H ∪D, where D is a
subset of F−{p} (without loss of generality, we will assume that p ∈C1). Next we will specify two variants
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of the election H, one for the TP case and one for the TE case, such that the only partitions of the form
presented above that may possibly lead to p being a winner (the unique winner) have ‖D‖ ≤ k. We will
conclude the construction by choosing F to be one of the elections from the proof of Theorem 4.12, so that p
can become a winner (the unique winner) of F by deleting at most k candidates if and only if G has a vertex
cover of size at most k.
Let E , F , and H be elections as in Construction 4.14. We further assume that there are no ties in the head-
to-head contests among the candidates of H (and that thus there are no ties in the head-to-head contests among
the corresponding candidates in E) and that in the case of CCRPC-TE, H−{r} has a unique winner. Let us
assume that p can become a winner (the unique winner) of election E via run-off partition of candidates and
let (C1,C2) be a partition of candidates such that p ∈C1 is a winner (the unique winner) of the thus-formed
Copelandα run-off election (performed using either the TP or the TE tie-handling rule).
Lemma 4.15 Let E, F, and H be elections as in Construction 4.14, and let (C1,C2) be a partition of C that
makes p a winner (the unique winner) in either the CCRPC-TP or the CCRPC-TE scenario, where we adopt
the assumptions explained in the previous two paragraphs. There is a set D⊆ F−{p} such that C1 = F−D
and C2 = H ∪D.
Proof. We will handle the TP and TE cases in parallel. For the sake of seeking a contradiction, let us assume
that C1∩H 6= /0. We consider three cases.
Case 1: C1 contains at least two candidates from H − {r}. Let hi and h j be two such candidates such
that hi wins his or her head-to-head contest with h j. Note that p is not a winner of (C1,V ) because
scoreα(C1,V )(hi) ≥ ‖C1∩F‖+ 1 whereas score
α
(C1,V )(p) ≤ ‖C1∩F‖ (since p gets at most ‖C1∩F‖− 1
points from defeating members of C1∩F and one additional point from defeating r if r ∈C1). Thus, in
this case, p does not advance to the final stage, irrespective of the tie-handling model used.
Case 2: C1 contains exactly one member of H−{r}, say hi. By an analysis similar to the one above, if C1
does not contain r then scoreα
(C1,V )
(p)<Copelandα (C1,V )(hi) and irrespective of the tie-handling model
p does not advance to the final stage. If r ∈ C1 then scoreα(C1,V )(p) ≤ Copeland
α
(C1,V )(hi). Thus, in
the TE model, p certainly does not advance to the final stage. In the TP model, the set of candidates
that advance from (C1,V ) to the final stage includes hi and it might include p. However, the final stage
includes at least one member of H−{r,hi}, namely a winner of (C2,V ) (it is easy to verify that in our
current case (C2,V ) has at least one winner that belongs to H−{r}). Thus, either p does not participate
in the final stage or, via the same argument as in Case 1, p is not a winner of the final stage because he
or she meets at least two members of H−{r} there.
Case 3: C1 ∩H = {r}. Since r loses the head-to-head contests with all members of F , r certainly does not
advance to the final stage of the election. Let us assume that p participates in the final stage. However,
at least one winner (the only winner, in the TE model)12 of (C2,V ) is a member of H−{r}. Then, via
the same argument as in the first subcase of Case 2 above, p is not a winner of the final stage.
Thus the lemma holds. ❑ Lemma 4.15
We now define variants of election H appropriate for the TE and TP models, in the nonunique-winner
model, such that the set D in Lemma 4.15 is forced to have at most k elements. (We will handle the unique-
winner cases at the end of this proof.)
12Recall that we assumed that in the TE case H−{r} has a unique winner and that each member of H−{r} defeats each member of
F in their head-to-head contests.
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For the TP case, we set H ′ to be an election with candidate set {r,h1, . . . ,hq}, q≥ 3, such that there exists
a nonnegative integer ℓ for which we have the following scores:
1. scoreαH′(r) = ℓ,
2. for i ∈ {1,2}, scoreαH′(hi) = ℓ− k− 1, and
3. for each i ∈ {3, . . . ,q}, scoreαH′(hi)≤ ℓ− k− 1.
Such an election is easy to build in polynomial time using Lemma 4.8.
For the TE case, we set H ′′ to have candidate set {r,h1, . . . ,hq}, q≥ 2, with the following scores:
1. scoreαH′′(r) = ℓ,
2. scoreαH′′(h1) = ℓ− k, and
3. for each i ∈ {2, . . . ,q}, scoreαH′′(hi)< ℓ− k− 1.
Note that both H ′ and H ′′ satisfy the assumptions that we made regarding H before Lemma 4.15.
Lemma 4.16 For the TP case with H = H ′ and for the TE case with H = H ′′, the set D in Lemma 4.15 has
the additional property that ‖D‖ ≤ k.
Proof. Recall that in E each candidate hi ∈ H −{r} wins each of his or her head-to-head contests with
candidates in F and that each candidate fi ∈ F wins his or her head-to-head contest with r. From Lemma 4.15
we know that if p is a winner in either the CCRPC-TP or the CCRPC-TE scenario with the partition (C1,C2)
of C, then C1 = F−D and C2 = H∪D. If ‖D‖> k were to hold in the TP case, then at least h1 and h2 would
be winners of (C2,V ), and so even if p were promoted to the final stage, he or she would meet two members
of H −{r} there and would not become a global winner. If ‖D‖ > k were to hold in the TE case, then h1
would be the unique winner of (C2,V ) and the final stage would involve, at best, p and h1. Naturally, p would
lose. ❑ Lemma 4.16
For the TP case (TE case), we set F to be the election built in the proof of Theorem 4.12 for the nonunique-
winner model (for the unique-winner model). In particular, candidates e1, . . . ,em correspond to the edges of
graph G. Since p can become a winner of his or her subcommittee in the TP model (in the TE model) if
and only if p can become a winner (the unique winner) of election F −D, where D ⊆ F−{p} and ‖D‖ ≤ k,
it follows by our choice of F , that p can advance to the final stage only if G has a vertex cover of size at
most k. On the other hand, if G has a vertex cover of size at most k then it is easy to see that if we partition
the candidates in C as in Lemma 4.15 with D containing the candidates corresponding to an at-most-size-k
vertex cover of G then p advances to the final stage of the election and is a winner there. Why? In the TP
case, the subcommittee H ∪D has r as the unique winner and the subcommittee F−D’s winner set contains
p and some subset of {e1, . . . ,em} (see the note below the proof of Theorem 4.12). Since p and all candidates
in {e1, . . . ,em} tie in their head-to-head contests and since they all defeat r, they all are winners of the final
stage. Similarly, in the TE case, r is the only candidate that can be a unique winner of subcommittee H ∪D,
and the subcommittee F−D has p as the unique winner. Since p defeats r, p is the winner of the final stage.
This completes the proof for the nonunique-winner case.
The proof for the TE case in the nonunique-winner model works just as well in the unique-winner model
and so it remains to handle the TP case in the unique-winner model. To do so, we form the election E
using Construction 4.14 with F set to the unique-winner version of the election from Theorem 4.12 and with
H set to H ′. Via Lemmas 4.15 and 4.16 and the subsequent discussion we have that any partition of E’s
candidate set C into C1 and C2 such that p∈C1 is a winner of the final-stage election requires C1 = F−D and
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C2 = H∪D, where D corresponds to an at-most-size-k vertex cover of G. On the other hand, by the choice of
F , it is easy to see that using such a D guarantees that p is the unique winner of the final stage election. The
proof is complete. ❑ Theorem 4.13
Copelandα is also resistant to constructive control via partition of candidates (without run-off) for each
rational value of α between (and including) 0 and 1. However, the proofs for the TP and TE cases are not as
uniform as in the CCRPC scenario and so we treat these cases separately.
Theorem 4.17 Let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Copelandα is resistant to constructive
control via partition of candidates with the ties-promote tie-handling rule (CCPC-TP), in both the nonunique-
winner model and the unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 4.13 and we maintain similar notation. In particular,
(G,k) is the given instance of the vertex cover problem we reduce from (where V (G) = {1, . . . ,n}, E(G) =
{e1, . . . ,em}, n 6= 0,m 6= 0, and k < min(n,m)), we set F to be the nonunique-winner variant of the election
built in the proof of Theorem 4.12 when we handle the nonunique-winner case for Copelandα-CCPC-TP,
and we set F to be the unique-winner variant of that election when we handle the unique-winner case for
Copelandα-CCPC-TP.
We define H to be an election with candidate set {r,h1, . . . ,hq}, q≥ 3, such that there exists a nonnegative
integer ℓ for which we have the following scores:
1. scoreαH(r) = ℓ,
2. for i ∈ {1,2,3}, scoreαH(hi) = ℓ− k− 1,
3. for each i ∈ {4, . . . ,q}, scoreαH(hi)≤ ℓ− k− 1, and
4. the results of the head-to-head contests between r, h1, h2, and h3 are that h1 defeats h2, h2 defeats h3,
h3 defeats h1, and r defeats each of h1, h2, and h3.13
Election H is easy to build using Lemma 4.8. Election E = (C,V ) is formed via applying Construc-
tion 4.14 to elections F and H.
In constructive control via partition of candidates (CCPC), the first stage of the election is held among
some subset C′ ⊆C of candidates. In the TP model, the winners of the first stage compete with the candidates
in C−C′. The following two lemmas describe what properties C′ needs to satisfy for p to become a winner
(the unique winner) of the final stage.
Lemma 4.18 Let C′ be a subcommittee such that p is a winner (the unique winner) of the final stage in E
whose first stage involves subcommittee C′ in the CCPC-TP model. Then p is not a member of C′.
Proof. If p were in C′ together with at least two members of H then p would not be a winner of this
subelection. If p were in C′ with less than two members of H then p would either meet at least two members
of H in the final stage or p would not make it to the final stage. In either case, p would not be a winner of the
final stage. ❑ Lemma 4.18
Lemma 4.19 Let C′ be a subcommittee such that p is a winner (the unique winner) of the final stage of E
whose first stage involves subcommittee C′ in the CCPC-TP model. Then C′ is of the form H ∪D, where
D⊆ F −{p} and ‖D‖ ≤ k.
13The reason for such a cycle of head-to-head contest results is that if we delete at most one candidate from H then there still will be
at least one candidate with score ℓ− k−1.
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Proof. From Lemma 4.18 we know that p is not in C′. If more than two members of H were not in C′ then
p would meet at least two members of H in the final stage and so would not be a winner (would not be a
unique winner).
Assume that exactly one member of H, say h, is not in C′. If r is not in C′ then the set of winners of
(C′,V ) includes at least one member of H−{r} and so p meets at least two members of H−{r} in the final
stage and thus is not a winner of that stage. So we additionally assume that r is in C′. Since H−{h} ⊆C′,
at least two of h1, h2, and h3 are in C′. If C′ contains more than k candidates from F then at least one of h1,
h2, and h3 is a winner of (C′,V ) and p, again, competes (and loses) against at least two members of H in the
final subelection. Thus let us assume that C′ contains at most k members of F , call them d1,d2, . . . ,d j, where
j≤ k. In such a case, p loses to at least one candidate s in F−{d1, . . . ,d j} (recall that k < n because otherwise
the input vertex cover instance is trivial and so our s can be, e.g., one of the candidates in F −{d1, . . . ,d j}
corresponding to a vertex in G) and so in the final stage p has a score lower than h’s score: h wins the head-
to-head contests with everyone with whom p wins his or her head-to-head contests except for r, but h also
wins his or her head-to-head contests with both p and s. As a result, p does not win the final stage. This
completes the proof. ❑ Lemma 4.19
Since r is the unique winner of any subelection of the form H∪D, where D contains at most k candidates
from F−{p} and all members of F defeat r in their head-to-head contests, via Lemma 4.19, we have that p
can become a winner (the unique winner) in our current control scenario (CCPC-TP) if and only if we can
select a set D of at most k candidates from F such that p is a winner (the unique winner) of F −D. By the
choice of F and Theorem 4.12, this is possible only if G has a vertex cover of size at most k. This completes
the proof. ❑ Theorem 4.17
We now turn to the TE variant of constructive control via partitioning candidates. We start by showing
resistance for Llull’s system (i.e., for Copeland1).
Theorem 4.20 Copeland1 is resistant to constructive control via partition of candidates with the ties-
eliminate tie-handling rule (CCPC-TE), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model,
for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. We use the same reduction as that in the proof of Theorem 4.17, except that we now use a slightly
different variant of the election H.
Let (G,k) be our input instance of the vertex cover problem. As in the proof of Theorem 4.17, we form an
election E via combining elections F and H, where F and H are as follows. If we are in the nonunique-winner
model then F is the nonunique-winner variant of the election from the proof Theorem 4.12, and otherwise
it is the unique-winner variant of that election. H is an election whose candidate set is {r,h1, . . . ,hℓ} and
whose voter set is such that r ties all head-to-head contests with the candidates h1, . . . ,hℓ and the scores of
the candidates satisfy:
1. score1H(r) = ℓ,
2. score1H(h1) = ℓ− k, and
3. for each h ∈ H−{r,h1}, score1H(h)< ℓ− k.
It is easy to see that such an election can be built in polynomial time in k (thus ensuring that ℓ is polynomially
bounded in k). A simple variant of the construction from Lemma 4.8 can be used for this purpose. (We cannot
use Lemma 4.8 directly because it doesn’t allow us to have r tie all its head-to-head contests, but clearly a
similar construction works.) As usual, we assume k < min(n,m), where n is the number of vertices in G and
m is the number of G’s edges.
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It is easy to see that if G does have a vertex cover of size k then using the subcommittee H ∪D, where
D is a subset of candidates from F that corresponds to this vertex cover does make p a winner (the unique
winner) of the final stage of our two-stage election.
For the converse, we show that if p can be made a winner (the unique winner) via partition of candidates
then G does have a vertex cover of size at most k. First, we note that p is not a winner (and so certainly
not a unique winner) of any subelection that involves any of the candidates h1, . . . ,hℓ. (This is because each
of h1, . . . ,hℓ wins all his or her head-to-head contests with members of F and ties the head-to-head contest
with r.) Thus if p is a winner (the unique winner) of our two-stage election then all candidates h1, . . . ,hℓ
participate in the first-stage subcommittee and p does not. In this case, the subcommittee also contains r
because otherwise h1 would be the unique winner of the subcommittee and, via the previous argument, p
would not be a winner of the final stage. Similarly, if the subcommittee contained more than k members of F
then, again, h1 would be its unique winner preventing p from being a winner of the final stage.
Let C′ be a subcommittee (i.e., the set of the candidates that participate in the first stage of the election)
such that p is a winner (the unique winner) of our two-stage election. Via the previous paragraph it holds that
C′ = H ∪D, where D ⊆ F and ‖D‖ ≤ k. Either r is the unique winner of C′ (if ‖D‖< k) or C′ does not have
a unique winner. Thus the winner set of the final stage is the same as that of F −D because all candidates in
F −D defeat r in their head-to-head contests. As a result, via Theorem 4.12, we have that p is a winner (the
unique winner) if and only if D corresponds to a vertex cover of G of size at most k. ❑
Theorem 4.21 Let α be a rational number, 0 ≤ α < 1. Copelandα is resistant to constructive control via
partition of candidates with the ties-eliminate tie-handling rule (CCPC-TE), in both the nonunique-winner
model and the unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. The proof follows via a reduction from the vertex cover problem. Let (G,k) be our input instance,
where G is an undirected graph and k is a nonnegative integer. By combining two subelections, F and H, we
will build an election E such that a candidate p in E can become a winner (the unique winner) via partitioning
of candidates if and only if G has a vertex cover of size at most k.
In the nonunique-winner case, we take F to be the nonunique-winner variant of the election built in the
proof of Theorem 4.12. In the unique-winner case, we set F to be this election’s unique-winner variant.
Election H has candidate set {r, rˆ,h1, . . . ,hk} and a voter set that yields the following results of head-to-head
contests within H:
1. r and rˆ are tied,
2. r ties with every candidate hi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,k},
3. rˆ defeats every candidate hi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, and
4. The results of head-to-head contests between candidates h1, . . . ,hk are set arbitrarily.
Within election H the candidates have the following Copelandα scores:
1. scoreαH(r) = kα +α ,
2. scoreαH(rˆ) = k+α , and
3. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, scoreαH(hi)≤ k− 1+α .
We form election E = (C,V ) via combining elections F and H in such a way that r defeats all the candidates
in F and for all the other head-to-head contests between the candidates from F and the candidates from H
the result is a tie.
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It is easy to see that if G does have a vertex cover of size k then we can make p a winner (the unique
winner) via partitioning of candidates. To do so we hold the first-stage election among the candidates in
H ∪D, where D is a set of candidates in F that correspond to a vertex cover within G of size k. Since r and
rˆ are the winners of this subelection, no candidates from this subelection proceed to the final stage of the
election. By Theorem 4.12, it follows that p is a winner (the unique winner) of the final stage.
For the converse, let us assume that p can become a winner (the unique winner) via partitioning of
candidates and let C′ be a subset of candidates such that if the first-stage election is (C′,V ) then p is a winner
(the unique winner) of the final stage. If p and r participate in the same subelection (be it the first stage or
the final stage) then it is easy to see that p is not a winner of that subelection. (This is true because r wins
his or her head-to-head contests with all members of F and ties with everyone else, whereas p ties with all
candidates rˆ,h1, . . . ,hk but loses to r.) Thus r ∈C′, p /∈C′, and r is not the unique winner of (C′,V )
We will now show that C′ contains at most k members of F . For the sake of seeking a contradiction let
us assume that this is not the case, and let d be the number of members of F in C′, d > k, and let k′ be the
number of members of {h1, . . . ,hk} in C′. Let us rename the candidates in F so that f1, . . . , fd are those that
belong to C′. Finally, we set b = 0 if rˆ /∈C′, and b = 1 otherwise. We have the following Copelandα scores
within (C′,V ):
1. scoreα(C′,V )(r) = d+ k
′α + bα ,
2. scoreα(C′,V )(rˆ) = k
′+ dα +α , provided that rˆ ∈C′,
3. for each hi ∈C′, scoreα(C′,V )(hi)≤ k
′− 1+ dα +α , and
4. for each fi ∈C′, scoreα(C′,V )( fi)≤ d− 1+ k′α + bα .
Since k′ ≤ k and d > k, it is easy to see that irrespective of whether rˆ participates in C′, r is the unique winner
of (C′,V ), which is a contradiction. Thus C′ contains at most k members of F .
Let D be the set of candidates from F that are in C′ and that do not participate in the final stage of the
election. Since p is a winner (the unique winner) of the final stage, r does not participate in that stage. Thus
the final stage is held with candidate set (F −D)∪H ′, where H ′ is some subset of H −{r}. It is easy to
see that the winners of F−D have such high scores in addition to tieing their head-to-head contests with all
members of H ′ that the winner set of ((F −D)∪H ′,V ) is the same as that of (F −D,V).
To see this, we note the following: Let c be a winner of F −D. In F −D, c’s score is at least mα + 2+
2ℓ+ 1−‖D‖, where ℓ = n+m, n is the number of vertices of G, and m is the number of edges of G. (See
Theorem 4.12 and the scores of candidates p and ei.) Since, due to our usual convention, k < min(m,n), it
holds that the lowest score a winner of F −D might have is at least mα + 2+ 2ℓ+ 1−‖D‖. The highest
score a candidate in H ′ might have is k+α . Since all members of H ′ tie in their head-to-head contents with
members of F −D (and since F contains m+ n+ 2 candidates), the highest score a member of H ′ can have
in (F −D)∪H ′ is
k+α +(m+ n+ 2)α−‖D‖< k+α + ℓ+ 2−‖D‖< mα + 2+ 2ℓ+ 1−‖D‖≤ scoreα(F−D)∪H′(c).
Thus any winner of F −D is still a winner of (F−D)∪H ′.
Thus, via Theorem 4.12, if p is a winner (the unique winner) of F−D, ‖D‖ ≤ k, then D corresponds to a
vertex cover of size at most k in G. This completes the proof. ❑
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α = 0 0 < α < 1 α = 1
unique nonunique unique nonunique unique nonunique
CCAV Thm. 4.22DCAV
CCDV Thm. 4.24 Thm. 4.25 Thm. 4.24 Thm. 4.25 Thm. 4.24 Thm. 4.23
DCDV Thm. 4.25 Thm. 4.24 Thm. 4.25 Thm. 4.24 Thm. 4.23 Thm. 4.24
CCPV-TP Thm. 4.26DCPV-TP
CCPV-TE Thm. 4.28 Thm. 4.29
DCPV-TE Thm. 4.32 Thm. 4.30
Table 2: Table of theorems covering all resistance results for voter control for Copelandα . Each theorem
covers both the case of rational voters and the case of irrational voters.
4.2 Voter Control
In this section, we show that for each rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα is resistant to all types of voter
control. Table 2 lists for each type of voter control, each rational α , 0≤ α ≤ 1, and each winner model (i.e.,
the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model) the theorem in which each given case is handled.
We start with control via adding voters.
Theorem 4.22 Let α be a rational number such that 0≤ α ≤ 1. Copelandα is resistant to both constructive
and destructive control via adding voters (CCAV and DCAV), in both the nonunique-winner model and the
unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. Our result follows via reductions from the X3C problem. We will first show how to handle the
nonunique-winner constructive case and later we will argue that the construction can be easily modified for
each of the remaining cases.
Let (B,S ) be an X3C instance where B = {b1, . . . ,b3k} and S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is a finite collection of
three-element subsets of B. Without loss of generality, we assume that k is odd (if it is even, we simply add
b3k+1,b3k+2,b3(k+1) to B and Sn+1 = {b3k+1,b3k+2,b3(k+1)} to S , and add 1 to k). The question is whether
one can pick k sets Sa1 , . . . ,Sak such that B =
⋃k
j=1 Sa j .
We build a Copelandα election E = (C,V ) as follows. The candidate set C contains candidates p (the
preferred candidate), r (p’s rival), s, all members of B, and some number of padding candidates. We select the
voter collection V such that in their head-to-head contests, s defeats p, r defeats each bi, and such that we have
the following Copelandα scores for these candidates, where ℓ is some sufficiently large (but polynomially
bounded in n) nonnegative integer:
1. scoreαE (p) = ℓ− 1,
2. scoreαE (r) = ℓ+ 3k, and
3. all other candidates have Copelandα scores below ℓ− 1.
It is easy to see that E can be constructed in polynomial time by Lemma 4.8. In addition, we ensure that we
have the following results of head-to-head contests between the candidates in C:
1. vsE(s, p) = k− 1,
2. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, vsE(r,bi) = k− 3, and
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3. for all other pairs of candidates c, d, we have |vsE(c,d)| ≥ k+ 1.
This can be done since we can add 2 to vsE(c,d) and leave all other relative vote scores the same by adding
two voters, c > d > C−{c,d} and C−{c,d}> c > d (see Lemma 4.6). Since k is odd and the number of
voters is even (see Lemma 4.8), it is easy to see that we can fulfill these requirements.
We also specify the set W of voters that the chair can potentially add. For each set Si ∈ S we have a
single voter wi ∈W with preference list
p > B− Si > r > Si > · · ·
(all unmentioned candidates follow in any fixed arbitrary order). We claim that S contains a k-element cover
of B if and only if p can become a winner of the above election via adding at most k voters selected from W .
If S contains a k-element cover of B, say Sa1 , . . . ,Sak , then we can make p a winner via adding the voters
from U = {wa1 , . . . ,wak}. Adding these k voters increases p’s score by one, since p now defeats s in their
head-to-head contest. Since voters in U correspond to a cover, the score of r goes down by 3k points. Why?
For each bi ∈B, adding the k−1 voters in U that correspond to the sets in the cover not containing bi increases
the relative performance of bi versus r by k− 1 votes, thus giving bi two votes of advantage over r. Adding
the remaining voter from U decreases this advantage to 1, but still bi wins the head-to-head contest with r.
We now show that if we can make p a winner by adding at most k voters then S contains a k-element
cover of B. Note that p is the only candidate that can possibly become a winner by adding at most k voters,
that p can at best obtain Copelandα score ℓ, that p will obtain this score only if we add exactly k voters, and
that r can lose at most 3k points via losing his or her head-to-head contests with each of the bi’s. Thus the
only way for p to become a winner by adding at most k voters from W is that we add exactly k voters such
that r loses his or her head-to-head contest with each bi. Assume that U ⊆W is such a set of voters that does
not correspond to a cover of B. This means that there is some candidate bi such that at least two voters in U
prefer r to bi. However, if this is the case then bi cannot defeat r in their head-to-head contest and p is not a
winner. U corresponds to a cover. This completes the proof of the nonunique-winner constructive case of the
theorem.
For the constructive unique-winner case, we modify election E so that scoreαE (p) = ℓ. All other listed
properties of the relative vote scores and absolute Copelandα scores are unchanged. As in the previous case,
it is easy to see that p can become the unique winner via adding k voters that correspond to a cover of B. For
the converse, we will show that we still need to add exactly k voters if p is to become the unique winner.
If we added fewer than k−1 voters then p would not get any extra points and so it would be impossible for
p to become the unique winner. Let us now show that adding exactly k− 1 voters cannot make p the unique
winner. If we added exactly k− 1 voters then p would get α points extra from the tie with s. Now consider
some candidate bi ∈ S j, where S j corresponds to one of the added voters, w j . Since w j prefers r to bi, adding
w j to the election increases the relative performance of r versus bi to k− 2. Thus adding the remaining k− 2
voters can result in bi either tieing or losing his or her head-to-head contest with r. In either case p would
not have a high enough score to become the unique winner. Thus we know that exactly k candidates must
be added if we want p to become the unique winner and, via the same argument as in the previous case, we
know that they have to correspond to a cover.
For the destructive cases it suffices to note that the proof for the constructive nonunique-winner case
works also as a proof for the destructive unique-winner case (where we are preventing r from being the
unique winner) and the constructive unique-winner case works also as a proof for the destructive nonunique-
winner case (where we are preventing r from being a winner). ❑
Let us now turn to the case of control via deleting voters. Unfortunately, the proofs here are not as
uniform as before and we need in some cases to handle α = 1 separately from the case where 0 ≤ α < 1.
Also, we cannot use the construction lemma (Lemma 4.8) anymore to so conveniently build our elections. In
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the case of deleting voters (or partitioning voters) we need to have a very clear understanding of how each
voter affects the election and the whole point of introducing the construction lemma was to abstract away
from such low-level details.
Analogously to the case of candidate control, we will later reuse the resistance proofs for deleting voters
within the resistance proofs for partitioning voters.
Theorem 4.23 Copeland1 is resistant to constructive control via deleting voters (CCDV) in the nonunique-
winner model and to destructive control via deleting voters (DCDV) in the unique-winner model, for both the
rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. Let (B,S ) be an instance of X3C, where B = {b1, . . . ,b3k} and S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is a finite family
of three-element subsets of B. Without loss of generality, we assume that n ≥ k and that k > 2 (if n < k then
S does not contain a cover of B, and if k ≤ 2 then we can solve the problem by brute force). We build an
election E = (C,V ) such that the preferred candidate p can become a Copeland1 winner of E by deleting at
most k voters if and only if S contains a k-element cover of B.
We let the candidate set C be {p,r,b1, . . . ,b3k} and we let V be the following collection of 4n− k voters:
1. We have n− 1 voters with preference B > p > r,
2. we have n− k+ 1 voters with preference p > r > B, and
3. for each Si ∈S , we have two voters, vi and v′i, such that
(a) vi has preference r > B− Si > p > Si, and
(b) v′i has preference r > Si > p > B− Si.
It is easy to see that for all bi ∈ B, vsE(r,bi) = 2n− k+ 2, vsE(bi, p) = k− 2, and vsE(r, p) = k.
If S contains a k-element cover of B, say {Sa1 , . . . ,Sak}, then we delete voters va1 , . . . ,vak . In the resulting
election, p ties every other candidate in their head-to-head contests, and thus p is a winner.
For the converse, suppose that there is a subset W of at most k voters such that p is a winner of Ê =
(C,V −W ). It is easy to see that score1
Ê
(r) = 3k+ 1. Since p is a winner of Ê , p must tie-or-defeat every
other candidate in their head-to-head contests. By deleting at most k voters, p can at best tie r in their head-
to-head contest. And p will tie r only if ‖W‖ = k and every voter in W prefers r to p. It follows that W is a
size k subset of {v1,v′1, . . . ,vn,v′n}.
Let bi ∈ B. Recall that vsE(bi, p) = k−2 and that p needs to at least tie bi in their head-to-head contest in
Ê . Since ‖W‖= k, it follows that W can contain at most one voter that prefers p to bi. Since k > 2, it follows
that W contains only voters from the set {v1, . . . ,vn} and that the voters in W correspond to a k-element cover
of B.
This completes the proof for the nonunique-winner constructive case. This proof also handles the unique-
winner destructive case, since r is always a winner after deleting at most k voters from E and bi is never a
winner after deleting at most k voters from E . And so r can be made to not uniquely win by deleting at most
k voters if and only if p can be made a winner by deleting at most k voters. ❑
Theorem 4.24 Let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Copelandα is resistant to constructive
control via deleting voters (CCDV) in the unique-winner model and to destructive control via deleting voters
(DCDV) in the nonunique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. As in the proof of the previous theorem, let (B,S ) be an instance of X3C, where B = {b1, . . . ,b3k}
and S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is a finite family of three-element subsets of B. Without loss of generality, we assume
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that n ≥ k and that k > 2 (if n < k then S does not contain a cover of B, and if k ≤ 2 then we can solve the
problem by brute force). We build an election E = (C,V ) such that:
1. If S contains a k-element cover of B, then the preferred candidate p can become the unique Copelandα
winner of E by deleting at most k voters, and
2. if r can become a nonwinner by deleting at most k voters, then S contains a k-element cover of B.
We use the election from the proof of Theorem 4.23 with one extra voter with preference p > r > B. That
is, we let the candidate set C be {p,r,b1, . . . ,b3k} and we let V be the following collection of 4n−k+1 voters:
1. We have n− 1 voters with preference B > p > r,
2. we have n− k+ 2 voters with preference p > r > B, and
3. for each Si ∈S we have two voters, vi and v′i, such that
(a) vi has preference r > B− Si > p > Si, and
(b) v′i has preference r > Si > p > B− Si.
It is easy to see that for all bi ∈ B, vsE(r,bi) = 2n− k+ 3, vsE(bi, p) = k− 3, and vsE(r, p) = k− 1.
If S contains a k-element cover of B, say {Sa1 , . . . ,Sak}, then we delete voters va1 , . . . ,vak . In the resulting
election, p defeats every other candidate in their head-to-head contests, and thus p is the unique winner.
To prove the second statement, suppose that there is a subset W of at most k voters such that r is not a
winner of Ê = (C,V −W). Since vsE(r,bi) = 2n− k+3 and n≥ k, it is immediate that r defeats every bi ∈ B
in their head-to-head contests in Ê . In order for r not to be a winner of Ê , p must certainly defeat r and
tie-or-defeat every bi ∈ B in their head-to-head contests. But p can defeat r in their head-to-head contest only
if ‖W‖= k and every voter in W prefers r to p. It follows that W is a size-k subset of {v1,v′1, . . . ,vn,v′n}.
Let bi ∈ B. Recall that vsE(bi, p) = k−3 and that p needs to at least tie bi in their head-to-head contest in
Ê . Since ‖W‖= k, it follows that W can contain at most one voter that prefers p to bi. Since k > 2, it follows
that W contains only voters from the set {v1, . . . ,vn} and that the voters in W correspond to a k-element cover
of B. ❑
Theorem 4.25 Let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α < 1. Copelandα is resistant to constructive
control via deleting voters (CCDV) in the nonunique-winner model and to destructive control via deleting
voters (DCDV) in the unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. Let (B,S ) be an instance of X3C, where B = {b1, . . . ,b3k} and S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is a finite family
of three-element subsets of B. Without loss of generality, we assume that n ≥ k and that k > 2 (if n < k then
S does not contain a cover of B, and if k ≤ 2 then we can solve the problem by brute force). We build an
election E = (C,V ) such that:
1. If S contains a k-element cover of B, then the preferred candidate p can become a Copelandα winner
of E by deleting at most k voters, and
2. if r can be made to not uniquely win the election by deleting at most k voters, then S contains a
k-element cover of B.
Our election is similar to the elections from the proofs of Theorems 4.23 and 4.24. To avoid problems
when α = 0, we introduce a new candidate rˆ to ensure that p and r are the only possible winners after
deleting at most k candidates. We let the candidate set C be {p,r, rˆ,b1, . . . ,b3k} and we let V be the following
collection of 4n− k+ 2 voters:
1. We have n− 2 voters with preference B > p > r > rˆ,
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2. we have n− k+ 2 voters with preference p > r > rˆ > B,
3. for each Si ∈S , we have two voters, vi and v′i, such that
(a) vi has preference r > rˆ > B− Si > p > Si, and
(b) v′i has preference r > rˆ > Si > p > B− Si,
4. we have one voter with preference r > p > rˆ > B, and
5. we have one voter with preference B > p > r > rˆ.
It is easy to see that for all bi ∈B, vsE(r,bi) = vsE(rˆ,bi) = 2n−k+4, vsE(r, rˆ) = 4n−k+2, vsE(bi, p) = k−4,
vsE(r, p) = k, and vsE(rˆ, p) = k− 2.
If S contains a k-element cover of B, say {Sa1 , . . . ,Sak}, then we delete voters va1 , . . . ,vak . In the resulting
election, p ties r in their head-to-head contest and p defeats every other candidate in their head-to-head
contests. It follows that p is a winner.
To prove the second statement, suppose that there is a subset W of at most k voters such that r is not a
unique winner of Ê = (C,V −W ). It is easy to see that r defeats every candidate in {rˆ,b1, . . . ,b3k} in their
head-to-head contests in Ê . So it certainly cannot be the case that r defeats p in their head-to-head contest in
Ê . It follows that ‖W‖ = k and that every voter in W prefers r to p. Note that both r and p defeat rˆ in their
head-to-head contest in Ê and that both r and rˆ defeat every bi ∈ B in their head-to-head contests in Ê . It
follows that the only possible winners in Ê are r and p. (Note that without rˆ, it would be possible that after
deleting k voters, some bi defeats all candidates other than r in their head-to-head contests. If α = 0, this
could prevent r from being the unique winner without necessarily making p a winner.)
Let bi ∈ B. Recall that vsE(bi, p) = k− 4 and that p needs to defeat bi in their head-to-head contest in Ê .
Since ‖W‖ = k, it follows that W can contain at most one voter that prefers p to bi. Since k > 2 and every
voter in W prefers r to p, it follows that W contains only voters from the set {v1, . . . ,vn} and that the voters
in W correspond to a k-element cover of B. ❑
Theorem 4.26 Let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Copelandα is resistant to both construc-
tive and destructive control via partitioning voters in the TP model (CCPV-TP and DCPV-TP), in both the
nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. Let (B,S ) be an instance of X3C, where B = {b1, . . . ,b3k} and S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is a finite family
of three-element subsets of B. Without loss of generality, we assume that n ≥ k and that k > 2 (if n < k then
S does not contain a cover of B, and if k ≤ 2 then we can solve the problem by brute force). We build an
election E = (C,V ) such that:
1. If S contains a k-element cover of B, then the preferred candidate p can become the unique Copelandα
winner of E via partitioning voters in the TP model, and
2. if r can be made to not uniquely win E via partitioning voters in the TP model, then S contains a
k-element cover of B.
Note that this implies that Copelandα is resistant to both constructive and destructive control via partitioning
voters in the TP model, in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model.
Our construction is an extension of the construction from Theorem 4.24. We let the candidate set C be
{p,r,s,b1, . . . ,b3k} and we let V be the following collection of voters:
1. We have k+ 1 voters with preference s > r > B > p,
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2. we have n− 1 voters with preference B > p > r > s,
3. we have n− k+ 2 voters with preference p > r > B > s, and
4. for each Si ∈S we have two voters, vi and v′i, such that
(a) vi has preference r > B− Si > p > Si > s, and
(b) v′i has preference r > Si > p > B− Si > s.
Let V̂ ⊆ V be the collection of all the voters in V except for the k+ 1 voters with preference s > r > B > p.
Note that V̂ is exactly the voter collection used in the proof of Theorem 4.24 with candidate s added as the
least desirable candidate. Since s does not influence the differences between the scores of the other candidates,
the following claim follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 4.24.
Claim 4.27 If r can become a nonwinner of (C,V̂ ) by deleting at most k voters, then S contains a k-element
cover of B.
Recall that we need to prove that if S contains a k-element cover of B, then p can be made the unique
Copelandα winner of E via partitioning voters in the TP model, and that if r can be made to not uniquely win
E via partitioning voters in the TP model, then S contains a k-element cover of B.
If S contains a k-element cover of B, say {Sa1 , . . . ,Sak}, then we let the second subelection consist of the
k+ 1 voters with preference s > r > B > p and voters va1 , . . . ,vak . Then p is the unique winner of the first
subelection, s is the unique winner of the second subelection, and p uniquely wins the final run-off between
p and s.
To prove the second statement, suppose there is a partition of voters such that r is not a unique winner
of the resulting election in model TP. Note that in at least one of the subelections, without loss of generality
say the second subelection, a majority of the voters prefers r to all candidates in {p,b1, . . . ,b3k}. Since r
is the unique winner of every run-off he or she participates in, r cannot be a winner of either subelection.
Since r defeats every candidate in {p,b1, . . . ,b3k} in their head-to-head contests in the second subelection, in
order for r not to be a winner of the second subelection, it must certainly be the case that s defeats r in their
head-to-head contest in the second subelection. This implies that at most k voters from V̂ can be part of the
second subelection.
Now consider the first subelection. Note that r cannot be a winner of the first subelection. Then, clearly, r
cannot be a winner of the first subelection restricted to voters in V̂ . By Claim 4.27 it follows that S contains
a k-element cover of B. ❑
Theorem 4.28 Let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α < 1. Copelandα is resistant to constructive
control via partitioning voters in the TE model (CCPV-TE), in both the nonunique-winner model and the
unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. We use the exact same construction as in the proof of Theorem 4.26. We will show that if S
contains a k-element cover of B then p can be made the unique Copelandα winner of E via partitioning voters
in the TE model, and that if p can be made a winner by partitioning voters in the TE model then S contains
a k-element cover of B.
If S contains a k-element cover of B, say {Sa1 , . . . ,Sak}, then we let the second subelection consist of the
k+ 1 voters with preference s > r > B > p and voters va1 , . . . ,vak . Then p is the unique winner of the first
subelection, s is the unique winner of the second subelection, and p uniquely wins the final run-off between
p and s.
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To prove the second statement, suppose there is a partition of voters such that p is a Copelandα winner of
the resulting election in model TE. Note that in at least one of the subelections, without loss of generality say
the second subelection, a majority of the voters prefers r to all candidates in {p,b1, . . . ,b3k}. Since r is the
unique winner of every run-off he or she participates in, r can certainly not be the unique winner of the second
subelection. Since r defeats every candidate in {p,b1, . . . ,b3k} in their head-to-head contests in the second
subelection, and since s does not influence the relative vote scores of the candidates in {p,r,b1, . . . ,b3k}, no
candidate in {p,b1, . . . ,b3k} is a winner of the second subelection. It follows that s is a winner of the second
subelection. If s were to tie r in their head-to-head contest in the second subelection, then s would tie all
candidates in their head-to-head contests in the second subelection, and r would be the unique winner of
the second subelection (since α < 1). It follows that s defeats r in their head-to-head contest in the second
subelection. This implies that at most k voters from V̂ can be part of the second subelection.
Now consider the first subelection. Note that p must be the unique winner of the first subelection. So,
certainly, r cannot be a winner of the first subelection. Then, clearly, r cannot be a winner of the first
subelection restricted to voters in V̂ . By Claim 4.27 it follows that S contains a k-element cover of B. ❑
Theorem 4.29 Copeland1 is resistant to constructive control via partitioning voters in the TE model (CCPV-
TE), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irra-
tional voter model.
Proof. We use the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 4.26, except that we have one fewer voter
with preference s > r > B > p. We will show that if S contains a k-element cover of B then p can be made
the unique Copeland1 winner of E via partitioning voters in the TE model, and that if p can be made a winner
by partitioning voters in the TE model then S contains a k-element cover of B.
If S contains a k-element cover of B, say {Sa1 , . . . ,Sak}, then we let the second subelection consist of
the k voters with preference s > r > B > p and voters va1 , . . . ,vak . Then p is the unique winner of the first
subelection and proceeds to the run-off, and r and s are winners of the second subelection, and so no candidate
from the second election proceeds to the run-off. It follows that p is the only candidate participating in the
final run-off, and so p is the unique winner of the election.
To prove the second statement, suppose there is a partition of voters such that p is a Copeland1 winner
of the resulting election in model TE. Note that in at least one of the subelections, without loss of generality
say the second subelection, a majority of the voters prefers r to all candidates in {p,b1, . . . ,b3k}. Since r is
the unique winner of every run-off he or she participates in, r should not participate in the final run-off. In
particular, r cannot be the unique winner of the second subelection. The only way to avoid this is if r does
not defeat s in their head-to-head contest in the second subelection. This implies that at most k voters from V̂
can be part of the second subelection.
Now consider the first subelection. Note that p must be the unique winner of the first subelection. So,
certainly, r cannot be a winner of this subelection. Then, clearly, r cannot be a winner of this subelection
restricted to voters in V̂ . By Claim 4.27 it follows that S contains a k-element cover of B. ❑
Theorem 4.30 Copeland1 is resistant to destructive control via partitioning voters in the TE model (DCPV-
TE), in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique winner model, for both the rational and the irra-
tional voter model.
Proof. We use the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 4.29, except that we have one fewer voter
with preference p > r > B > s. We will show that if S contains a k-element cover of B then r can become a
nonwinner of E via partitioning of voters in the TE model, and that if r can be made to not uniquely win E
via partitioning of voters in the TE model then S contains a k-element cover of B.
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Let V̂ ⊂ V be the collection of all voters except for the k voters with preference s > r > B > p. Note
that V̂ is exactly the voter collection used in the proof of Theorem 4.23 with candidate s added as the least
desirable candidate. Since s does not influence the differences between the scores of the other candidates, the
following claim follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 4.23.
Claim 4.31 If r can be made to not uniquely win (C,V̂ ) by deleting at most k voters, then S contains a
k-element cover of B.
If S contains a k-element cover of B, say {Sa1 , . . . ,Sak}, then we let the second subelection consist of the
k voters with preference s > r > B > p and voters va1 , . . . ,vak . Then p is a winner of the first subelection, s is
a winner of the second subelection, and it follows that r does not participate in the run-off.
For the second statement, suppose there is a partition of voters such that r is not a unique winner of the
resulting election in model TE. Since r uniquely wins any run-off he or she participates in, it follows that
r does not uniquely win either subelection. Note that in at least one of the subelections, without loss of
generality say the second subelection, a majority of the voters prefers r to all candidates in {p,b1, . . . ,b3k}.
It follows that r cannot defeat s in their head-to-head contest in the second subelection. This implies that at
most k voters from V̂ can be part of the second subelection.
Now consider the first subelection. Note that r cannot be a unique winner of the first subelection. Then,
clearly, r cannot be a unique winner of the first subelection restricted to voters in V̂ . By Claim 4.31, it follows
that S contains a k-element cover of B. ❑
Theorem 4.32 Let α be a rational number such that 0 ≤ α < 1. Copelandα is resistant to destructive
control via partitioning voters in the TE model (DCPV-TE), in both the nonunique-winner model and the
unique-winner model, for both the rational and the irrational voter model.
Proof. Let (B,S ) be an instance of X3C, where B = {b1, . . . ,b3k} and S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is a finite family
of three-element subsets of B. Without loss of generality, we assume that n ≥ k and that k > 2 (if n < k then
S does not contain a cover of B, and if k ≤ 2 then we can solve the problem by brute force). We build an
election E = (C,V ) such that:
1. If S contains a k-element cover of B, then r can become a nonwinner of E via partitioning voters in
the TE model, and
2. if r can be made to not uniquely win E via partitioning voters in the TE model, then S contains a
k-element cover of B.
Note that this implies that Copelandα is resistant to destructive control via partitioning voters in the TE model,
in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model.
In the proof of Theorem 4.26, we extended the construction from the proof of Theorem 4.24. In the proof
of the present theorem, we extend the construction from Theorem 4.25 in the same way.
We let the candidate set C be {p,r, rˆ,s,b1, . . . ,b3k} and we let V be the following collection of voters:
1. We have k+ 1 voters with preference s > r > rˆ > B > p,
2. we have n− 2 voters with preference B > p > r > rˆ > s,
3. we have n− k+ 2 voters with preference p > r > rˆ > B > s,
4. for each Si ∈S , we have two voters, vi and v′i, such that
(a) vi has preference r > rˆ > B− Si > p > Si > s, and
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(b) v′i has preference r > rˆ > Si > p > B− Si > s,
5. we have one voter with preference r > p > rˆ > B > s, and
6. we have one voter with preference B > p > r > rˆ > s.
Let V̂ ⊆V be the collection of all the voters in V except for the k+1 voters with preference s > r > rˆ > B> p.
Note that V̂ is exactly the voter collection used in the proof of Theorem 4.25 with candidate s added as the
least desirable candidate. Since s does not influence the differences between the scores of the other candidates,
the following claim follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 4.25.
Claim 4.33 If r can be made to not uniquely win (C,V̂ ) by deleting at most k voters, then S contains a
k-element cover of B.
If S contains a k-element cover of B, say {Sa1 , . . . ,Sak}, then we let the second subelection consist of
the k+ 1 voters with preference s > r > rˆ > B > p and voters va1 , . . . ,vak . Then p is a winner of the first
subelection, s is the unique winner of the second subelection, and it follows that r does not participate in the
run-off.
For the second statement, suppose there is a partition of voters such that r is not a unique winner of the
resulting election in model TE. Since r uniquely wins any run-off he or she participates in, it follows that
r does not uniquely win either subelection. Note that in at least one of the subelections, without loss of
generality say the second subelection, a majority of the voters prefers r to rˆ and both r and rˆ to all candidates
in {p,b1, . . . ,b3k}. If s were to tie r in their head-to-head contest in the second subelection, then s would
tie all candidates in the second subelection in their head-to-head contests, and r would be the unique winner
of the second subelection. It follows that s defeats r in their head-to-head contest in the second subelection.
This implies that at most k voters from V̂ can be part of the second subelection.
Now consider the first subelection. Note that r cannot be the unique winner of the first subelection. Then,
clearly, r cannot be the unique winner of the first subelection restricted to voters in V̂ . By Claim 4.33 it
follows that S contains a k-element cover of B. ❑
4.3 FPT Algorithm Schemes for Bounded-Case Control
Resistance to control is generally viewed as a desirable property in system design. However, suppose one is
trying to solve resistant control problems. Is there any hope?
In their seminal paper on NP-hard winner-determination problems, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b]
suggested considering hard election problems for the cases of a bounded number of candidates or a bounded
number of voters, and they obtained efficient-algorithm results for such cases. Within the study of elec-
tions, this same approach—seeking efficient fixed-parameter algorithms—has, for example, also been used
(although somewhat tacitly—see the coming discussion in the second paragraph of Footnote 14) within the
study of bribery [FHH06a,FHH06b]. To the best of our knowledge, this bounded-case approach to finding
the limits of resistance results has not been previously used to study control problems. In this section we do
precisely that.
In particular, we obtain for resistant-in-general control problems a broad range of efficient algorithms for
the case when the number of candidates or voters is bounded. Our algorithms are not merely polynomial time.
Rather, we give algorithms that prove membership in FPT (fixed-parameter tractability, i.e., the problem is not
merely individually in P for each fixed value of the parameter of interest (voters or candidates), but indeed has
a single P algorithm having degree that is bounded independently of the value of the fixed number of voters
or candidates) when the number of candidates is bounded, and also when the number of voters is bounded.
And we prove that our FPT claims hold even under the succinct input model—in which the voters are input
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via “(preference-list, binary-integer-giving-frequency-of-that-preference-list)” pairs—and even in the case of
irrational voters.
We obtain such algorithms for all the voter-control cases, both for bounded candidates and for bounded
voters, and for all the candidate-control cases with bounded candidates. On the other hand, we show that for
the resistant-in-general irrational-voter, candidate-control cases, resistance still holds even if the number of
voters is limited to being at most two.
We structure this section as follows. We first start by briefly stating our notions and notations. We next
state, and then prove, our fixed-parameter tractability results. Regarding those, we first address FPT results
for the (standard) constructive and destructive cases. We then show that in many cases we can assert FPT
results that are more general still—in particular, we will look at “extended control”: completely pinpointing
whether under a given type of control we can ensure that at least one of a specified collection of “Copeland
Outcome Tables” (to be defined later) can be obtained. Finally, we give our resistance results.
Notions and Notations
The study of fixed-parameter complexity (see, e.g., [Nie06]) has been expanding explosively since it was
parented as a field by Downey, Fellows, and others in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Although the area has built
a rich variety of complexity classes regarding parameterized problems, for the purpose of the current paper
we need focus only on one very important class, namely, the class FPT. Briefly put, a problem parameterized
by some value j is said to be fixed-parameter tractable (equivalently, to belong to the class FPT) if there is an
algorithm for the problem whose running time is f ( j)nO(1). (Note in particular that there is some particular
constant for the “big-oh” that holds for all inputs, regardless of what j value the particular input has.)
In our context, we will consider two parameterizations: bounding the number of candidates and bounding
the number of voters. We will use the same notations used throughout this paper to describe problems, except
we will postpend a “-BV j” to a problem name to state that the number of voters may be at most j, and we
will postpend a “-BC j” to a problem name to state that the number of candidates may be at most j. In each
case, the bound applies to the full number of such items involved in the problem. For example, in the case
of control by adding voters, the j must bound the total of the number of voters in the election added together
with the number of voters in the pool of voters available for adding.
Typically, we have been viewing input votes as coming in each on a ballot. However, one can also consider
the case of succinct inputs, in which our algorithm is given the votes as “(preference-list, binary-integer-
giving-frequency-of-that-preference-list)” pairs. (We mention in passing that for the “adding voter” cases,
when we speak of succinctness we require that not just the always-voting voters be specified succinctly but
also that the pool of voters-available-to-be-added be specified succinctly.) Succinct inputs have been studied
extensively in the case of bribery [FHH06a,FHH06b], and speaking more broadly, succinctness-of-input
issues are often very germane to complexity classification (see, e.g., [Wag86]). Note that proving an FPT
result for the succinct case of a problem immediately implies an FPT result for the same problem (without
the requirement of succinct inputs being in place), and indeed is a stronger result, since succinctness can
potentially exponentially compress the input.
Finally, we would like to be able to concisely express many results in a single statement. To do so, we
borrow a notational approach from transformational grammar, and use square brackets as an “independent
choice” notation. So, for example, the claim
[
It
She
He
][
runs
walks
]
is a shorthand for six assertions: It runs; She runs;
He runs; It walks; She walks; and He walks. A special case is the symbol “ /0” which, when it appears in such
a bracket, means that when unwound it should be viewed as no text at all. For example, “
[Succinct
/0
]
Copeland
is fun” asserts both “Succinct Copeland is fun” and “Copeland is fun.”
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Fixed-Parameter Tractability Results
We immediately state our main results, which show that for all the voter-control cases FPT schemes hold for
both the bounded-voter and bounded-candidate cases, and for all the candidate-control cases FPT schemes
hold for the bounded-candidate cases.
Theorem 4.34 For each rational α , 0≤α ≤ 1, and each choice from the independent choice brackets below,
the specified parameterized (as j varies over N) problem is in FPT:
[
succinct
/0
]
-
[
Copelandα
CopelandαIrrational
]
-
[
C
D
]
C


AV
DV
PV-TE
PV-TP

 -
[
BV j
BC j
]
.
Theorem 4.35 For each rational α , 0≤α ≤ 1, and each choice from the independent choice brackets below,
the specified parameterized (as j varies over N) problem is in FPT:
[
succinct
/0
]
-
[
Copelandα
CopelandαIrrational
]
-
[
C
D
]
C


ACu
AC
DC
PC-TE
PC-TP
RPC-TE
RPC-TP


-BC j.
Readers not interested in a discussion of those results and their proofs can at this point safely skip to the
next labeled section header.
Before proving the above theorems, let us first make a few observations about them. First, for cases where
under a particular set of choices that same case is known (e.g., due to the results of Sections 4.1 and 4.2) to
be in P even for the unbounded case, the above results are uninteresting as they follow from the earlier results
(such cases do not include any of the “succinct” cases, since those were not treated earlier). However, that is
a small minority of the cases. Also, for clarity as to what cases are covered, we have included some items that
are not formally needed. For example, since FPT for the succinct case implies FPT for the no-succinctness-
restriction case, and since FPT for the irrationality-allowed case implies FPT for the rational-only case, the
first two choice brackets in each of the theorems could, without decreasing the results’ strength, be removed
by eliminating their “ /0” and “Copelandα” choices.
We now turn to the proofs. Since proving every case would be uninterestingly repetitive, we will at times
(after carefully warning the reader) prove the cases of one or two control types when that is enough to make
clear how the omitted cases’ proofs go.
Let us start with those cases that can be done simply by appropriately applied brute force.
We first prove Theorem 4.35.
Proof of Theorem 4.35. If we are limited to having at most j candidates, then for each of the cases
mentioned, the total number of ways of adding/deleting/partitioning candidates is simply a (large) constant.
For example, there will be at most (“at most” rather than “exactly” since j is merely an upper bound on the
number of candidates) 2 j possible run-off partitions and there will be at most 2 j−1 relevant ways of deleting
candidates (since we can’t (destructive case) or would never (constructive case) delete the distinguished
candidate). So we can brute-force try all ways of adding/deleting/partitioning candidates, and for each such
way can see whether we get the desired outcome. This works in polynomial time (with a fixed degree
independent of j and α) even in the succinct case, and even with irrationality allowed. ❑ Theorem 4.35
64
A brute-force approach similarly works for the case of voter control when the number of voters is fixed.
In particular, we prove the following subcase of Theorem 4.34.
Lemma 4.36 For each rational α , 0≤ α ≤ 1, and each choice from the independent choice brackets below,
the specified parameterized (as j varies over N) problem is in FPT:
[
succinct
/0
]
-
[
Copelandα
CopelandαIrrational
]
-
[
C
D
]
C


AV
DV
PV-TE
PV-TP

 -BV j.
When considering “BV j” cases—namely in this proof and in the resistance section starting on page 71—
we will not even discuss succinctness. The reason is that if the number of voters is bounded, say by j, then
succinctness doesn’t asymptotically change the input sizes interestingly, since succinctness at very best would
compress the vote description by a factor of about j—which in this case is a fixed constant (relative to the
value of the parameterization, which itself is j).
Proof of Lemma 4.36. If we are limited to having at most j voters, note that we can, for each of these
four types of control, brute-force check all possible approaches to that type of control. For example, for the
case of control by deleting voters, we clearly have no more than 2 j possible vote deletion choices, and for the
case of control by partitioning of voters, we again have at most 2 j partitions (into V1 and V −V1) to consider.
And 2 j is just a (large) constant. So a direct brute-force check yields a polynomial-time algorithm, and by
inspection one can see that its run-time’s degree is bounded above independently of j. ❑ Lemma 4.36
We now come to the interesting cluster of FPT cases: the voter-control cases when the number of can-
didates is bounded. Now, at first, one might think that we can handle this, just as the above cases, via a
brute-force approach. And that is almost correct: One can get polynomial-time algorithms for these cases via
a brute-force approach. However, for the succinct cases, the degrees of these algorithms will be huge, and
will not be independent of the bound, j, on the number of candidates. For example, even in the rational case,
one would from this approach obtain run-times with terms such as n‖C‖!. That is, one would obtain a family
of P-time algorithms, but one would not have an FPT algorithm.
To overcome this obstacle, we will employ Lenstra’s [Len83] algorithm for bounded-variable-cardinality
integer programming. Although Lenstra’s algorithm is truly amazing in its power, even it will not be enough
to accomplish our goal. Rather, we will use a scheme that involves a fixed (though very large) number of
Lenstra-type programs each being focused on a different resolution path regarding the given problem.
What we need to prove, to complete the proof of Theorem 4.34, is the following lemma.
Lemma 4.37 For each rational α , 0≤ α ≤ 1, and each choice from the independent choice brackets below,
the specified parameterized (as j varies over N) problem is in FPT:
[
succinct
/0
]
-
[
Copelandα
CopelandαIrrational
]
-
[
C
D
]
C


AV
DV
PV-TE
PV-TP

 -BC j.
Let us start by recalling that, regarding the first choice bracket, the “succinct” case implies the “ /0” case,
so we need only address the succinct case. Recall also that, regarding the second choice bracket, for each
rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the “CopelandαIrrational” case implies the “Copelandα” case, so we need only address
the CopelandαIrrational case.
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So all that remains is to handle each pair of choices from the third and forth choice brackets. To prove
every case would be very repetitive. So we will simply prove in detail a difficult, relatively representative
case, and then will for the other cases either mention the type of adjustment needed to obtain their proofs, or
will simply leave it as a simple but tedious exercise that will be clear, as to how to do, to anyone who reads
this section.
So, in particular, let us prove the following result.
Lemma 4.38 For each rational α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the following parameterized (as j varies over N) problem is
in FPT: succinct-CopelandαIrrational-CCPV-TP-BC j .
Proof. Let α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, be some arbitrary, fixed rational number. In particular, suppose that α can be
expressed as b/d, where b∈N, d ∈N+, b and d share no common integer divisor greater than 1, and if b = 0
then d = 1. We won’t explicitly invoke b and d in our algorithm, but each time we speak of evaluating a
certain set of pairwise outcomes “with respect to α ,” one can think of it as evaluating that with respect to a
strict pairwise win giving d points, a pairwise tie giving b points, and a strict pairwise loss giving 0 points.
We need a method of specifying the pairwise outcomes among a set of candidates. To do this, we will
use the notion of a Copeland outcome table over a set of candidates. This will not actually be a table, but
rather will be a function (a symmetric one—it will not be affected by the order of its two arguments) that,
when given a pair of distinct candidates as inputs, will say which of the three possible outcomes allegedly
happened: Either there is a tie, or one candidate won, or the other candidate won. Note that a COT is simply
a representation of an election graph (see Section 4.1.2). So, in a j-candidate election, there are exactly 3( j2)
such functions. (We will not care about the names of the candidates, and so will assume that the tables simply
use the names 1 through j, and that we match the names of the actual candidates with those integers by
linking them lexicographically, i.e., the lexicographically first candidate will be associated with the integer 1
and so on.) Let us call a j-candidates Copeland outcome table a j-COT.
We need to build our algorithm that shows that the problem succinct-CopelandαIrrational-CCPV-TP-BC j,
j ∈ N, is in FPT. So, let j be some fixed integer bound on the number of candidates.14
Let us suppose we are given an input instance. Let j′ ≤ j be the number of candidates in this instance
(recall that j is not the number of candidates, but rather is an upper bound on the number of candidates).
The top level of our algorithm is specified by the pseudocode in Figure 10. (Although this algorithm
seemingly is just trying to tell whether the given control is possible for the given case, rather than telling how
to partition to achieve that control, note that which iteration through the double loop accepts and the precise
values of the variables inside the integer linear program constraint feasibility problem that made that iteration
be satisfied will in fact tell us precisely what the partition is that makes the preferred candidate win.)
14We will now seem to specify the algorithm merely for this bound. However, it is important to note that we do enough to establish
that there exists a single algorithm that fulfills the requirements of the definition of FPT. In particular, the specification we are about to
give is sufficiently uniform that one can simply consider a single algorithm that, on a given input, notes the value of j, the number of
candidates, and then does what the “ j” algorithm we are about to specify does.
We take this moment to mention in passing that our earlier work, [FHH06a] and (this is an expanded, full version of that) [FHH06b],
that gives P-time algorithms for the fixed parameter (fixed candidate and fixed voters) cases in fact, in all such claims we have in that
work, implicitly is giving FPT algorithms, even though those papers don’t explicitly note that. The reason is generally the same as why
that is true in this paper—namely, the Lenstra technique is not just powerful but is also ideally suited for FPT algorithms and for being
used inside algorithms that are FPT algorithms. Most interestingly, the Lenstra approach tends to work even on succinct inputs, and so
the FPT comment we made applies even to those results in our abovementioned earlier papers that are about the succinct-inputs case of
fixed-number-of-candidates and fixed-number-of-voters claims. (The fixed-number-of-candidates and fixed-number-of-voters Dodgson
winner/score work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b] is known to be about FPT algorithms (see [BGN08]). Although the paper
of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b] doesn’t address the succinct input model, [FHH06a] notes that their approach works fine even
in the succinct cases of the winner problem. That is true not just for the P-ness of their algorithms even in the succinct case, but also for
the FPT-ness of their algorithms even in the succinct case.)
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For each j′-COT, T1,
For each j′-COT, T2,
Do
If
when we have a CopelandαIrrational election (involving all the input voters), with respect to α ,
between all the candidates who win under T1 with respect to α , and all the candidates who win
under T2 with respect to α , the preferred candidate of the input problem is a winner,
then
create and run the integer linear program constraint feasibility problem that checks whether
there exists a partition of the voters such that the first subelection has j′-COT T1 and the second
subelection has j′-COT T2, and if so, then accept.
Figure 10: The top-level code for the case succinct-CopelandαIrrational-CCPV-TP-BC j .
Now, note that the total number of j′-COTs that exist (we do not need to care whether all can be realized
via actual votes) is 3( j
′
2)
. So the code inside the two loops executes at most 9(
j′
2) times, which is constant-
bounded since j′ ≤ j, and we have fixed j.
So all that remains is to give the integer linear program constraint feasibility problem mentioned inside
the inner loop. The setting here can sometimes be confusing, e.g., when we speak of constants that can
grow without limit. It is important to keep in mind that in this integer linear program constraint feasibility
problem, the number of variables and constraints is constant (over all inputs), and the integer linear program
constraint feasibility problem’s “constants” are the only things that change with respect to the input. This is
the framework that allows us to invoke Lenstra’s powerful algorithm.
We first specify the set of constants of the integer linear program constraint feasibility problem. In partic-
ular, for each i, 1≤ i≤ 2(
j′
2), we will have a constant, ni, that is the number of input voters whose vote is of the
ith type (among the 2( j
′
2) possible vote possibilities; keep in mind that voters are allowed to be irrational, thus
the value 2(
j′
2) is correct). Note that the number of these constants that we have is itself constant-bounded (for
fixed j), though of course the values that these constants (of the integer linear program constraint feasibility
problem) take on can grow without limit.
In addition, let us define some constants that will not vary with the input but rather are simply a notational
shorthand that we will use to describe how the integer linear program constraint feasibility problem is defined
(what constraints occur in it). In particular, for each i and ℓ such that 1≤ i≤ j′, 1≤ ℓ≤ j′, and i 6= ℓ, let val1i,ℓ
be 1 if T1 asserts that (in their head-to-head contest) i ties or defeats ℓ, and let it be 0 if T1 asserts that (in their
head-to-head contest) i loses to ℓ. Let val2i,ℓ be identically defined, except with respect to T2. Informally
put, these values will be used to let our integer linear program constraint feasibility problem seek to enforce
such a win/loss/tie pattern with respect to the given input vote numbers and the given type of allowed control
action.
The integer linear program constraint feasibility problem’s variables, which of course are all integer
variables, are the following 2(
j′
2) variables. For each i, 1≤ i≤ 2(
j′
2), we will have a variable, mi, that represents
how many of the ni voters having the ith among the 2(
j′
2) possible vote types go into the first subelection.
Finally, we must specify the constraints of our integer linear program constraint feasibility problem. We
will have three groups of constraints.
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The first constraint group is enforcing that plausible numbers are put in the first partition. In particular,
for each i, 1≤ i≤ 2(
j′
2), we have the constraints 0≤ mi and mi ≤ ni.
The second constraint group is enforcing that after the partitioning we really do have in the first subelec-
tion a situation in which all the pairwise contests come out exactly as specified by T1. In particular, for each
i and ℓ such that 1≤ i≤ j′, 1≤ ℓ≤ j′, and i 6= ℓ, we do the following. Consider the equation
(4.a) ( ∑
{a | 1 ≤ a ≤ 2(
j′
2) and in votes of type a it
holds that i is preferred to ℓ}
ma) OP ( ∑
{a | 1 ≤ a ≤ 2(
j′
2 ) and in votes of type a it
holds that ℓ is preferred to i}
ma),
where a in each sum varies over the 2(
j′
2) possible preferences. If val1(i, ℓ) = 1 we will have a constraint of
the above form with OP set to “≥”. If val1(ℓ, i) = 1 we will have a constraint of the above form with OP set
to “≤”. Note that this means that if val1(i, ℓ) = val1(ℓ, i) = 1, i.e., those two voters are purported to tie, we
will add two constraints.
The third constraint group has the same function as the second constraint group, except it regards the
second subelection rather than the first subelection. In particular, for each i and ℓ such that 1 ≤ i ≤ j′,
1≤ ℓ≤ j′, and i 6= ℓ, we do the following. Consider again equation (4.a) from above, except with each of the
two occurrences of ma replaced by na−ma. If val2(i, ℓ) = 1 we will have a constraint of that form with OP
set to “≥”. If val2(ℓ, i) = 1 we will have a constraint of that form with OP set to “≤”. As above, this means
that if val2(i, ℓ) = val2(ℓ, i) = 1, we will add two constraints.
This completes the specification of the integer linear programming constraint feasibility problem.
Note that our top-level code, from Figure 10, clearly runs within polynomial time relative to even the
succinct-case input to the original CCPV-TP problem, and that that polynomial’s degree is bounded above
independently of j. Note in particular that our algorithm constructs at most a large constant (for j fixed)
number of integer linear programming constraint feasibility problems, and each of those is itself polynomial-
sized relative to even the succinct-case input to the original CCPV-TP problem, and that polynomial size’s
degree is bounded above independently of j. Further, note that the integer linear programming constraint
feasibility problems clearly do test what they are supposed to test—most importantly, they test that the sub-
elections match the pairwise outcomes specified by j′-COTs T1 and T2. Finally and crucially, by Lenstra’s
algorithm ([Len83], see also [Dow03,Nie02] which are very clear regarding the “linear”s later in this sen-
tence), since this integer linear programming constraint feasibility problem has a fixed number of constraints
(and in our case in fact also has a fixed number of variables), it can be solved—relative to its size (which
includes the filled-in constants, such as our ni for example, which are in effect inputs to the integer program’s
specification)—via a linear number of arithmetic operations on linear-sized integers. So, overall, we are in
polynomial time even relative to succinctly specified input, and the polynomial’s degree is bounded above
independently of j. Thus we have established membership in the class FPT. ❑
We now describe very briefly how the above proof of Lemma 4.38 can be adjusted to handle all the
partition cases from Lemma 4.37, namely, the cases
[
succinct
/0
]
-
[
Copelandα
CopelandαIrrational
]
-
[
C
D
]
C
[
PV-TE
PV-TP
]
-BC j.
As noted before, the first two brackets can be ignored, as we have chosen the more demanding choice for
each. Let us discuss the other variations. Regarding changing from constructive to destructive, in Figure 10
change “is a winner” to “is not a winner.” Regarding changing from PV-TP to PV-TE, in the “if” block in
Figure 10 change each “all the candidates who win” to “the candidate who wins (if there is a unique candidate
who wins).”
The only remaining cases are the cases
[
succinct
/0
]
-
[
Copelandα
CopelandαIrrational
]
-
[
C
D
]
C
[
AV
DV
]
-BC j. However,
these cases are even more straightforward than the partition cases we just covered, so for space reasons we
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will not write them out, but rather will briefly comment on these cases. Basically, one’s top-level code for
these cases loops over all j′-COTs, and for each (there are 3( j
′
2)) checks whether the right outcome happens
under that j′-COT (i.e., the distinguished candidate either is (constructive case) or is not (destructive case) a
winner), and if so, it runs Lenstra’s algorithm on an integer linear programming constraint feasibility problem
to see whether we can by the allowed action (adding/deleting) get to a state where that particular j′-COT
matches our (after addition or deletion of voters) election. In the integer program, the variables will be the
obvious ones, namely, for each i, 1≤ i≤ 2(
j′
2), we will have a variable, mi, that describes how many voters of
type i to add/delete. As our key constants (of the integer linear program constraint feasibility problem), we
will have, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2(
j′
2), a value, ni, for the number of type i voters in the input. Also, if this is a
problem about addition of voters, we will have additional constants, n̂i, 1≤ i≤ 2(
j′
2), representing the number
of type i voters among the pool, W , of voters available for addition. And if our problem has an internal “k” (a
limit on the number of additions or deletions), we enforce that with the natural constraints, as do we also with
the natural constraints enforce the obvious relationships between the mi, ni, n̂i, and so on. Most critically,
we have constraints ensuring that after the additions/deletions specified by the mi, each pairwise outcome
specified by the j′-COT is realized.
Finally, although everything in Section 4.3 (both the part so far and the part to come) is written for
the case of the nonunique-winner model, all the results hold analogously in the unique-winner model, with
the natural, minor proof modifications. (Also, we mention in passing that due to the connection, found
in Footnote 5 of [HHR07a], between unique-winner destructive control and nonunique-winner constructive
control, one could use some of our nonunique-winner constructive-case results to indirectly prove some of
the unique-winner destructive-case results.)
FPT and Extended Control
In this section, we look at extended control. By that we do not mean changing the ten standard control
notions of adding/deleting/partitioning candidates/voters. Rather, we mean generalizing past merely looking
at the constructive (make a distinguished candidate a winner) and the destructive (prevent a distinguished
candidate from being a winner) cases. In particular, we are interested in control where the goal can be far
more flexibly specified, for example (though in the partition cases we will be even more flexible than this),
we will allow as our goal region any (reasonable—there are some time-related conditions) subcollection of
“Copeland outcome tables” (specifications of who won/lost/tied each head-to-head contest). Since from a
Copeland outcome table, in concert with the current α , one can read off the CopelandαIrrational scores of the
candidates, this allows us a tremendous range of descriptive flexibility in specifying our control goals, e.g.,
we can specify a linear order desired for the candidates with respect to their CopelandαIrrational scores, we can
specify a linear-order-with-ties desired for the candidates with respect to their CopelandαIrrational scores, we
can specify the exact desired CopelandαIrrational scores for one or more candidates, we can specify that we
want to ensure that no candidate from a certain subgroup has a CopelandαIrrational score that ties or defeats the
CopelandαIrrational score of any candidate from a certain other subgroup, etc.15 Later in this section we will
give a list repeating some of these examples and adding some new examples.
15We mention up front that that initial example list applies with some additional minor technical caveats. Those examples were
speaking as if in the final election we have all the candidates receiving CopelandαIrrational scores in the final election. But in fact in the
partition cases this is not (necessarily) so, and so in those cases we will focus on the Copeland outcome tables most natural to the given
case. For example, in control by partition of voters, we will focus on subcollections of pairs of Copeland outcome tables for the two
subelections. Also, though our Copeland outcome tables as defined below are not explicitly labeled with candidate names, but rather use
a lexicographical correspondence with the involved candidates, in some cases we would—though we don’t repeat this in the discussion
below—need to allow the inclusion in the goal specification of the names of the candidates who are in play in a given table or tables,
most particularly, in the cases of addition and deletion of candidates, and in some partition cases.
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All the FPT algorithms given in the previous section regard, on their surface, the standard control problem,
which tests whether a given candidate can be made a winner (constructive case) or can be precluded from
being a winner (destructive case). We now note that the general approaches used in that section in fact yield
FPT schemes even for the far more flexible notions of control mentioned above. In fact, one gets, for all
the FPT cases covered in the previous section, FPT algorithms for the extended-control problem for those
cases—very loosely put, FPT algorithms that test, for virtually any natural collection of outcome tables (as
long as that collection itself can be recognized in a way that doesn’t take too much running time, i.e., the
checking time is polynomial and of a degree that is bounded independently of j), whether by the given type
of control one can reach one of those outcome tables.
Let us discuss this in a bit more detail. A key concept used inside the proof of Lemma 4.38 was that of a
Copeland outcome table—a function that for each distinct pair of candidates specifies either a tie or specifies
who is the (not tied) winner in their pairwise contest. Let us consider the control algorithm given in the proof
of that lemma, and in particular let us consider the top-level code specified in Figure 10. That code double-
loops over size j′ Copeland outcome tables (a.k.a. j′-COTs), regarding the subpartitions, and for each case
when the outcome tables’ subelection cases, followed by the final election that they imply, correspond to the
desired type of constructive (the distinguished person wins) or destructive (the distinguished person does not
win) outcome, we check whether those two j′-COTs can be made to hold via the current type of control (for
the case being discussed, PV-TP).
However, note that simply by easily varying that top-level code we can obtain a natural FPT algorithm
(a single algorithm, see Footnote 14 the analogue of which applies here) for any question of whether via the
allowed type of control one can reach any run-time-quick-to-recognize collection of pairs of j′-COTs (in the
subelection), or even whether a given candidate collection and one of a given (run-time-quick-to-recognize)
j′′-COT collection over that candidate collection ( j′′ being the size of that final-round candidate collection)
can be reached in the final election. This is true not just for the partition cases (where, informally put,
we would do this by, in Figure 10, changing the condition inside the “if” to instead look for membership
in that collection of j′-COTs16) but also for all the cases we attacked via Lenstra’s method (though for the
nonpartition cases we will typically single-loop over Copeland outcome tables that may represent the outcome
after control is exerted; also, for some of these cases, the caveat at the end of Footnote 15 will apply). And it
is even easier to notice that for those cases we attacked by direct brute force this also holds.
So, as just a few examples (some echoing the start of this section, and some new), all the following
have (with the caveats mentioned above about needed names attached, e.g., in cases of candidate addi-
tion/deletion/partition, and regarding the partition cases focusing not necessarily directly on the final table)
FPT extended control algorithms for all the types of control and boundedness cases for which the FPT results
of the previous section are stated.
1. Asking whether under the stated action one can obtain in the final election (simply in the election in
the case when there is no partitioning) the outcome that all the CopelandαIrrational-system scores of the
16Let us discuss this a bit more formally, again using PV-TP as an example. Consider any family of boolean functions Fj , j ∈ N, such
that each Fj is computable, even when its first argument is succinctly specified, in polynomial time with the polynomial degree bounded
independently of j. Now, consider changing Figure 10’s code to:
For each j′-COT, T1,
For each j′-COT, T2,
If (Fj′ (input,T1 ,T2))
then · · · .
Note that this change gives an FPT control scheme for a certain extended control problem. In particular, it does so for the extended
control problem whose goal is to ensure that we can realize at least one of the set of (T1,T2) such that Fj′ ( j′ being the number of
candidates in the particular input), given as its inputs the problem’s input, T1, and T2 evaluates to true. That is, the Fj functions are
recognizing (viewed a bit differently, are defining) the goal set of the extended control problem.
From the input, T1, and T2 we can easily tell the scores in the final election. So this approach can be used to choose as our extended-
control goals natural features of the final election.
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candidates precisely match the relations of the lexicographic names of the candidates.
2. More generally than that, asking whether under the stated action one can obtain in the final election
(simply in the election in the case when there is no partitioning) a certain linear-order-without-ties
regarding the CopelandαIrrational-system scores of the candidates.
3. More generally still, asking whether under the stated action one can obtain in the final election (simply
in the election in the case when there is no partitioning) a certain linear-order-with-ties regarding the
CopelandαIrrational-system scores of the candidates.
4. Asking whether under the stated action one can obtain in the final election (simply in the election in the
case when there is no partitioning) the situation that exactly 1492 candidates tie as winner regarding
their CopelandαIrrational-system scores.
5. Asking whether under the stated action one can obtain in the final election (simply in the election in the
case when there is no partitioning) the situation that no two candidates have the same CopelandαIrrational-
system scores as each other.
Again, these are just a very few examples. Our point is that the previous section is flexible enough to address
not just constructive/destructive control, but also to address far more general control issues.
Resistance Results
Theorems 4.34 and 4.35 give FPT schemes for all voter-control cases with bounded voters, for all voter-
control cases with bounded candidates, and for all candidate-control cases with bounded candidates. This
might lead one to hope that all the cases admit FPT schemes. However, the remaining type of case,
the candidate-control cases with bounded voters, does not follow this pattern. In fact, we note that for
CopelandαIrrational all the candidate-control cases that we showed earlier in this paper (i.e., without bounds
on the number of voters) to be resistant remain resistant even for the case of bounded voters. This resistance
holds even when the input is not in succinct format, and so it certainly also holds when the input is in succinct
format.
The reason for this is that, for the case of irrational voters, with just two voters (with preferences over j
candidates) any given j-COT can be achieved. To do this, for each distinct pair of candidates i and ℓ, to have
i preferred in their pairwise contest have both voters prefer i to ℓ, to have ℓ preferred in their pairwise contest
have both voters prefer ℓ to i, and to have a tie in the pairwise contest have one voter prefer ℓ to i and one
voter prefer i to ℓ. Since in the proofs of resistance for candidate control, we identified elections with their
election graphs, i.e., with their COTs, it is not hard to see that all these resistance proofs carry over even to
the case of two irrational voters.
The only open cases remaining regard the rational-voter, candidate-control, bounded-voter cases. We note
that Betzler and Uhlmann [BU08] have recently resolved some of these open issues.
5 Control in Condorcet Elections
In this section we show that Condorcet elections are resistant to constructive control via deleting voters
(CCDV) and via partition of voters (CCPV). These results were originally claimed in the seminal paper of
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], but the proofs there were based on the assumption that a voter can
be indifferent between several candidates. Their model of elections did not allow that (and neither does
ours). Here we show how one can obtain these results in the case when the voters’ preference lists are linear
orders—which is both their model and ours.
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Recall that a candidate c of election E = (C,V ) is a Condorcet winner of E if he or she defeats all other
candidates in their head-to-head contests. Alternatively, one could say that a candidate c is a Condorcet
winner of election E if and only if he or she has Copeland0 score of ‖C‖− 1. Since each election can have
at most one Condorcet winner, it doesn’t make sense here to differentiate between the unique-winner and the
nonunique-winner models.
Theorem 5.1 Condorcet elections are resistant to constructive control via deleting voters.
Proof. This follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 4.24. Note that a Condorcet winner is always
a unique Copelandα winner, for each rational α with 0≤ α ≤ 1, and note that in the proof of Theorem 4.24,
if S contains a k-element cover of B, then we can delete k voters such that in the resulting election p
defeats every other candidate in their head-to-head, contest, i.e., p is a Condorcet winner in the resulting
election. ❑
Before we proceed with our proof of resistance for the case of constructive control via partition of voters
(CCPV), we have to mention a slight quirk of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s model of voter partition. If
one reads their paper carefully, it becomes apparent that they have a quiet assumption that each given set of
voters can only be partitioned into subelections that each elect exactly one winner, thus severely restricting
the chair’s partitioning possibilities. That was why Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07a]
replaced Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s convention with the more natural ties-promote and ties-eliminate rules
(see the discussion in [HHR07a]), but for this current section of our paper we go back to Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick’s model, since our goal here is to reprove their results without breaking their model.
Theorem 5.2 Condorcet elections are resistant to constructive control via partitioning voters (CCPV) in
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s model (see the paragraph above).
Proof. The proof follows via a reduction from the X3C problem. In fact, we use exactly the construction
from the proof of Theorem 4.26. Let E = (C,V ) be the election constructed in that proof.
Since s is the only candidate that p defeats in a head-to-head contest, the only way for p to become a
winner via partitioning voters is to guarantee that p wins within his or her subelection and that s wins within
the other one. (Note that since p is not a Condorcet winner, p cannot win in both subelections.)
If S contains a k-element cover, say, {Sa1 , . . . ,Sak}, then letting Vp = V̂ −{va1 , . . . ,vak} and Vs =V −Vp
will make p the Condorcet winner in this CCPV scenario.
For the converse, let (Vp,Vs) be a partition of the collection of voters such that p is the global Condorcet
winner in the CCPV scenario where we use two subelections, one with voters Vp and one with voters Vs.
Via the above paragraph we can assume, without loss of generality, that p is the Condorcet winner in (C,Vp)
and that s is the Condorcet winner in (C,Vs). We can assume that Vs contains the k+ 1 voters in V − V̂ (i.e.,
the voters with preference s > r > B > p). Also, Vs contains at most k voters from V̂ , as otherwise s would
certainly not be a Condorcet winner in (C,Vs).
As a result, p can be made the Condorcet winner of (C,V̂ ) by deleting at most k voters. It follows from
Claim 4.27 that S contains a k-element cover of B. ❑
6 Conclusions
We have shown that from the computational point of view the election systems of Llull and Copeland (i.e.,
Copeland0.5) are broadly resistant to bribery and procedural control, regardless of whether the voters are
required to have rational preferences. It is rather charming that Llull’s 700-year-old system shows perfect
72
resistance to bribery and more resistances to (constructive) control than any other natural system (even far
more modern ones) with an easy winner-determination procedure—other than Copelandα , 0 < α < 1—is
known to possess, and this is even more remarkable when one considers that Llull’s system was defined long
before control of elections was even explicitly studied. Copeland0.5 voting matches Llull’s perfect resistance
to bribery and in addition has perfect resistance to (constructive) control.
A natural open direction would be to study the complexity of control for additional election systems.
Particularly interesting would be to find existing, natural voting systems that have polynomial-time winner
determination procedures but that are resistant to all standard types of both constructive and destructive con-
trol. Also extremely interesting would be to find single results that classify, for broad families of election
systems, precisely what it is that makes control easy or hard, i.e., to obtain dichotomy meta-results for con-
trol (see Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [HH07] for some discussion regarding work of that flavor for
manipulation).
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